Respondent operated a facility (the “Facility”) that utilizes anhydrous ammonia to provide cooling capabilities to package, refrigerate, store, and ship cherries and grapes. On September 16, 2021, EPA performed and inspection of the Facility to evaluate compliance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act Section 103, EPCRA Sections 304-312, and CAA Section 112(r) (the “Inspection”). Based upon the information gathered during the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent violated certain provisions EPCRA and the CAA.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
COUNT I – Failure to Comply with Tier II Inventory Reporting Requirements
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to submit its Tier II annual hazardous materials inventory forms for all three of its refrigeration systems in 2018 and 2019.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to submit Tier II annual hazardous materials inventory forms, Respondent violated EPCRA § 312, Tier II Inventory, 40 C.F.R. § 370.40.
COUNT II – Failure to Comply with RMP Applicability. Submission and Updates Requirements
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that the North Refrigeration System contained more than 10,000 pounds of ammonia since at least 2013, but Respondent failed to submit an RMP to EPA prior to August 20, 2018.
Under 40 C.F.R. § 68.190(b)(4), the owner or operator of a stationary source is required to revise and update the RMP submitted under§ 68.150 no later than the date which a regulated substance is first present above a TQ in a new process.
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to update its RMP to include the Southwest Refrigeration System RMPcovered process, despite having calculations indicating that its Southwest Refrigeration System contained more than the TQ of 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to submit an RMP to EPA on the date which a regulated substance was first present above a threshold quantity in its North Refrigeration System and its Southwest Refrigeration System, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7), 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.10(a)(3), 68.150(b)(3), and 68.190(b)(4).
COUNT III – Failure to Comply with Documentation Requirements
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to document the rationale for its selection of the specified alternative release scenarios.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to properly maintain records documenting its selection of the specified alternative release scenarios, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7), 40 C.F.R. § 68.39(b).
COUNT IV – Failure to Comply with Process Safety Information Requirements
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to compile PSI for ammonia refrigeration piping installed before April 13, 2021, relief valve discharge piping, and ventilation system in its ammonia machinery rooms (“AMR”).
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that the Respondent failed to document that its equipment associated with the covered process complies with RAGAGEP.
For existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use, under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(3), the owner or operator must determine and document that the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner.
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that the Respondent did not document that the deviations from RAGAGEPw ere designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to include accurate information concerning the equipment of a process, and by failing to comply with RAGAGEPo r document that its existing equipment was safe, Respondent violated the process safety information requirements set forth at CAA Section 112(r)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7), and 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65(c)(l), 68.65(d)(2) and 68.65(d)(3).
COUNT V – Failure to Comply with Process Hazard Analysis Requirements
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that the Respondent relied on invalid engineering and administrative controls (i.e., safeguards) for its 2018 PHA, including describing controls that were not accurate to the covered process.
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s PHA was insufficient as follows:
a. Respondent failed to assign timely deadlines to recommendations in its first PHA, which were undated.
b. The Respondent failed to track the recommendation to completion.
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to retain the PHA for its Southwest Refrigeration System for the life of the process.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to: timely perform its initial PHA for the North Refrigeration System, rely on valid engineering and administrative controls, have sufficient documentation for its PHA, and retain the PHA for its Southwest Refrigeration System, Respondent violated the process hazard analysis requirements set forth at CAA Section 112(r)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7), and 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.67(a), (c), (e), and (f).
COUNT VI – Failure to Develop and Implement Adequate Operating Procedures
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to develop and implement adequate written operating procedures for the following:
a. The Respondent’s SOP did not provide clear instructions for safely conducting the following activities:
i. SOP 001 and SOP 008 did not provide clear instructions for normal shutdown of hose connections and for checking leaks before opening valves.
ii. SOP 001 did not provide clear instructions for valve positions.
b. The Respondent’s emergency shutdown procedures failed to include conditions where emergency shutdown is required and did not assign shutdown responsibility to qualified operators.
c. The Respondent’s SOP, including SOP 009, failed to identify operating limits determined to be safe for the process, consequences of deviating from those limits, or steps that employees are required to take if a deviation from those safe operating limits is observed.
d. The Respondent’s SOP for “Draining Oil Out of a Pressure Vessel Drop Leg,” failed to state which personal protective equipment (“PPE”} must be worn by employees executing a procedure and failed to describe the precautions necessary to prevent exposure.
e. The Respondent’s Line Break procedure had the following deficiencies:
i. References to the Line Break procedure in other SOPs was confusing because it stated multiple times that it “will be developed as a separate document,” which indicated that the procedure may not have been developed yet.
ii. The Line Break procedure failed to specify that PPE should be used in the event of a line break, which is often different than the PPE that should be used during normal operating conditions.
iii. The Line break procedure failed to document Safeguard #28 from the 2018 PHA, which stated, “XXXXXX refrigeration personnel are not allowed to engage in line-break activities.”
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to adequately develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process including steps for SOPs, emergency shutdown, operating limits, and safety and health considerations, Respondent violated the operating procedure requirements set forth at CAA Section 112(r)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7), and 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a).
Count VII – Failure to Ensure Mechanical Integrity
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to follow the mechanical integrity inspection and testing requirements for the following:
a. Manual override, testing to verify functionality, and loss of power of the emergency ventilation;
b. Power loss for ammonia detection and alarm systems;
c. Eyewash stations and safety showers;
d. The 2019 non-destructive evaluation ultrasonic thickness testing results did not include a calculation of the corrosion rate and the remaining life for each vessel, the next inspection interval, and the recommendations based on the completed evaluation; and
e. There was no documentation on whether the frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment were consistent with RAGAGEP.
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that there were mechanical integrity deficiencies outside acceptable limits for the following pieces of equipment:
a. Ten pressure vessels in operation lacked sufficient safety documentation, including material data sheets, Maximum Allowable Working Pressure, and legible nameplates with National Board Numbers;
b. Severe corrosion was not addressed in Suction Accumulator 1-1;
c. The emergency ventilation in the North Refrigeration System was not set to activate at an ammonia concentration of 25 ppm;
d. The pressure relief valve on a liquid transfer vessel was not timely replaced;
e. The concerns identified in the 5-year Mechanical Integrity Audit in 2018 were not timely addressed, including the undersized relief valve termination piping, a fan with unknown ventilation design, and a non-functioning ventilation system in the North AMR;
f. The pressure relief valve for North Room 3 Accumulator was not replaced within five years; and
g. Compressor 3 in the Southwest System had an illegible nameplate.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to establish and implement written procedures to maintain on-going integrity of process equipment, to ensure that inspection and testing procedures follow RAGAGEPa, nd to correct deficient equipment that are outside acceptable limits before further use, or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation, Respondent violated the mechanical integrity requirements set forth at CAA Section 112(r)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7), and 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.73(b), (d), and (e).
Count VIII – Failure to Coordinate with Local Authorities for Emergency Response
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to coordinate its emergency action plan with the local fire department in 2019 and failed to submit its emergency procedures to the CERSto coordinate with the LEPCi n 2018 and 2019.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to coordinate with local emergency planning and response organizations and document any coordination with such organizations, and by failing to have the information available for local emergency planning and response organizations, Respondent violated the emergency response plan requirements set forth at CAA Section 112(r)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7), 40 C.F.R. § 68.93.
Count IX – Failure to Identify Hazards Under the General Duty Clause
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s Hazard Assessment for methyl bromide was inadequate because the recommendations for the scenarios not specific to the scenarios and did not include any engineering controls or safeguards.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to comply with the general duty clause for identifying and addressing hazards which may result in a release for methyl bromide, Respondent violated 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(l).
CIVIL ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY
Respondent agrees to pay a civil penalty in the amount of TWO-HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND, NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE DOLLARS ($262,971) (“Assessed Penalty”).
a. The EPCRA portion of the penalty totals THREE THOUSAND, TWO-HUNDRED NINETY-THREE DOLLARS ($3,293).
b. The CAA portion of the penalty totals TWO-HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT DOLLARS ($259,678).
CLICK HERE for the CAFO