The Company owns and operates a fruit processing plant and controlled temperature storage warehouse, near a mixed business-residential area approximately one half mile northeast of a college campus and approximately one-half mile east of a downtown area. The facility uses anhydrous ammonia in a “closed-loop” refrigeration system. According to the Respondent, as of February 2, 2016, the refrigeration system was expanded and contains up to 21,610 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. Before the 2016 modification, the system had contained up to 16,500 pounds of anhydrous ammonia, distributed through interconnected refrigeration vessels, piping, and other components.
On September 7, 1999, Respondent submitted an initial Program 3 RMP for its use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia at the Facility (the” 1999 RMP”) and reported that it utilized 18,088 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. In a letter to EPA postmarked December 5, 2006, Respondent declared that the actual total system inventory of anhydrous ammonia in the process was less than 8,000 pounds, i.e., less than the threshold quantity (10,000 lbs.) for anhydrous ammonia, and requested that the ammonia refrigeration process be de-registered from the Risk Management Program. EPA allowed the de-registration, with an effective date of December 5, 2006.
On March 4, 2011, Respondent re-registered the ammonia refrigeration process, listing the total system inventory of anhydrous ammonia as 16,500 pounds. Accordingly, the anhydrous ammonia Process at the Facility is a “covered process” subject to the RMP provisions of Part 68 because Respondent “uses,” “stores,”‘ and “handles” the RMP chemical anhydrous ammonia in the Process in an amount greater than 10,000 pounds.
According to the RMP, the endpoint for a worst-case release of the amount of anhydrous ammonia used in the process is greater than the distance to a public receptor. Additionally, the Process is subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 because it uses anhydrous ammonia in an amount over the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds. Therefore, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.1 0(a)-(d), Respondent’s use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia in the Process is subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3.
In light of the potential hazards posed by the mishandling of anhydrous ammonia, industry trade associations have issued standards outlining the recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) in the ammonia refrigeration industry. In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“HAR “) has issued (and updates) “Standard 2: Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems, along with other applicable standards and guidance. Also in collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 15: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems.” These standards are consistently relied upon by refrigeration experts and are often incorporated into state building and mechanical codes. IIAR also issues bulletins and guidance for the ammonia refrigeration industry, including IIAR Bulletin No. 109: Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System (1997) (hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 109”); IIAR Bulletin No. 110: Start-Up, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (rev. 2007) (hereinafter, “IIAR Bull. 110”); and IIAR Bulletin 114: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components (2014) (hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 114″), among others. For example, the Maine State Building Code references the 2009 International Building Code (IBC”). In turn, the IBC states, “Refrigeration systems shall comply with the requirements of this code and, except as modified by this code. ASH RAE 15. Ammonia-refrigerating systems shall comply with this code and, except as modified by this code. ASHRAE 15 and IIAR 2.
On October 30, 2012, EPA inspectors visited the Facility following a prior notification by letter dated October 11, 2012, to inspect and assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA and with Sections 302-312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (the “Inspection”).
The “closed-loop” refrigeration system at the facility includes a number of compressors together with associated refrigeration equipment. Four condensers are located exterior to the buildings on elevated support structures. A single high-pressure receiver, located in an exterior ground level enclosed shed attached to the building, serves the entire interconnected process.
During and after the Inspection of the Facility, EPA requested and received specific documentation pertaining to the process. On September 29, 2017, EPA and Respondent entered into a Notice of Violation and Administrative Order on Consent (“NOV/AOC’) pursuant to CAA Sections 113, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, which became effective on October 2, 2017. The NOV/AOC summarized conditions and alleged RMP deficiencies and observed by EPA inspectors; ordered Respondent to comply with RMP requirements at the Facility; and ordered Respondent to certify and document its compliance with applicable RMP requirements. Immediately after the Inspection, Respondent started to address the compliance deficiencies EPA alleged.
EPA found that the Inspection and EPA’s review of submitted information revealed specific violations of 40 CFR Part 68. EPA has not visited the Facility since Respondent submitted a modification to its RMP on February 2, 2016, so the allegations herein relate to the pre-2016 conditions.
Complainant alleges the following violations of 40 C.F.R. Part 68:
Count 1: Failure to Comply with Safety Information Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.65, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to compile written process safety information, including information pertaining to the technology of the process (40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(l)) and information related to the equipment in the process (40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)), before completing the process hazard analysis (“PHA”), in order to perform an adequate PHA and to enable proper maintenance of process equipment. The owner or operator must document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2)). Additionally, for existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use, the owner or operator must determine and document that the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner (40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(3)).
Respondent failed to document that the Process complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) and that equipment designed according to antiquated standards were designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner. For example:
- Respondent failed to have emergency stop and remote ventilation switches located outside the door to the ground-level, enclosed shed attached to the building exterior that houses the high-pressure receiver;
- there was insufficient or inadequate labeling of certain piping, valves and machinery room doors;
- there was no ammonia detector located in the enclosed shed, referenced above that houses the high-pressure receiver;
- the ammonia evacuation alarms present were not separate audio/visual (“A/V’) alarms to warn of an ammonia leak, and A/V alarms were not located at machinery room doors;
- Although Respondent had installed an electric solenoid valve to serve as the main isolation valve, and which was intended to be operated remotely, Respondent had not ensured accessibility of the main manual isolation valve (king valve), and had not prominently labeled this valve with a tag or sign that would be readily visible to emergency responders;
- there were insufficient eyewash/safety shower stations inside and outside of the machinery rooms;
- the air intake (for emergency ventilation) for one of the machinery rooms included windows that were not equipped with an automatic opening mechanism and were observed to be closed at the time of the Inspection;
- there was some combustible material stored in the machinery rooms;
- Respondent had not adequately sealed machinery room wall joints and around pipes penetrating through a machinery room wall; and
- there were machinery room doors that were not tight-fitting, and not all were self-closing and had panic-bar hardware installed.
Accordingly, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. §68.65.
Count 2: Failure to Comply with Process Hazard Analysis Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §68.67, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to perform an initial process hazard analysis (“PHA”) on each covered process. The PHA must identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process. The owner or operator must update the PHA every five years and when a significant change in the process occurs. Additionally, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e), the owner or operator must establish a system to promptly address the recommendations identified in the PHA, including by defining a schedule for completing the action items, taking the actions as soon as possible, and documenting the resolution of the recommendations.
Respondent conducted a process hazard analysis in 2011 following reregistration of its process. Respondent failed to document resolution of all recommendations in the 2011 process hazard analysis, as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(g). Accordingly, Respondent violated the PHA requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e) for the Process.
Count 3: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Operating Procedures Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide instructions or steps for safely conducting activities associated with the covered process. These operating procedures must address steps for each operating phase, operating limits, safety and health considerations, and safety systems.
The owner or operator must make these procedures available to employees involved in the process, keep them up-to-date with current practices, and certify annually that they are current. The owner or operator must also develop and implement safe work practices to control hazards during specific operations, including by developing a “lockout/tag out” program for handling equipment during maintenance or bringing equipment in or out of service.
Respondent failed to include all required specific minimum elements that must be included in the written operating procedures provided to EPA. By failing to comply with the operating procedures requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69 for the Process.
Count 4: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Mechanical Integrity Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68. 73, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of specific process equipment and train employees accordingly. The owner or operator must train each employee involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of process equipment in the procedures applicable to the employee’s job task. The owner or operator must inspect and test the equipment either in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, or more frequently if needed based on prior operating experience. The owner or operator must also document the inspections or tests on process equipment, correct deficiencies, assure that any new equipment is suitable for the process application, perform checks to ensure that equipment is installed properly, and confirm that maintenance materials and spare parts are ideal for the process application.
Respondent’s maintenance program had not sufficiently addressed outdoor piping and valves, some of which exhibited rust. Respondent had not properly maintained or documented the maintenance of the calibration of ammonia detectors at the Facility. By failing to comply with the Program 3 mechanical integrity requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73
EPA has determined that it is fair and proper to assess a civil penalty of $53,000 for the violations alleged in this matter.
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
Respondent certifies that it has corrected the violations alleged in this CAFO pursuant to the Administrative Order on Consent (“AOC”) that EPA and Respondent entered into on September 29, 201 7. Respondent further certifies that its compliance at the Facility includes all the safety measures listed in the “List of Key Safety Measures:· appended to this CAFO as Attachment A.
ATTACHMENT A – LIST OF KEY SAFETY MEASURES
Identifying Hazards
- Hazard Addressed: Releases or safety deficiencies that stem from a failure to identify hazards in design/operation of the system
- The facility has completed a process hazard analysis or review.
Operating Activities
- Hazard Addressed: High risk of release from operating or maintenance activity
- System has self-closing/quick closing valves on oil pots.
- Facility has written procedures for maintenance and operation activities.
- Only authorized persons have access to machinery room and the ability to alter safety settings on equipment.
Maintenance/Mechanical Integrity
- Hazard Addressed: Leaks/releases from maintenance neglect
- A preventative maintenance program is in place to, among other things, detect and control corrosion, deteriorated vapor barriers, ice buildup, and pipe hammering, and to inspect the integrity of equipment /pipe supports.
- All piping system openings except the relief header are plugged or capped, or valve is locked.
- Equipment, piping, and emergency shutdown valves are labeled for easy identification, and pressure vessels have legible, accessible nameplates.
- All atmospheric pressure relief valves have been replaced in the last five years with visible confirmation of accessible pressure relief valves [note – replacement every five years is the general rule, but there are two other options in IIAR Bulletin 110, 6.6.3].
Machinery Room and System Design
- Hazard Addressed: Inability to isolate and properly vent releases
- The System(s) has/have emergency shut-off and ventilation switches outside each machinery room.
- The machinery room(s) has/have functional, tested, ventilation. Air inlets are positioned to avoid recirculation of exhaust air and ensure sufficient inlet air to replace exhausted air.
- Documentation exists to show that pressure relief valves that have a common discharge header have adequately sized piping to prevent excessive back pressure on relief valves, or if built prior to 2000, have sufficient diameter based on the sum of the relief valve cross-sectional areas.
Emergency Actions
- Hazard Addressed: Inability to regain control and reduce release impact
- Critical shutoff valves are accessible, and a schematic is in place to show responders where to access them.
- EPCRA Tier II reporting is up to date.
Additional Compliance Items
Identifying Hazards
- For systems that employ hot gas defrost, the process hazard analysis/review includes an analysis of, and identifies, the engineering and administrative controls for the hazards associated with the potential of vapor propelled liquid slugs and condensation-induced hydraulic shock events.
Operating Activities and Maintenance/Mechanical Integrity
- Written procedures are in place for proper use and care of personal protective equipment.
- If respirators are used, facilities know the location of their respirators, and they are inspected and maintained per manufacturer or industry standards.
- All changes to automation systems (programmable logic controls and/or supervisory control and data acquisition systems) if present, are subject to the management of change procedures.
Machinery Room and System Design
- The facility has engineering controls in place to protect equipment and piping against overpressure due to hydrostatic expansion of trapped liquid refrigerant. Administrative controls are acceptable where hydrostatic overpressure can occur only during maintenance operations.
- Eyewash station(s) and safety shower(s) is/are present and functional.
Emergency Actions
- Emergency response communication has occurred or has been attempted with the Local Emergency Planning Committee and local responders.
- The facility has an emergency action plan pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1910.38(a) or an emergency response plan pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(q) and 40 C.F.R. 68.95.
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