Respondent operates a natural gas processing plant where raw natural gas is received via pipeline and processed to remove heavy natural gas liquids (NGLs) (i.e., butane, ethane, methane, pentane, propane, isobutane and isopentane ). After being processed and purified into a finished by-product, the NGL mixture is stored in pressurized tanks and transferred into tanker trucks for sale, while the clean natural gas is sold from the site via pipeline. During calendar year 2014, EPA opened an RMProgram compliance monitoring investigation to determine Respondent’s compliance with 40 C.F.R. Part 68 at its stationary source. As part of this investigation, the Respondent agreed to allow a duly authorized EPA representative to conduct an onsite inspection of its RMProgram related records and process equipment on August 7, 2014. The focus of the onsite inspection was to assess the Respondent’s compliance with RMProgram requirements for its covered processes operating at its stationary source.
At its stationary source the facility has a single RMProgram covered process for the natural gas processing operation which includes two interconnected sub-plants: 1 and 2, each nearly identical in processing capabilities. The 1 sub-plant processing equipment was constructed in 2010. The need for increased capacity prompted the construction of the 2 sub-plant, which went online in November 2012.
At its Facility, the Respondent has one RMProgram level 3 covered process which stores or otherwise uses a NGL flammable mixture in amounts exceeding its applicable threshold of 10,000 pounds.
At the time of the inspection or thereafter, Respondent did not produce evidence supporting that it had compiled the safe upper pressure and temperature limits for all process equipment.
- A review of the controls section of the process technology sheet for Tank S1 lists the maximum allowable working pressure as “?? psig at ?? °F“.
- The set pressure for pressure control valve 450, which regulates flow to the flare, is shown as “??” on the process technology sheet.
- Respondent’s piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs) presented during the inspection were inconsistent with the actual installed process equipment.
- The P&ID for storage Tank S1 indicates that pressure safety valves (PSVs) 470 and 471 have a set pressure of 390 psig; however, the actual PSV s installed on the tank have a set pressure of 325 psig, which was field verified by inspection of the relevant in-service PSV tags.
During the inspection, EPA’ s authorized representatives observed a truck driver loading a tanker truck with NGL from Tank S1 via the process transfer hose rack.
- The Respondent could not produce a written operating procedure addressing this transfer activity.
- EPA’s review of the Respondent’s operating procedure for startup and shutdown of the triethylene glycol (TEO) heater found the operating procedure did not reflect current operating practice.
- During a walk-through of the TEO heater startup and shutdown procedure with a facility operator, EPA’s authorized representatives observed that the 1-inch ball valve on the main gas line was in the open position even though the TEO heater was in a shutdown condition. According to the shutdown portion of the procedure, the ball valve on the main gas line should be closed during shutdown. The operator present at the time of EPA’s observation indicated that the current practice was to close another main gas line valve upstream of the ball valve in question. At the time of inspection, the shutdown procedure did not reflect current operating practice.
The Respondent doubled the NOL process capacity of the facility in November 2012 when it brought the 2 sub-plant online. The Respondent correctly completed a process hazard analysis prior to startup of the 2 sub-plant, but failed to also update its RMPlan within six months of the startup.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW
Based on EPA’s compliance monitoring investigation, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated the codified rules governing the Act’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions, because Respondent did not adequately implement provisions of 40 C.F .R. Part 68 when it:
- Failed to compile written process safety information for the technology of the process which includes safe upper and lower limits as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1)(iv);
- Failed to compile written process safety information pertaining to the equipment in the process which includes piping and instrument diagram(s) as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(ii);
- Failed to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a);
- Failed to review operating procedures as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c); and
- Failed to review and update the RMPlan within six months of a process change that required a revised PHA as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.190(b)(5).
TERMS OF CONSENT AGREEMENT
For the purpose of this proceeding, Respondent agrees to pay the civil penalty of FIFTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($53,200).
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