EPA RMP citations @ Refinery (Flammables & $?????)

I am not sure how much of the $4 million was for RMP, as there were other issues in this Consent Decree and I have only pulled out the RMP issues.

On or about September 4, 2017, heater tube 23 ruptured in the CRU2/HTU2 charge heater process due to creep, a molecular failure mechanism that causes metal deformation as a result of stress from high temperatures. The rupture of heater tube 23 caused the release of a naphtha/hydrogen mixture into the heater box. The naphtha/hydrogen mixture ignited, causing a fire and smoke to emanate from the heater stack (hereinafter the “Fire”). An outside operator, who was called by the board operator to investigate the “No Flame” alarm signaled from the control system, was engulfed by the emanating flames and died as a result of second and third-degree burns over eighty percent of his body.

General Duty Clause and Risk Management Program

The following substances are extremely hazardous substances and “regulated substances” pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.3: Butane; Ethane; Isobutane [Propane, 2-methyl]; Pentane; Isopentane [Butane, 2-methyl-]; Propane; Methane; and Hydrogen. The threshold quantity for the extremely hazardous substances referenced above, as listed in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, is 10,000 pounds.

On or about November 17, 2014 through November 21, 2014, an EPA representative conducted an inspection of the Refinery to determine compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA and the regulations promulgated thereunder (hereinafter “EPA Inspection”). Specifically, the EPA Inspection reviewed two of the sixteen Refinery processes, including the FCCU process and the Gofiner process.

Information gathered as a result of the EPA Inspection revealed that the extremely hazardous substances referenced in Paragraph 133, were produced, processed, handled, or stored at the Refinery. Information gathered as a result of the EPA Inspection revealed that the FCCU process had greater than 10,000 pounds of the following extremely hazardous substances: Ethane; Methane; Propane; Pentane; Isobutane [Propane, 2-methyl]; Isopentane [Butane, 2-methyl-]; and Butane.

Information gathered as a result of the EPA Inspection revealed that the Gofiner process had greater than 10,000 pounds of the following extremely hazardous substances: Butane; Isobutane [Propane, 2-methyl]; Hydrogen; Isopentane [Butane, 2-methyl-]; Propane; Hydrogen Sulfide; Methane; Ethane; and Pentane.

On or about September 4, 2017, heater tube 23 ruptured in the CRU2/HTU2 charge heater process due to creep, a molecular failure mechanism that causes metal deformation as a result of stress from high temperatures. The rupture of heater tube 23 caused the release of a naphtha/hydrogen mixture into the heater box. The naphtha/hydrogen mixture ignited, causing a fire and smoke to emanate from the heater stack (hereinafter the “Fire”). An outside operator, who was called by the board operator to investigate the “No Flame” alarm signaled from the control system, was engulfed by the emanating flames and died as a result of second and third degree burns over eighty percent of his body.

On or about October 12, 2017, EPA issued another request for information seeking specific information related to the Fire and the cause of the Fire. On or about November 13, 2017, November 20, 2017, and June 11, 2018, EPA received responses to the October 12, 2017 request for information. Information gathered as a result of the October 12, 2017 request for information revealed that the CRU2/HTU2 process had greater than 10,000 pounds of the following extremely hazardous substances: Butane; Ethane; Isobutane [Propane, 2-methyl]; Pentane; Isopentane [Butane, 2-methyl-]; and Propane.

From the time the refinery first produced, processed, handled, or stored any of the extremely hazardous substances referenced above, it was subject to the requirements of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA. From the time it first had on site greater than 10,000 pounds of the extremely hazardous substances referenced above in a process, it was subject to the requirements of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA and 40 C.F.R. Part 68.

From the time the refinery first had on site greater than 10,000 pounds of the extremely hazardous substances referenced above in a process, it was subject to the Program 3 prevention program requirements because, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(d), the covered processes at the Refinery did not meet the eligibility requirements of Program 1; the refinery is subject to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration process safety management standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119; and it falls under a specified North American Industry Classification System code, 324110 – Petroleum Refining. As a result of the EPA Inspection and the responses to the October 12, 2017 request for information (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “EPA Investigation”), EPA has determined that violations of Section 112(r) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r), and 40 C.F.R. Part 68 occurred at the Refinery.

Information gathered as a result of the EPA Investigation demonstrated that the refinery had knowledge, through process safety information, operational history, and industry guidance and standards, that creep can occur at a more rapid pace when heater tubes are exposed to process temperatures above safe design operating limits, which may cause tube failure. Information gathered as a result of the EPA Investigation revealed that the refinery took steps, in its design and maintenance of the CRU/HTU2 process, to increase the risk for a release to occur. Specifically, it altered the design of the CRU/HTU2 process, in order to increase capacity, by increasing the process temperature and continued to maintain the process at temperatures exceeding safe design operating limits.

On September 4, 2017, tube 23 failed as a result of creep, causing the release of the naphtha/hydrogen mixture, an extremely hazardous substance.

The refinery took steps to exacerbate the risk for creep to occur, rather than taking necessary steps to design and maintain a safe facility to prevent releases, as required by the General Duty Clause. The refinery’s failure to design and maintain a safe facility, including but not limited to taking such steps as were necessary to prevent the September 4, 2017, catastrophic release and resulting fire, is a violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA. As a result of violations, including, but not limited to, the above-listed violation, and pursuant to Section 113(b) of the CAA, the refinery is liable for a permanent or temporary injunction and/or the assessment of civil penalties for each violation of the CAA.

 

Risk Management Program Mechanical Integrity Equipment Deficiencies

40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3) requires the owner or operator of a stationary source with a process subject to Program 3 to implement the prevention requirements of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65 through 68.87. 246.40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e) requires that the “owner or operator shall correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits (defined by the process safety information in [40 C.F.R.] § 68.65) before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.”

Temperature Deficiency

The refinery’s process safety information collected as a result of the EPA Investigation included process safe upper limits for temperatures for the heater tubes in the CRU/HTU2 process. It’s mechanical integrity temperature testing data collected as a result of the EPA Investigation revealed that equipment in the CRU/HTU2 process, namely the heater tubes, repeatedly exceeded the safe upper limits defined by the process safety information. Information gathered as a result of the EPA Investigation demonstrated that necessary means were not taken by the refinery to correct the deficient temperature exceedances in order to assure safe operation. It continued to use the heater tubes until the Fire. The refinery’s failure to correct heater tube temperatures exceeding safe operating limits, as defined by it’s process safety information, when necessary means needed to be taken to assure safe operation, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e), pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

Life Span Deficiency

The refinery’s process safety information collected as a result of the EPA Investigation included life span information for the heater tubes in the CRU/HTU2 process. It’s mechanical integrity inspection information collected as a result of the EPA Investigation revealed recommendations that the heater tubes be replaced by a date certain prior to the Fire. It’s process safety information and industry standards recommend including a “creep factor” when calculating the remaining life of a heater tube, noting that stress from increased heat above safe operating limits significantly reduces the life span of heater tubes. Information gathered as a result of the EPA Investigation demonstrated that despite it’s knowledge of increased heat significantly reducing the life span of heater tubes and recommendations to replace the heater tubes, only approximately ten percent of the heater tubes had been replaced at the time of the Fire, not including heater tube 23. The refinery’s failure to replace heater tubes exceeding safe life span expectancies, as defined by it’s process safety information, when necessary means needed to be taken to assure safe operation, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e), pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Risk Management Program Mechanical Integrity Inspections and Testing

40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3) requires the owner or operator of a stationary source with a process subject to Program 3 to implement the prevention requirements of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65 through 68.87. 259.40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(1) requires that inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment.

40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3) requires that the frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices, and shall occur more frequently if determined necessary by prior operating experience.

Heater Tubes

The refinery’s mechanical integrity inspection rules, collected as part of the EPA Investigation, and industry standards direct that heater tubes should be inspected for evidence of overheating and increase in temperatures. It’s inspection data, collected as part of the EPA Investigation, revealed that temperature testing was conducted on only approximately fifty percent of the heater tubes in the CRU/HTU2 process between January 9, 2015 and June 29, 2017, not including heater tube 23. The refinery’s mechanical integrity inspection rules, collected as part of the EPA Investigation, also directed the refinery to increase the frequency of temperature testing if the results revealed readings with temperatures exceeding safe upper limits. The refinery’s data, collected as part of the EPA investigation, revealed that the frequency of temperature testing was not increased as directed by its own mechanical integrity inspection rules. On at least four testing intervals, when readings indicated heater tube temperatures exceeding safe upper limits, the subsequent temperature testing was not conducted at the frequency directed by its own mechanical integrity inspection rules. From these four testing intervals, approximately forty-nine readings indicated temperatures exceeding safe upper limits. The refinery’s failure to perform inspections and tests on approximately fifty percent of the heater tubes in the CRU/HTU2 process, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3), and it’s failure to perform the inspections at a frequency consistent with good engineering practices determined by it’s own mechanical integrity rules and prior operating experience, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3), pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7).

Piping

The refinery’s mechanical integrity inspection rules, collected as part of the EPA Investigation, and industry standards recommend testing above-ground piping systems at maximum intervals ranging from five to ten years. The refinery’s mechanical integrity inspection records, collected as part of the EPA Investigation, revealed that at least three above-ground piping systems at the Refinery were inspected at intervals of over thirty years. The refinery’s mechanical integrity inspection rules, collected as part of the EPA Investigation, recommend testing below-ground piping systems at maximum intervals ranging from five to ten years and industry standards recommend testing below-ground piping systems at maximum intervals ranging from five to fifteen years. The refinery’s mechanical integrity inspection records, collected as part of the EPA Investigation, revealed that a below-ground piping system at the Refinery was installed in 1982 and not inspected until 2013, a range of thirty-one years. The refinery’s failure to perform inspections and tests of the above-ground and below-ground piping systems at a frequency consistent with good engineering practices as determined by the refinery’s mechanical integrity rules, prior operating experience, and industry’s recommended standards, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3), pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7).

 

Risk Management Program: Program 3 Prevention Requirements

40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3) requires the owner or operator of a stationary source with a process subject to Program 3 to implement the prevention requirements of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65 through 68.87. 274. The EPA Investigation revealed that the refinery failed to implement numerous Program 3 prevention requirements found in 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65 through 68.87, specifically:

(a) Process Safety Information

i.40 C.F.R. § 68.65 requires that the owner or operator shall complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by 40 C.F.R. Part 68, which shall include information related to the equipment in the process including, materials of construction and design codes and standards, and shall document that the equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices.

ii.Documentation collected as a result of the EPA Investigation revealed that the refinery failed to complete a compilation of written process safety information that included materials of construction and design codes and standards for pressure vessel equipment and failed to document that the pressure vessel equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65.

(b)Process Hazard Analysis

i.40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c) and (e) require that the owner or operator shall perform a process hazard analysis that addresses the hazards of the process and shall establish a system to promptly address the team’s findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed; and communicate the actions to operating and maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions.

ii.Documentation collected as a result of the EPA Investigation revealed that the refinery failed to address the hazards associated with a process power loss in the process hazard analysis and failed to assure that the process hazard analysis findings and recommendations were resolved in a timely manner, assure that the resolutions were documented, and document what actions were to be taken, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c) and (e).

(c) Standard Operating Procedures

i.40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a) requires that the owner or operator develop and implement written operating procedures (commonly referred to as “standard operating procedures” or “SOPs”) that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information, and address the elements provided in 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)-(4).

ii. Documentation collected as a result of the EPA Investigation revealed that the refinery failed to develop and implement SOPs that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a). Specifically, the refinery’s SOPs reference valves no longer in service, fail to consistently utilize unique identifiers or designators for process equipment, and do not include procedures for lining up the Main Seal Tank. The refinery’s failure to develop clear SOPs resulted in process upsets and a release of catalyst into the community.

(d) Management of Change

i.40 C.F.R. §§ 68.75(e) and 68.77(b)(2) require the owner or operator to update operating procedures when a significant change or modification is made to the process that results in a change in the operating procedures or practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69, prior to the introduction of a regulated substance into the process.

ii.Documentation collected as a result of the EPA Investigation revealed that the refinery failed to update written operating procedures, prior to the introduction of a regulated substance into the CRU2/HTU2 process, and after a modification was made to the gas delivery system in the CRU2/HTU2 process that resulted in a change in operating procedures, as required by 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.75(e) and 68.77(b)(2).

(e) Compliance Audit

i.40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a) and (d) require that the owner or operator shall certify that they have evaluated compliance with the provisions of Subpart D – Program 3 Prevention Program – (commonly referred to as “the compliance audit”) at least every three years to verify that procedures and practices developed under Subpart D are adequate and are being followed and shall promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that deficiencies have been corrected.

ii.Documentation collected as a result of the EPA Investigation revealed that the refinery:

(a) failed to complete a compliance audit for each process at the Facility at least every three years, including the CRU/HTU2 process;

(b) failed to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each compliance audit finding; and

(c) failed to document that deficiencies were corrected, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a) and (d).

(f) Incident Investigation

i.40 C.F.R. § 68.81(a), (d), and (e) require that the owner or operator shall investigate each incident which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a regulated substance; prepare a report at the conclusion of the investigation; establish a system to promptly address and resolve incident report findings and recommendations; and document resolutions and corrective actions.

ii.Documentation collected as a result of the EPA Investigation revealed that after the Fire and the catastrophic release of the naphtha/hydrogen mixture, the refinery failed to establish a system to promptly address and resolve incident report findings and recommendations and failed to document resolutions and corrective actions taken, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(a), (d), and (e).

 

Risk Management Program: Emergency Response Program

40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(5) requires the owner or operator of a stationary source with a process subject to Program 3 to develop and implement an emergency response program as provided in 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.90 – 68.95.

40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(1)(ii) requires that the owner or operator shall develop and implement an emergency response program that includes an emergency response plan, which shall be maintained at the stationary source, that contains documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposure. The refinery’s emergency response plan, collected as part of the EPA Investigation, failed to contain documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposure. The refinery’s failure to develop and implement an emergency response program that includes an emergency response plan that contains documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposure, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(1)(ii), pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(5), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

CLICK HERE for the EPA citations

 

Here is the OSHA Case file for this fatality:

 

At 1:00 a.m. on September 4, 2017, an employee was checking a condition on the DHT-2 Furnace. The employee sustained 80 percent of his body burned due to a chemical fire and he was killed.