EPA RMP citations @ milk and fruit juice facility (NH3 & $255K, with SEPs $316K)

Respondent owns and operates a controlled temperature production plant for milk and fruit juices. The Facility is located in a predominantly industrial and commercial area, across the street from the Lynn wastewater treatment plant, which also is an RMP facility. The Facility is within a quarter mile of a church, restaurants, other businesses, and freight and passenger rail lines. The Facility is within a half mile of residences and playgrounds and is less than one mile from three towns. Facility uses anhydrous ammonia in a refrigeration “process,” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3, in a series of interconnected pipes and vessels at the Facility (the “Process”).

The Process is located in and outside of the main production plant building, which was constructed in 1937, and expanded in 1992. According to information provided by the facility, Process equipment has been installed over the last 35 years, including some of the compressors in 1983, condensers in 2009, and chillers in 2010.

In 2004, Respondent filed a Program 3 RMP for the Process and reported that it used 39,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. In its 2009 RMP, Respondent again
reported that it used 39,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. The chemical inventory reports submitted by Respondent for 2010, 2011, and 2012 indicated a range from 10,000 to 99,999 pounds of anhydrous ammonia at the Facility. The chemical inventory report for 2014 indicates a specific amount of 38,539 pounds of anhydrous ammonia and a range of25,000 to 49,999 pounds. Accordingly, the anhydrous ammonia Process at the Facility is a “covered process” subject to the RMP provisions of Part 68 because Respondent ”uses,” “stores,” and “handles” the RMP chemical anhydrous ammonia in the Process in an amount greater than 10,000 pounds.

According to the Facility’s 2009 RMP, the endpoint for a worst-case release of the amount of anhydrous ammonia used in the Process is greater than the distance to a public receptor. Likewise, modeling performed by the EPA RMPcomp model indicates that the endpoint for a worst case release from the Process is greater than the distance to a public receptor.

Additionally, the Process is subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 because it uses anhydrous ammonia in an amount over the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds. Therefore, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(a)-(d), Respondent’s use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia in the Process is subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3.

On December 12, 2012, EPA inspectors visited the Facility (the “Inspection”) to assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA and with Sections 302-312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. In light of the potential hazards posed by the mishandling of anhydrous ammonia, industry trade associations have issued standards outlining the recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) in the ammonia refrigeration industry. In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“HAR”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 2: Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems,” along with other applicable standards and guidance. Also in collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 15: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems.” These standards are consistently relied upon by
refrigeration experts and are sometimes incorporated into state building and mechanical codes.

The Process is a “closed-loop” refrigeration system, with components and piping in interconnected areas both inside and outside of the main building. The Process includes:

two adjacent machinery rooms (referred to by Respondent as “Compressor Rooms 1 and 2”), where most of the refrigeration components are located;
areas on the roof above each Compressor Room, where the condensers and some of the piping are located;
the food product cooler areas used for storage, where the evaporators and associated piping are located;
the loading docks, which have additional evaporators and associated piping; and
the outside storage tanks that have associated piping.

Compressor Room 1 has two access doors, one which leads to an interior hallway, and the other to the Boiler Room. Neither door opens to the outdoors.

Compressor Room 2 has only one access door that opens inwards from the hallway. It, too, does not open to the outdoors.

NOTE: the Massachusetts State Building Code, Sixth Edition, Base Volume, is based on the 1993 edition of the Building Officials and Code Administrators (“BOCA”) National Building Code, with certain amendments. 780 C.M.R. Forward at 1 (1997). Both the BOCA National Building Code, and the Massachusetts State Building Code that is based on it, state that “[a]ll mechanical equipment and systems shall be constructed, installed and maintained in accordance with the BOCA National Mechanical Code …. ” Id. § 2801.2; BOCA Nat’! Bldg. Code§ 2801.2 (1993). The BOCA National Mechanical Code, in tum, specified that systems are limited to twenty pounds of refrigerant except that those using ammonia “shall not be limited in capacity where the system is designed and installed in accordance with ASHRAE 15 and IIAR 2.” BOCA Nat Mech. Code§ M-1303.2 & .2.1 (1993).

During the Inspection of the Facility, EPA requested and received certain documentation pertaining to the Process, including a document titled “Emergency Planning & Response Guidelines” (Revision 0), dated December 1, 2012, which purports to be the Facility’s emergency action plan (“EAP”), and an RMP compliance audit, conducted in May of 2012 (“May 2012 Compliance Audit”).

EPA found that the Inspection and EPA’s review of submitted information revealed some potentially dangerous conditions relating to the Process at the time of the Inspection in 2012, including that Respondent:

Had not developed a system to adequately manage RMP compliance, in that the person assigned overall responsibility for RMP development, implementation, and integration (the Plant Manager), who accompanied the EPA representatives during the Inspection, did not demonstrate a good understanding of the ammonia refrigeration system and RMP implementation;
Had not determined and documented for Process equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use that the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in safe manner;
Had not developed a schedule for addressing most of the recommendations identified in Respondent’s 2009 update to its Process Hazard Analysis (“PHA”) until 2012 and did not document that the actions were taken in a timely manner. In addition, the May 2012 “Process Safety Management Compliance Audit” prepared for Respondent by Ammonia Safety Management, Inc. (the “2012 Compliance Audit”), had Compliance Audit Findings that Respondent did not have a system to promptly address the findings and recommendations from the 2009 update to the PHA, and had not documented the resolution of those findings and recommendations;
Had not identified that the Facility is located in a flood zone, is in a zone of moderate earthquake activity, and is within an area that could have tornados;
Did not have, or have available for EPA review, all of the necessary process safety information and documentation pertaining to the Process to allow Respondent to adequately identify hazards posed by and to properly maintain the Process;
Had not properly labeled much of the ammonia piping and equipment, such as valves. The Facility also had steam or hot water insulated pipes similar in appearance to those used in the ammonia refrigeration system, which, given the incomplete identification of ammonia piping, could complicate the identification of which pipes were used for ammonia;
Had not properly maintained the ammonia piping and equipment, much of which was corroded, including some that had visible pitting. This included evidence of corrosion where ammonia piping was insulated;
Had not properly maintained the insulation or other coverings on the ammonia piping and equipment, some of which was cracked or otherwise damaged or had rust-colored stains, and which could allow moisture to penetrate the insulation layer;
Had not properly maintained the ammonia piping that had frost or ice on it;
Had not properly installed vents for pressure relief valves for the ammonia piping and equipment, many of which were located or configured inappropriately;
Had not installed audio-visual ammonia warning systems or proper ammonia safety labels outside the doors for Compressor Rooms 1 and 2;
Had not adequately installed and labeled switches controlling emergency ventilation and emergency shutdown immediately outside door Y-4 or the doors for Compressor Rooms 1 and 2;
Had not installed visible wind direction indicators in the Process area. The only wind indicator observed during the Inspection was a tattered wind sock, not visible from the Process area, located at the Facility’s wastewater treatment plant, which was across the street from the portion of the plant that contained the Process;
Had not installed doors leading directly to the outdoors from Compressor Rooms 1 and 2;
Had substantial amounts of combustible materials such as wood and cardboard and a cabinet marked “Flammables” in Compressor Room 1, which did not have a sprinkler system;
Had not sealed numerous jagged holes in the walls around ammonia pipes in Compressor Room 1 that went to other parts of the Facility, including the adjacent Boiler Room. Some of the holes were in the area above the drop ceiling in Compressor Room 1. These holes could make it difficult to effectively monitor the ammonia content in the air in Compressor Room 1, prevent releases of ammonia to the Boiler Room or other adjacent areas, and safely vent any releases of ammonia that may occur;
Had not installed any alarms, exit signs, or window on the second door in Compressor Room 1, or any sign that that the door could be used for emergency egress;
Had not sealed the metal panel in the wall in Compressor Room 1;
Had not installed a door that opened outward or a door with a crash bar in Compressor Room 2;
Had not installed a second door in Compressor Room 2;
Had not installed an emergency eyewash or shower in or immediately outside of Compressor Room 2;
Had an unlabeled small-bore pipe at the bottom of the upright cylindrical ammonia accumulator tank with an illegible (corroded) tag on its shut-off valve in Compressor Room 1. In addition, the signs for the accumulator tank’s “King Valve”, “Compressor Liquid Injection” and “King Valve, Plant Liquid Supply” were loosely attached to the accumulator tank. Lastly, the two king valves were on the bottom of the accumulator tank, partially obstructed by pipes and other equipment, and would be difficult to access in an emergency;
Had exposed high voltage electrical wires in Compressor Room 2 that had not been covered and had no evidence of any Lock Out/Tag Out system;
Had not tagged all Process control valves;
Had not protected all of the components and piping of the Process from forklift traffic or other potential impact, as evidenced by the damage done to the base and side of the ceiling-mounted chiller unit AU-7 in the loading dock;
Had not labeled the blue-capped sensor located below the ammonia relief pipe in the Inner Truck Yard;
Had not labeled the red light high above door Y-4;
Had not labeled the silver-colored shed with an orange pipe coming from it (indicative of liquid ammonia) to the right of door Y-4;
Had not identified as a “near miss” the damage done to the base and side of the ceiling-mounted chiller unit AU-7 in the loading dock area. In addition, during the opening meeting before the Inspection, Facility representatives told the EPA inspectors that the facility had not had any near misses in the previous five years;
Had not labeled the eight capped vent headers on the roof above Compressor Rooms 1 and 2 to indicate whether they were still in service or connected to any pressure source;
Had not labeled the orange PRV vent header on the roof above Compressor Rooms 1 and 2 that had been severed from the Process pipes and was no longer in service even though it had an attached wired ammonia detector;
Had not labeled the air intakes and exhausts for Compressor Rooms 1 and 2 located on the roof above those rooms. In addition, the air intakes were not located at least 20 feet from the exhausts, and Respondent had not tested the intakes and exhausts to ensure exhaust air was not recirculated into the intake vent;
Had not properly maintained the ammonia leak detectors, in that, in 2010, results of testing just prior to the calibration procedure indicated that 7 of the 12 ammonia detectors failed to give a signal that would have indicated detection of the 250 parts per million action level for ammonia, and thus, presumably, would not have triggered an alarm or initiated ventilation if the action level had been exceeded. The lack of an effective detector system to provide early warning of ammonia leaks may present a particular danger for employees at this facility, given that Compressor Rooms 1 and 2 lack exit doors to the outdoors;
Had not placed air ventilation inlets near the lower portions of the two floor mounted compressors in Compressor Room 1, and Compressor Room 2 did not have an air ventilation inlet;
According to the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, had not ensured that the operating procedures for the Process were being implemented, reflected current practice, addressed temporary or emergency operations, included limits to outline consequences of process deviation and steps to correct or avoid deviations, included safety and health considerations, were being reviewed as often as necessary to ensure that they reflected current practice, were certified annually that they were current and accurate, and failed to develop and implement safe work practices for employees and contractors;
According to the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, had not developed a written mechanical integrity program that included relief and vent systems and devices, emergency shutdown systems, or controls, including monitoring devices, sensors, and interlocks;
According to the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, had not trained each employee involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of the Process equipment in an overview of the Process and its hazards;
According to the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, did not have an inspection and testing procedures that followed good engineering practices;
According to the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, did not conduct inspections and tests of Process equipment that were consistent with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practice;
According to the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, did not document for each inspection and test of process equipment the serial number or other identifier for each piece of equipment or describe the inspection or test performed;
Failed to have operational ventilation fan overrides outside of Compressor Rooms 1 and 2;
According to the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, failed to correct deficiencies in Process equipment before further use, or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation;
According to the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, failed to implement appropriate management of change documents when there were changes to the Process chemicals, technology, equipment or procedures, and incomplete management of change documents for Process safety information and operating procedures and practices;
According to the 2010 Compliance Audit Certification and the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, failed to correct the deficiencies related to inspections for mechanical integrity noted in the Facility’s 2010 Compliance Audit Certification (did not follow good engineering practices for inspections of Process equipment; inspection frequencies were not consistent with manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practice; and, lack of required documentation for each inspection)
Failed to investigate the near miss incident(s) that damaged the base and side of the ceiling-mounted chiller unit AU-7 in the loading dock area and more generally, according to the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, did not have all required information in the investigation reports it did prepare (lack of date of incident and date investigation began), did not have a system to promptly address findings and recommendations in the investigation reports, and did not review the report with affected employees or contractors; and,
According to the May 2012 Compliance Audit Findings, failed to evaluate contractor safety performance and programs before selecting a contractor to work on or adjacent to the Process, did not inform contractor employees about the facility’s emergency response program, and did not do a periodic evaluation of its contractors to ensure the contractors complied with their obligations under 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(c), including providing safety training for contractor employees.

Accordingly, Complainant alleges the following violations of 40 C.F.R. Part 68. Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations. The examples of industry
standards of care cited below are those that were in effect in 2009 when Respondent completed its latest Process Hazard Analysis before the 2012 Inspection.

Count 1: Failure to Comply with RMP Management Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.15, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process
is required, among other things, to assign a qualified person or position responsible for development, implementation, and integration of the RMP elements. If any of the individual requirements are assigned to anyone other than the person or position just described, those names or positions and lines of authority shall be documented.

At the time of Inspection, Respondent had not developed a system to adequately manage RMP compliance, in that the Plant Manager was responsible for overall RMP implementation but he did not have a good understanding of all of the program elements. For example, he was not able to document that he was trained in RMP implementation or ammonia refrigeration systems. In addition, Respondent did not identify, in an organization chart or similar document, others who were
responsible for RMP implementation or how they were qualified to so, by training or other experience.

By failing to comply with RMP management requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.15.

Count 2: Failure to Comply with Safety Information Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.65, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to compile written process safety information before completing the PHA, in order to perform an adequate PHA and to enable proper maintenance of process equipment. This includes documenting information pertaining to the hazards of the RMP chemical in the process; information pertaining to the technology and equipment of the process, including that the equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices; and information showing that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner. This compilation enables appropriate identification and understanding of hazards posed by regulated substances in the process and the technology and equipment of the process.

At the time of Inspection, Respondent had not compiled all of the necessary process safety information pertaining to the technology and equipment of the Process.

Respondent also failed to document that the Process complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices and that equipment designed according to outdated standards was designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner.

Respondent had not installed visual and audible alarms for ammonia outside the doors to Compressor Rooms 1 and 2. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to equip the detectors to activate visual and audible alarms inside a machinery room (i.e., Compressor Rooms 1 and 2) and at each of its entrances.

In addition, in 2010, results of testing that occurred just prior to adjustment during the calibration procedure indicated that 7 of the 12 ammonia detectors failed to give a m V signal that would have indicated detection of the 250 parts per million action level for ammonia, and thus presumably would not have activated an alarm or initiated ventilation if the action level had been exceeded. See, Am. Nat’l Standards Inst./Am. Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Eng’rs, Standard 15-2007: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems§§ 8.11.2.1 and 8.12(h) (2007) [hereinafter “ASHRAE 15-2007″]; Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Standard 2-2008: Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (2008) [hereinafter “IIAR 2-2008”] § 13.2.3.l (activate alarm and normal machinery room ventilation at TLV-TWA for ammonia).

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent had not adequately provided and labeled emergency shutdown and ventilation switches for the Process immediately outside the doors to Compressor Rooms 1 and 2 and door Y-4. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to provide clearly marked emergency shutdown and ventilation switches immediately outside the principal machinery room door (and, preferably, all access doors). See, IIAR 2-2008 § 13.3.11.1 (provide remote controls for emergency ventilation immediately outside door); ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, §§ 8.12(i) (provide switches immediately outside door), 11.2.2.a (identify switches). The switches should have tamper-resistant covers, and the ventilation switch should have “on/auto” settings. See, IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 13.3 .11.3 (provide on/auto ventilation override switch immediately outside door) and App. L, Figure 5 (label for emergency shutdown button).

NOTE: This CAFO cites the industry standards in effect at the time of the Facility’s 2009 PHA, which was the most recent PHA done prior to the Inspection in 2012.

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent did not have sufficient signs on the doors to Compressor Rooms 1 and 2. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to post signs warning of the presence of ammonia and restricting entry to authorized personnel at each entrance to a machinery room, see ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, §§ 8.11.8, 11.2.4, and to post other signs with information about the operation of the process, including about the alarms and the emergency shutdown procedures, outside the principal machinery room door. See, supra, §§ 8.11.2.1 (meaning of alarms),
11.7 (emergency shutdown procedures and precautions); and IIAR 2-2008, supra, at App. L (additional information and examples of proper signage for machinery rooms).

At the time of the Inspection, many of the Process pipes were unlabeled or improperly labeled (lacking information on whether the ammonia was liquid or a gas, the pressure, and/or direction of flow) and valves were untagged, and the labels for the king valves on the accumulator tank in Compressor Room 1 were not durable. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to label all system pipes and valve systems with durable labels. See, IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 10.5 (pipes need to be marked with physical state of refrigerant, relative pressure level, and direction of flow); ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, §§ 9.12.6 (stop valves) and 11.2.2 (piping, valves, and switches for refrigerant flow, ventilation, and compressor); Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Bulletin No. 109: IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System, supra,§§ 4.7.6 (1997) [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 109″] (all piping needs attached markers indicating the use of the pipe and direction of flow) and§ 4.10.3 (regarding signage on shut-off valves).

See generally, Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Bulletin No. 114: Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components (1991) [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 114”] (all piping should be identified with physical state of the refrigerant, the relative pressure level, and the direction of flow; all components of the system should be uniformly identified as to the name of the equipment and a pressure level designation).

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent had not protected all of the components and piping of the Process from forklift traffic or other potential impact, as evidenced by the damage done to the base and side of the ceiling-mounted chiller unit AU-7 in the loading dock area. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to safeguard piping, controls, and other refrigeration equipment to minimize the chance of accidental damage by external sources such as forklifts. See, ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, § 11.1 ; IIAR Bull. 109, supra, §§ 4.4.2, 4.7.3.

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent had not safely installed the pressure-relief vent pipes for the Process. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to raise the relief header pipe at least fifteen feet above grade, orient it to point up and away from where any people may be nearby, and locate it at least twenty feet from any window, ventilation intake, or building exit. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra, §§ 11 .3.6.3 and .4; ASHRAE 15-2007, supra,§ 9.7.8.

Compressor Rooms 1 and 2 did not have doors leading directly outside or through a vestibule equipped with self closing, tight-fitting doors. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems at the time of the Inspection was to have a door from a machinery room that leads to the outdoors or to a vestibule equipped with self-closing, tight-fitting doors. See ‘ ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, § 8.12(d). In addition, machinery room doors that lead to another area inside the building shall be equipped with panic hardware. IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 13.1.10.2.

The only door in Compressor Room 2 opened inwards into the room, and there was only one door in that room. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to have doors from machinery rooms that open outwards, and to have an adequate number of doors for people to escape in an emergency. See ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, § 8.11.2.

Wood, cardboard, and a flammable materials cabinet were located in Compressor Room 1. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to prohibit combustible materials from being stored in machinery rooms. See IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 13.1.3.1

There were many unsealed holes in the walls in Compressor Room 1 where pipes went through, and the metal panel on the wall in that room had not been sealed. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to have no openings in a machinery room that could allow passage of refrigerant (the anhydrous ammonia) to other parts of the building, and to tightly seal any openings where pipes go through walls. See, ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, at§§ 8.11.2 and 8.12(f); IIAR 2-2008, supra, at 13.1.5.2.

There was no eyewash or emergency shower in Compressor Room 2 or immediately outside it. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to have readily accessible eyewash and emergency showers. See,~, IIAR Bull. 109, supra, §4.10.10.

The ventilation air inlets in Compressor Room 1 were not located near the lower portions of the two floor-mounted compressors in Compressor Room 1, and Compressor Room 2 did not have any ventilation air inlets. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to position air inlets for machinery rooms so as to avoid recirculation of exhaust air, to ensure there is sufficient inlet air to replace exhausted air, and to ensure that any leaked ammonia refrigerant is exhausted to the outdoors at a rate calculated to protect safety. See,~, IIAAR 2-2008, supra,§§ 13.3.1, 13.3.2, 13.3.3, and
13.3.3.2; ASHRAE 15-2007, supra,§§ 8.11.4 and 8.11.5.

Accordingly, by failing to compile the necessary information about the technology and equipment of the Process, including by documenting that the Process complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65.

Count 3: Failure to Adequately Identify, Evaluate, and Control Hazards

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to perform an initial PHA on each covered process. The PHA must identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process. The owner or operator must update the PHA every five years and when a major change in the process occurs. Additionally, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e), the owner or operator must establish a system to promptly address the recommendations identified in the PHA, including by defining a schedule for completing the action items, taking the actions as soon as possible, and documenting the resolution of the recommendations.

Respondent performed an updated PHA in 2009 and identified recommended action items. However, Respondent did not establish a schedule for addressing most of those items until 2012 and, as of the date of the Inspection, did not document that all of them were completed.

Accordingly, Respondent violated the PHA requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e) for the Process.

Count 4: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Operating Procedures Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide instructions or steps for safely conducting activities associated with the covered process.

These operating procedures must address steps for each operating phase, operating limits, safety and health considerations, and safety systems. The owner or operator must make these procedures available to employees involved in the process, keep them up-to-date with current practices, and certify annually that they are current. The owner or operator must also develop and implement safe work practices to control hazards during specific operations, including by developing a “lockout/tagout” program for handling equipment during maintenance or bringing equipment in or out of service.

The May 2012 Compliance Audit found that Respondent did not ensure that the operating procedures for the Process were being implemented, or that they reflected current practice, addressed temporary or emergency operations, included limits to outline consequences of process deviation and step to correct or avoid deviations, included safety and health considerations, were being reviewed as often as necessary to ensure that they reflected current practice, were certified annually that they were current and accurate, and that they developed and implemented safe work practices for employees and contractors.

By failing to comply with the operating procedures requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69.

Count 5: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Mechanical Integrity Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of certain process equipment and train employees accordingly. The owner or operator must train each employee involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of process equipment in the procedures applicable to the employee’s job task. The owner or operator must inspect and test the equipment either in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, or more frequently if needed based on prior operating experience. The owner or operator must also document the inspections or tests on process equipment, correct deficiencies, assure that any new equipment is suitable for the process application, perform checks to ensure that equipment is installed properly, and assure that maintenance materials and spare parts are suitable for the process application.

The May 2012 Compliance Audit found that Respondent did not have written mechanical integrity procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of Process equipment.

The May 2012 Compliance Audit found that Respondent had not trained each employee involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of the Process equipment in an overview of the Process and its hazards, and the procedures applicable to that employees tasks to ensure the employee can perform the tasks in a safe manner.

The May 2012 Compliance Audit found that, Respondent had not performed all the necessary inspections and tests of the equipment in the Process, and had not maintained documentation thereof. Inspections and testing of Process equipment shall be done in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, which require annual inspections where no manufacturer recommendations exist. See, Int’l. Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Bulletin No. 110: Start-up, Inspection and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (1993) [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 110”], §6.l (inspection schedules shall be based upon supplier’s recommendations for the equipment and other relevant information, such as the age of the equipment); IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 13.3.12.1 and .2 (follow manufacture’s recommendations for testing of alarms and ventilation system, and if there are no recommendations, test annually).

Respondent had not maintained the mechanical integrity of the Process equipment by correcting deficiencies that are outside of acceptable bounds before continuing to use the equipment, or in a safe and timely manner when steps have been taken to ensure safe operation, as described:

(corrosion on pipes and valves) – The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia system piping is to scrape the rust off the pipe down to bare metal and to paint it with a rust preventive paint, and to replace badly corroded pipes. See,~. IIAR Bull. 109, supra, §4.7.4; IIAR Bulletin 110, Startup, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems, Section 6.7.
(damaged pipe insulation and covers) – The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to remove the damaged insulation or covers and inspect the pipe for corrosion, and then to scrape the rust off the pipe down to bare metal and to paint it with a rust preventive paint, and to replace badly corroded pipes. See,~. IIAR Bull. 109, supra, §§4.7.4 and 4.7.5.
(failure to remove ice from ammonia piping) – The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to remove ice that could damage the ammonia piping or other components, and to correct the conditions caused the ice to form. See,~. IIAR Bull.109, supra,§4.10.7.
(exposed high voltage wires that had not been locked-out, tagged-out in Compressor Room 1) – The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to install wiring in compliance with local and national electrical and fire codes, to remove electrical wire taken out of service or to cap the ends of such wires and label them, and to ensure personnel shall have safe access around all serviceable equipment. See,~. ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, at §§ 8.5 (install electrical wiring and equipment per local and national electrical codes) and 9.12.l (ensure safe access to all refrigeration system equipment); IIAR 2-2008, supra, at §13.1.7.1 (install electrical system per codes); and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1-2015, Fire Code at§§ 11.1.2.3 (wiring abandoned in place to be labelled “Abandoned in Place” or removed from accessible areas and insulated from contact from live electrical wires and devices) and 53.2.3.4.3 (electrical equipment in refrigeration machinery rooms to comply with NFPA 1-2015 §11.1).; and
(general failure to correct deficiencies in Process equipment before further use).

By failing to adequately train and record compliance with training requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.71 for the Process.

Count 6: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Management of Change Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.75, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must establish and implement written procedures to manage changes to Process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures, including making changes to operating procedures and to update safety information required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65.

The May 2012 Compliance Audit found that Respondent had not updated its management of change documents when there were changes to Process chemicals, technology, equipment, or procedures, and after such Process changes occurred, had incomplete revisions to its written Process safety information and operating procedures and practices.

Accordingly, by not establishing and implementing sufficient written management of change documents, Respondent violated the management of change requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.75 for the Process.

Count 7: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Compliance Audit Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.79, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must evaluate compliance with the provisions of the prevention program at least every three years; document the audit findings; promptly determine and document a response to each of the findings of the audit; document that deficiencies have been corrected; and retain the two most recent compliance reports.

Respondent performed compliance audits in 2010 and 2012, but as of the date of the Inspection, had not corrected the deficiencies related to mechanical integrity testing that were identified in the 2010 audit that were also identified as deficiencies in the 2012 audit.

By failing to comply with the compliance audit requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.79 for the Process.

Supplemental Environmental Projects

Respondent shall satisfactorily complete three (3) supplemental environmental projects (SEPs) described below. The Parties agree that the SEPs are intended to secure significant environmental and public health protection and benefits by:

helping prevent or mitigate releases of ammonia from, and improve chemical safety at the Facility
enhance the hazardous materials response capabilities of the Fire Department for the City of XXXXX (the “Lynn Fire Department SEP”); and
protect Lynn school children by removing unneeded hazardous chemicals from the high school science laboratory, and providing safety equipment and chemical management training for the Lynn Public Schools (collectively, the “Lynn Schools SEP”).

Respondent has selected the Fire Department and the Public Schools to be the SEP Recipients for the SEPs.

Facility Safety Upgrades SEP

Respondent shall make safety improvements in accordance with the requirements and deadlines described in Exhibit A. Respondent will install ammonia sensors at all pressure relief valve headers, at an estimated cost of $75,000, and install a Win911 ammonia release emergency notification system, at an estimated cost of $25,000.

Respondent represents that, to the best of its knowledge after thorough review of the most current industry standards by Respondent or its agents, that each part of the Safety Upgrades SEP described above and in Exhibit A exceed the requirements of the most current industry standards.

Required Action: Respondent or its contractor(s) shall expand the ammonia detection system to install ammonia sensors in the pressure release valve (PRV) headers in the following locations:

AHU -1 System;
AHU-3 System;
AHU-13 System;
AHU-14 System;
AHU-15 System;
AHU-16 System;
C-1 Silo System;
C-2 Silo System;
C-3 Silo System;
Engine Room 2, System 2:
PS -13 Silo;
RS-4, RS-5, RS-6, RS-7 SRV System;
RS-11, RS-14 Silo SRV System;
RS-9 Silo System;
RS-10 Silo System; and
ST-2 System

Respondent or its contractor(s) shall test each sensor within five (5) days after it is installed to ensure each one is properly calibrated and operate properly. Respondent or its contractor(s) shall prepare and implement procedures to inspect each sensor in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations, both substantive and regarding the frequency of such inspections. If the manufacturer does not provide such instructions, they shall be established by Respondent in accordance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP). This project shall be completed no later than September 30, 2016. The cost of this project is approximately $75,000.

Benefit: Sensors in the PRV headers allow for early detection of the most common industry-wide type of an outdoor ammonia release. Together with automatic valves and controls, it provides a means to shut down the source of the overpressure to minimize the ammonia release.

Required Action: Respondent or its contractor(s) shall install a WIN911 notification system. Respondent or its contractor(s) shall test the WIN911 notification system within five (5) days after it is installed to ensure it operates properly. The WIN911 notification system shall provide alerts to the following persons for the following types of events:

Alarm Classification – Informational; Alarm Description Example – High temperature in cooler; Actions – Email Production and Maintenance Management
Alarm Classification – Caution; Alarm Description Example – High compressor filter differential pressure; Actions – Email Maintenance Team
Alarm Classification – Warning; Alarm Description Example – Low suction pressure warning; Actions – Email maintenance team
Alarm Classification – Alarm; Alarm Description Examples – Ammonia detector warning, high discharge pressure alarm, high level shutdown; Actions – Email
Maintenance Team, call Plant Engineer and Maintenance Supervisors
Alarm Classification – Critical Alarm; Alarm Description Example – Discharge pressure shutdown; Actions – Email Maintenance Team, Call Plant Engineer, Plant Manager, and other members of the Emergency Action Team.

Respondent or its contractor(s) shall prepare and implement procedures to inspect the WIN911 notification system in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations, both substantive and regarding the frequency of such inspections. If the manufacturer does not provide such instructions, they shall be established by Respondent in accordance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP). This project shall be completed no later than September 30, 2016. The cost of this project is approximately $25,000.

Benefit: The WIN911 notification system interfaces with the ammonia refrigeration programmable logic controller (PLC) to automatically send alerts (email, text, call) of any alarm conditions from a central system. These alerts can be sent to the appropriate plant personnel and emergency responders, thus reducing the time to alert personnel to an ammonia release.

Fire Department SEP

Respondent shall provide emergency response equipment, two ammonia detectors and twelve pumps, a five-year maintenance and service contract for the detectors and pumps, and training classes to the Fire Department. The purpose of this SEP is to enhance the emergency planning and chemical spill response capabilities, including those for an ammonia release, for local first responders. The Fire department SEP is expected to cost approximately $195,000.

Required Action: Respondent shall provide the following to the Fire Department:

2 Ammonia sensor units;
12 Pumps for the ammonia sensor units;
14 Vehicle Charging Cradles for the ammonia sensors and pumps;
12 Single Gas CO monitors;
8 one-hour classes to train Lynn fire responders on the use of the ammonia sensors;
4 four-hour classes to provide advanced training to selected Lynn fire responders on the use of the ammonia sensors:
1 five-year maintenance service contract for the ammonia sensors and pumps;
12 two-three hour classes to train all Lynn fire responders on proper hazmat response to facilities that have ammonia on site;
16 LTO Black Kevlar/Nomex EWR bunker coats;
16 LTO Black Kevlar/Nomex EWR bunker pants;
16 Defender Black and gold wristlet gloves; and
16 Nomex hoods

Respondent shall provide all of the above items and training to the Fire Department by September 30, 2016. The cost of this project is approximately $195,000.

Benefit: The equipment and training will improve the Fire Department’s ability to detect and safely respond to releases of ammonia and other toxic substances.

Public Schools SEP

Respondent shall provide each of the goods and services as described in this paragraph to the Public Schools. Respondent will do portions of the Schools SEP itself, and another portion will be performed by a SEP Implementer selected by Respondent. The first component is the removal of unneeded toxic and flammable materials from science laboratories at the High School. Respondent has selected an Environmental Services company to be the SEP Implementer for this part of the project. The second component is to provide safety equipment and chemical safety training at the Middle Schools. The purpose of this SEP is to promote health and safety for Public Schools students and staff. The Schools SEP is expected to cost $21,000.

Required Action: Respondent, through the SEP Implementer shall package and safely dispose of the science laboratory chemicals from the High School. This project shall be completed by September 30, 2016. The cost of this project is approximately $4,500.

Benefit: Flammable and toxic chemicals will be removed from the school and safely disposed of, thus reducing the risk of chemical exposure to students, teachers, and staff.

Required Action: Respondent shall provide the science laboratory equipment to the Middle Schools. This project shall be completed by September 30, 2016. The cost of this project is approximately $16,500.

Benefit: The science laboratory safety equipment will help protect students and teachers from exposure to toxic chemicals.

Required action: Respondent, through its Environmental Health and Safety professionals, shall provide HAZCOM 2012 (Global Harmonization) compliant chemical safety training to the Public Schools Assistant Director of Curriculum and Instruction/Science K-12, and four teachers from each of the following schools: High School and Middle Schools.

This project shall be completed by September 30, 2016. There is no SEP-creditable cost for this project because the training will be provide by Respondent’s employee(s).

Benefit: The HAZCOM 2012 compliant training will help the teachers better understand and comply with the safe handling, storage, and disposal of toxic and flammable chemicals found in the school science laboratories, thus helping protect students, teachers and staff from exposure to those chemicals.

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