Respondent owns and operates a global technology and specialty materials company operating in the production of vinyl acetate. Respondent operates the Facility in part to produce vinyl acetate in a reactor process. Vinyl acetate is identified at 40 C.F.R. Part 68.130 as a toxic regulated substance with a threshold quantity of 15,000 pounds. Respondent produces, stores, or handles vinyl acetate in an amount over the threshold quantity of 15,000 pounds in a process unit. The unit at Respondent’s facility is a covered process subject to RMP Program 3 requirements. Respondent’s covered process includes Azeotrope Distillation Column T-127, where crude vinyl acetate and water are separated from acetic acid and ethyl acetate. The crude vinyl acetate is separated from acetic acid through an evaporation and condensation process. As part of the distillation process the vinyl acetate vapor is transported by piping from the T-127 column through cooling water exchangers and then flows to a receiver vessel. The Facility employs a differential pressure transmitter located at the top of T-127 column and before the cooling water exchangers to monitor pressure across the column. The transmitter sends a reading to the unit’s control room. On October 1, 2015 Respondent reported a release of vinyl acetate from the covered process to the National Response Center. The report states that the release began on September27, 2015 but was not identified until October 1, 2015. During the four days the leak persisted, Respondent released 35,444 pounds of vinyl acetate.
Respondent discovered that the source of the release was broken tubing running from the differential pressure transmitter. Upon investigation Respondent discovered the cause of the release was a tubing rupture resulting from vibration fatigue at a compression fitting. Respondent conducted a thorough investigation into the release and issued an investigative report. The investigative report found that the tubing was not retightened to the manufacturer’s instructions, the tubing was not properly supported, and the tubing should have been made of thicker material.
The failure to properly install the tubing is a violation of 40 CFR § 68.56(a), by failing to implement procedures to maintain the ongoing mechanical integrity of the process equipment. Respondent reported that the leak persisted for four days at a rate of approximately 370 pounds per hour of process vapor and reported that the composition of the process vapor stream was approximately 92 percent vinyl acetate with the balance primarily water with trace quantities of ethylene and carbon dioxide. Respondent reported that when the leak occurred the differential pressure reading in the control room was lost, but the unit otherwise appeared to continue operating normally.
Despite losing the differential pressure reading in the control room, Respondent did not immediately investigate the unit. Respondent reported that the differential pressure transmitter is prone to plugging and so the operators logged the loss of the instrument reading and entered a low-priority work order on September 27, 2015.
On October 1, 2015 a technician responded to the work order for the differential pressure transmitter and observed the rupture. Given the placement of the tubing is
approximately 40 feet above grade and is not accessible by a fixed ladder or platform, Respondent obtained a crane and personnel basket to access the isolation valve. Once required safety precautions were in place, employees with adequate personnel protective equipment were elevated using the crane and personnel basket to stop the release by closing the isolation valve. It took approximately two hours to stop the release from the time of its discovery.
The failure to investigate the pressure drop from the differential pressure reading for four days was a violation of 40 CFR § 68.69(d) for failing to develop and implement safe work practices.
CIVIL PENALTY
Pursuant to the authority granted in sections 113(a)(3) and 113(d)(1)(B) of the CAA, and taking into consideration the size of the Respondent’s business, the economic impact of the penalty on the Respondent’s business, the Respondent’s full compliance history and good faith efforts to comply, the duration of the violation, payment by Respondent of penalties previously assessed for the same violation (if any), agreement to perform a Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP), the economic benefit of noncompliance, and the seriousness of the violation, as well as other factors which justice may require, EPA and Respondent agree that an appropriate penalty to settle this matter is $18,750.
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
Description of SEP
a. Respondent shall perform a SEP consisting of providing the Bay City Fire Department with nine (9) Scott self-contained breathing apparatus units including face piece and amplifier, one (1) Eclipse LDX thermal imager including accessories needed for use, and one (1) foam jet nozzle, which the parties agree is intended to implement or improve emergency planning and preparedness for the City of Bay City, Texas.
b. Not more than thirty (30) days from the effective date of this CAFO, Respondent will begin the procurement process to order the equipment for the Bay City Volunteer Fire Department as described in the attached SEP Proposal (Attachment I), attached and incorporated herein by reference.
c. Respondent shall perform the SEP activities in accordance with the terms and schedule of the SEP Proposal (Attachment I).
Cost of the SEP
Respondent must expend at least $70,312.50 for the implementation of this SEP. Respondent shall include documentation of the expenditures made in connection with the SEP as part of the SEP Completion Report.
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