Complainant alleges that Respondent violated the provisions identified herein and seeks the assessment of a civil penalty. Respondent owns and operates a refinery. At all times relevant to this action, Respondent processed, handled. and stored regulated flammable substances listed in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130 in a mixture at its facility. At all times relevant to this action, Respondent had eight covered processes at its facility, which are referred to as:
- Alkylation (“Alky”)/Butane Isomerization Unit (“BI”);
- Catalytic Cracking Unit (“CCU”):
- Clean Fuels Hydrotreater (“CFH”)/Distillate Hydrotreater (“DHT”);
- Catalytic Reformer (“CR”)/Naphtha Hydrotreater (“NHT”)/Catalytic Gas Splitter (“CGS”)/Selective Hydrogenation Unit (“SHU”)/Benzene Saturation Unit (“BSU”);
- Crude Unit (“CU”)/Vacuum Flasher (“VF’);
- Flare;
- Volatiles Handling; and,
- Residuum Oil Supercritical Extraction (“ROSE”).
At all times relevant to this action, the E-6611 NHT and the E-6650 NHT heat exchanger were components of the NHT covered process.
At all times relevant to this action, the concentration of a regulated flammable substance in a mixture in each of the Processes exceeded one percent by weight.
At all times relevant to this action, Respondent used, stored. manufactured, or handled more than 10,000 pounds of a mixture containing regulated flammable substances in each of the Processes, therefore, the Processes were “covered processes” as that term is defined at 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
At all times relevant to this action, each of the Processes were subject to the OSHA process safety management standard, codified at 29 C.F.R. 1910.119. Therefore, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(d), at all times relevant to this action, each of the Processes identified above were subject to Program 3 requirements.
The regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(a) and (d) require that, in addition to submitting a single RMP as provided in 40 C.F.R §§ 68.150 to 68.185, facilities with a Program 3 covered process shall, among other things,
- develop a management system as provided in 40 C.F.R § 68.15,
- conduct a hazard assessment as provided in 40 C.F.R §§ 68.20 to 68.42, and
- implement the prevention program, as required by 40 C.F.R §§ 68.65 to 68.87.
Respondent submitted an RMP to EPA on June 11, 1999; February 17, 2000; October 25, 2000; September 4, 2001; September 20, 2001: March 20, 2003: June 7, 2004; April 17, 2006; October 4, 2010; and March 28, 2011.
EPA conducted inspections of the Respondent’s Facility on January 24-28, 2011, and October 3-7, 2011, to determine compliance with the RMP requirements of Section 112(r) of the CAA, and 40 C.F.R. Part 68. On April 22, 2011, EPA sent an information request letter to the Respondent requesting additional information to evaluate Respondent’s compliance with the RMP requirements of Section 112(r) of the CAA, and 40 C.F.R. Part 68. Respondent responded to EPA’s April 22, 2011, information request on June 22, 2011.
PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION
From at least October 7, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written process safety information for the CFH did not include a safe upper temperature limit for the CFH reactor differential temperature as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1)(iv).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written process safety information for the CFH did not include any of the the consequences of deviation from the safe upper temperature limit for the CFH reactor differential temperature, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1)(v).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written process safety information for DHT failed to adequately identify the consequences of deviation from the safe upper and lower limits, such as runaway reaction and catalyst damage, for the sate upper temperature limit for the DHT reactor differential temperature, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1)(v).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written process safety information for the E-6611 NHT did not evaluate the consequences of deviation for several design pressure or temperature limits as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1)(v).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written process safety information for the CFH and ROSE units, which were both built after June 21, 1999, failed to include energy balances, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(vii).
PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS
Respondent’s June 2010 PHA for the CR/NHT/CGS PHA identified operational deviations and hazards at the E-6650 NHT heat exchanger and made recommendations to reduce the potential hazards. As of October 7, 2011, Respondent failed to assure that the PHA team’s findings and recommendations for the E-6650 NHT heat exchanger were promptly addressed, that the recommendations were resolved in a timely maimer, and that the resolution was documented, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e).
Respondent’s May/June 2008 DHT PHA identified operational deviations and hazards at the DHT heat exchangers. As of October 7, 2011, Respondent failed to adequately evaluate the hazards identified at the DHT heat exchangers or assure that the PHA team’s findings and recommendations for the DHT heat exchangers were promptly addressed, that the recommendations were resolved in a timely manner, and that the resolution was documented, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(a) and (e).
OPERATING PROCEDURES
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the DHT startup, shutdown, temporary, and emergency procedures did not indicate who is responsible for executing the steps in the procedures.
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the DHT startup, shutdown, temporary, and emergency procedures, used icons whose meanings are not readily apparent. Therefore, from at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the DHT startup, shutdown, temporary, and emergency procedures did not provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities associated with the DHT process consistent with the written process safety information for each operating phase as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondents written operating procedures for the CCU, Alky/BI, CU/VF, and ROSE units startup, shutdown, temporary operations, and emergency operations, did not indicate who is responsible for executing the steps in the procedures.
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the CCU, Alky/Bl, CUNF, and ROSE units startup, shutdown, temporary operations, and emergency operations, used icons whose meanings are not readily apparent. Therefore, from at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the CCU, Alky/Bl, CUNF, and ROSE units startup, shutdown, temporary operations, and emergency operations did not provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities associated with these processes consistent with the written process safety information and for each operating phase. as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent relied upon the operating limits, the DHT manual, and operator training for conducting DHT normal operations. At no time relevant to this action did Respondent develop and implement a written operating procedure that adequately addressed normal operations of the DHT, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(ii).
From at least January 28, 2011. until present, Respondent relied upon the operating limits, the CCU, Alky/Bl, CU/VF, and ROSE unit manuals, and operator training for conducting CCU, Alky/Bl, CUNF, and ROSE normal operations. At no time relevant to this action did Respondent develop and implement a written operating procedure that addressed normal operations of the CCU, Alky/BI. CUNF, and ROSE processes, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(ii).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent relied upon the operating limits, the E-6611 NHT unit manuals, and operator training for conducting E-6611 “NHT normal operations. At no time relevant to this action did Respondent develop and implement a written operating procedure that addressed normal operations of the E-6611 NHT process, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(ii).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent relied upon the operating limits, the BSU unit manuals, and operator training for conducting BSU normal operations. At no time relevant to this action did Respondent develop and implement a written operating procedure that addressed normal operations of the BSU process, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(ii).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the DllT failed to provide clear instructions on the consequences of deviation from operating limits, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(1).
From at least January 28, 20 l l, until present Respondent’s written operating procedures for the E-6611 NHT failed to provide clear instructions to address the consequences or deviation from operating limits, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(i).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the CFH failed to provide clear instructions to address the consequences of deviation from operating limits, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(i).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present Respondent’s written operating procedures for the DHT failed to provide clear instructions indicating what steps to take to correct or avoid deviation from operating limits, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(ii).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the CFH failed to address the steps required to correct or avoid deviation from the operating limits, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(ii).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the CCU failed to address the steps required to correct or avoid deviation from operating Limits, as required by 40 C.F.R. 68.69(a)(2)(ii).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for emergency shutdown of the DHT failed Lo address safety and health considerations, as required by 40 C.F.R. 68.69(a)(3).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedure for the CCU, Alky/BI, CUNF. and ROSE units failed to address safety and health considerations for startup, shutdown, temporary operations, and emergency operations, as required by 40 C F.R. § 68.69(a)(3).
From at least January 28, 2011, until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for t11e E-661/NHT failed to address safety and health considerations for startup, shutdown, temporary operations, and emergency operations, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(3).
From at least January 28, 2011 , until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for emergencies at the DHT failed to address safety systems and their functions, as required by 40 C.F.R. 68.69(a)(4).
From at least January 28, 2011 until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the CCU, Alky/Bl, CU/VF, and ROSE units failed to address safety systems and their functions for emergency operations. as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(4).
From at least October 7, 2011 until present, Respondent’s written operating procedures for the CCU, Alky/BI, CU/VF, and ROSE units failed to address safety systems and their functions for emergency operations, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(4).
From at least October 7, 2011, until present, Respondent failed to maintain its operating procedures for the BSU in a manner that was readily accessible to employees who work in or maintain the process, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(b).
From at least October 7, 2011 , until present, Respondent failed to maintain its operating procedures for the DHT in a manner that was readily accessible to employees who work in or maintain the process; as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(b).
From at least October 7, 2011, until present, Respondent failed to maintain its operating procedures for the NHT in a manner that was readily accessible to employees who work in or maintain the process, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(b).
From at least October 7, 2011, until present, Respondent failed to maintain its operating procedures for the CCU, Alley/Bl, CUNF, and ROSE in a manner that was readily accessible to employees who work in or maintain the process as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(b).
MECHANICAL INTEGRITY
From at least October 7, 2011 until December 31, 2014, Respondent failed to establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of the rotating process equipment listed in 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a) (“covered rotating process equipment”), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b). At all times relevant to this complaint, the manufacturer’s recommendations for inspecting and testing the covered rotating process equipment included vibration testing.
From at least October 7, 2011, until December 31, 2014 Respondent failed to perform vibration testing on covered rotating process equipment, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d).
From at least October 7, 2011, until December 31, 2014, Respondent failed to document each vibration inspection and test that was required to be performed on covered rotating process equipment, including the date of the inspection or test, the name of the person who performed the inspection or test, the serial number or other identifier of the equipment on which the inspection or test was performed, a description of the inspection or test performed, and the results of the inspection or test, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4).
COMPLIANCE AUDITS
Respondent’s March 2010 Audit (issued on 11 /16/2010) identified action items (e.g., #2320, #232 1) for updating all training documentation according to the training policy during the three-year recertification process with a target completion date of December 13, 2013, which exceeds by two years the one-year deadline for addressing action items/recommendations specified in Respondent’s written policy (PSM-03-Action Item Management Guidelines). Therefore, Respondent failed to promptly determine and document au appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audits and document that deficiencies have been corrected, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d).
PROPOSED PENALTY
The proposed civil penalty in this matter has been determined in accordance with Section 113(e)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1). along with the “Combined Enforcement Policy for CAA Sections 112(r)(1), 112(r)(7), and 40 C.F.R. Part 68 dated June 2012. EPA has taken into account the size of the business, the economic impact of the penalty on the business, Respondent’s full compliance history and good faith efforts to comply, the duration of the violation as established by any credible evidence, payment by Respondent of penalties previously assessed for the same violation, the economic benefit of noncompliance, the seriousness of the violations, and such other factors as justice may require. After considering these factors, Complainant proposes that an administrative penalty in the amount of $718,361 be assessed against Respondent.
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