Respondent operates a meat processing facility that uses 24,300 pounds of ammonia as its refrigerant. Respondent has one RMProgram level 3 covered process, an ammonia refrigeration process, which stores or otherwise uses a toxic chemical in an amount exceeding its applicable threshold of 10,000. During calendar year 2014, EPA opened an RMProgram compliance monitoring investigation to determine Respondent’s compliance with 40 C.F.R. Part 68. As part of this investigation, the EPA conducted an onsite inspection of RMProgram related records on May 22, 2014. The focus of the onsite inspection was to assess the Respondent’s compliance with RMProgram requirements for its covered process.
At the time of the inspection, there were no visual alarms outside the entrance door to the engine room, as defined in the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) Standard 15-2013 Section 8.11.2.1, to alert of an ammonia release.
Also, sections of the process piping lacked labeling to indicate the physical state, the identity of the refrigerant, and the direction of refrigerant flow, as outlined in International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (IIAR) Bulletin No. 14 (9/91).
Additionally, some of the ammonia process piping located on the roof had sections of insulation that was damaged (mechanical damage) and some of the uninsulated piping was rusted (potential integrity damage); both of which should be repaired upon discovery, as outlined in IIAR Bulletin No.11 (Revised 3/02), Section 6.7.
At the time of the inspection, the facility was asked to provide all retained on site Process Hazard Analyses (PHAs), including the initial PHA and subsequent 5 year required updates or revalidations. The initial RMP was submitted in June of 1999. The facility could only provide PHAs dated December 4, 2013 and February 25, 2009. Previous RMP submissions indicated PHAs were conducted in October of 1997 and in May of 2004, but the Respondent could not provide these analyses.
At the time of the inspection, the Respondent indicated that facility and process specific training is completed and tracked in a training and testing platform identified as “Super Skills”. This platform did not have any tracking that any of the Respondent’s 4 process operators had completed the Respondent’s required training series in Super Skills prior to operating the facility’s process.
At the time of the inspection, the Respondent provided the inspector with a record of one of the process operators completing an off-site training, “Refrigeration Engineers Technician Association” training, in 2003. This same operator completed the Super Skill training series in 2007, but there were no additional records that every three years refresher training for this operator, or the other 3 operators, had been completed.
At the time of the inspection, the Respondent could not provide information that a vibrational analysis had been performed on the process compressors in 2013.
Respondent could not provide the inspector with confirmation that the facility’s ammonia sensors had been calibrated in January, February or May of 2014. The monthly preventative maintenance schedule the Respondent prepared for their process required the sensors to be calibrated monthly. Respondent’s safety relief valve (SRV) inspection did not follow HAR Bulletin No. 110 (Revised 3/02). At the time of inspection, 33 of the Respondent’s covered process SRVs had either a manufacture/ install date of January 2009, or earlier, which is beyond the IIAR 5 (five) year replacement guideline for ammonia SRVs.
At the time of the inspection, the facility provided copies of their incident reports. On August 22, 2012, an incident occurred when a filter gasket was blown out, causing oil containing ammonia to escape the system. The incident specific report recommended 3 corrective actions. The Respondent could not provide information that the recommended corrective actions had been completed.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW
Based on EPA’s compliance monitoring investigation, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated the codified rules governing the Act’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions, because Respondent did not adequately implement provisions of 40 C.F.R. Part 68 when it:
- Failed to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices as required by 40 CFR § 68.65(d)(2);
- Failed to retain PHAs and updates or revalidations as well as the resolution of recommendations for the life of the process as required by 40 CFR § 68.67(g);
- Failed to initially train each employee before being involved in operating a newly assigned process as required by 40 CF~§ 68.71(a)(1);
- Failed to provide refresher training at least every three years, to each employee involved in operating a process to assure that the employee understands and adhere to the current operating procedures of the process as required by 40 CFR § 68.71(b);
- Failed to perform inspection and tests on process equipment as required by 40 CFR§ 68.73(d)(1);
- Failed to ensure its inspection and testing procedures followed recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices as required by 40 CFR § 68.73(d)(2); and
- Failed to establish a system to address and resolve the (compliance report) findings and recommendations and to document resolutions and corrective actions as required by 40 CFR § 68.81(e).
TERMS OF CONSENT AGREEMENT
Respondent agrees to pay the civil penalty of EIGHTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS ($82,600) (“EPA Penalty”) within 30 calendar days of the Effective Date of this Agreement.
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