EPA RMP citations @ refinery (HF Releases & $524K)

By /

Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) is a regulated substance listed as a toxic substance. The refinery uses 250,000 lbs of HF at its facility as part of the processes, and if released, could affect 220,000 people within a fifteen (15) mile radius of the facility, according to the Risk Management Program submittals. The refinery uses a water cannon system, which activates upon detection of HF vapor, to suppress releases of HF from the Alkylation unit. On March 5, 2012 300 to 400 lbs of HF vapor released from the Alkylation/Mole Sieve unit at the facility. The release occurred over the course of several hours until the HF vapor mitigation system activated. On March 10 and 11, 2012 an unknown quantity of HF was released from the Alkylation/Mole Sieve unit. Although exact quantity is unknown, both releases were significant enough to activate the HF vapor mitigation system. On May 15, 2012 330 lbs of HF were released from two bleeder valves in the Alkylation/Mole Sieve unit while operators were introducing HF from the storage tank into the unit. The HF vapor water mitigation system activated as a result of the release. Despite the activation of the mitigation system, HF was detected downwind of the Alkylation/Mole Sieve unit within the perimeter of the facility.  As a result of these series of HF releases, on May 21, 2012 the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board sent a letter to EPA Region 6 requesting that EPA perform a comprehensive RMP inspection at the facility. On June 11 through 15, 2012, EPA Region 6, along with EPA headquarters and contract investigators, conducted an unannounced IZMJJ inspection at the facility.

FACTUAL BASIS OF VIOLATIONS

The facility has a throughput of approximately 165,000 barrels of crude oil per day. At all times relevant to this complaint, the following processes were located at the Respondent’s facility:

  1. Alkylation/Mole Sieve
  2. C4 SHP Unit
  3. C5 Merox Unit
  4. Crude/Vacuum Unit
  5. Cumene Unit
  6. FCCU No. 1
  7. FCCU No. 2
  8. Flare System
  9. Gasoline Hydrotreater
  10. LPG Terminal
  11. MTBE Unit No. 2
  12. No. 4 Platformer
  13. Saturated Gas Plant
  14. Sulfur Recovery Unit
  15. UDEX/ADP Units
  16. Gas Oil Unibon Unit
  • At all times relevant to this complaint, 250,000 lbs of hydrogen fluoride (HF), a regulated substance listed at 40 CFR § 68.130 Table 1, was present in the Alkylation/Mole Sieve unit. The RMP regulations specify the threshold quantity of HF at 10,000 lbs.
  • At all times relevant to this complaint, 13,000,000 lbs of butane, a regulated substance listed at 40 CFR § 68.130 Table 3, was present in the LPG Terminal process. The RMP regulations specify the threshold quantity of butane at 10,000 lbs.
  • At all times relevant to this complaint, 4,000 lbs of chlorine, a regulated substance listed at 40 CFR § 68.130 Table 2, was present in each of the following processes located at the facility:
    • Alkylation/Mole Sieve,
    • Cumene Unit,
    • UDEX/ADP Units,
    • FCC No. 1,
    • No. 4 Platformer,
    • MTBE Unit No. 2, and the
    • C4 SHP Unit.
  • At all times relevant to this complaint, 6,000 lbs of chlorine, a regulated substance listed at 40 C.F.R. S 68.130 Table 2, was present in the Crude/Vacuum Unit process. The RMP regulations specify the threshold quantity of chlorine at 2,500 lbs.
  • At all times relevant to this complaint, 120,000 lbs of hydrogen sulfide, a regulated substance listed at 40 C.F.R. § 68.130 Table 1, was present in the Sulfur Recovery Unit process. The RMP regulations specify the threshold quantity of Hydrogen sulfide at 10,000 lbs.
  • At all times relevant to this complaint, 12,000,000 lbs of isobutane [propane, 2-methyl], a regulated substance listed at 40 CFR 68.130 Table 3, was present in the LPG Terminal process. The RMP regulations specify the threshold quantity of isobutane [propane, 2-methyl] at 10,000 lbs.
  • At all times relevant to this complaint 11,000 lbs of Propane, a regulated substance listed at 40 CFR § 68.130 Table 3, was present in the LPG Termininal process. At all times relevant to this complaint, 11,000 lbs of propane, a regulated substance listed at 40 C.F.R. § 68.130 Table 3, was present in the Saturated Gas Plant process. The RMP regulations specify the threshold quantity of propane at 10,000 lbs.
  • At all times relevant to this complaint, 1,000,000 lbs of Propylene [1—propene], a regulated substance listed at 40 CFR § 68.130 Table 3, was present in the LPG Terminal. The RMP regulations specify the threshold quantity of propylene [1-propene] at 10,000 lbs.

At all times relevant to this complaint, Respondent exceeded the threshold quantity of hydrofluoric acid, butane, chlorine, hydrogen sulfide, isobutane, propane, and propylene, all regulated substances, within the following process at the facility:

  1. Alkylation/Mole Sieve
  2. C4 SHP Unit
  3. Crude/Vacuum Unit
  4. Cumene Unit
  5. FCCU No. 1
  6. LPG Terminal
  7. MTBE Unit No. 2
  8. No. 4 Platformer
  9. Saturated Gas Plant
  10. Sulfur Recovery Unit
  11. UDEX/ADP Units

Each of the processes identified is a “covered process” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.

Each of the covered processes is subject to the Program 3 requirements of the RMP Regulations and must, among other things, comply with the Program 3 Prevention Program of 40 CFR Part 68, Subpart D.

 

On March 25, 2011, the Inlet Flange Set was leaking in the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process. On May 11, 2011, a work order was issued to tighten the flange on the Inlet flange Set. The 16 bolts on the Inlet flange Set were torqued on May 19, 2011.  An inspection of the Inlet Flange Set on September 7, 2011, revealed no leaks.

On September 8, 2011, the Inlet Flange was leaking and a work order was prepared to make appropriate repairs. There was no report written to confirm that the repairs listed on the September 8, 2011, work order were ever completed.  The work order was closed on December 30, 2011.

On January 30, 2012, it was reported that notification had been previously submitted for the Inlet flange Set requesting information about the repair status.  A response received on February 1, 2012, was that all of the bolts were scheduled for replacement and torquing according to specifications. 

On February 8, 2012, the bolts on the Inlet Flange Set were repaired by changing all bolts one at a time and torquing the bolts to a minimum of 750 ft-lb.

On February 10, 2012, a management of change was initiated to install a repair clamp on the Inlet Flange Set. On the same day a request was made for drawings for a flange leak repair clamp supports across the Inlet Flange Set.

HF was released on March 5, 2012. On March 5, 2012, at approximately 3:42 p.m., a technician reported an entry to the electronic event log system (EELS) a leak of HF at the inlet nozzle flange and associated piping flange to the Depropanizer Feed Settler vessel (Inlet Flange Set.. EELS indicated that the Area Supervisor advised the technician that work was underway to provide an external clamp for the Inlet Flange Set.
At approximately 6:56 PM, a HF open path detector located on the south side of the Alkylation unit, detected an HF concentration of 126.847 ppm (parts per million). As the concentration exceeded the 100 ppm set point, the Alkylation unit water cannon mitigation system automatically activated. The source or the vapor release was identified on the west side of the Inlet Flange Set. The total emissions were approximately 16 lbs of HF, 1 lb of Ethane, 67 lbs of Propane, 401 lb of i-butane, 42 lbs of n-Butane, and 10 lbs of 1-Pentane.

On March 10, 2012, an unknown amount of HF was released during the restart of the alkylation unit after the March 5, 2012, release.  The March 10, 2012, release activated the water mitigation system.

On March 11, 2012, an unknown amount of HF was released during the restart of the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process after the March 5, 2012, release.  The March 11, 2012, release activated the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process water mitigation system. On May 15, 2012, the refinery reported 330 pounds of HF were released from two bleeder valves as the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit operators were introducing HF acid from a storage tank

On May 15, 2012, the refinery reported 330 pounds of HF were released from two bleeder valves as the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit operators were introducing HF acid from a storage tank in to the unit. On June 11-15, 2012, EPA conducted an unannounced RMP inspection at the Refinery East.

 

On June 11-15, 2012, EPA conducted an unannounced RMP inspection at the Refinery East.

During the inspection, it observed that an eight-inch manual valve on the discharge of the Depropanizer Feed Container (083V015) shown on the Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) is not present in the field.

During the inspection, it observed that PSV-051A on the acid relief vent from the Depropanizer (083VO15) shown on the P&ID is not present in the field.
The P&ID shows a pressure indication gauge on bottoms inlet to the No. 1 Alky Reactor (083ROO1), however during the inspection it observed that this was not present in the field.

 

VIOLATIONS Count 1 Violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(ii)

During the Risk Management Plan inspection that was conducted from June 11 through 15, 2012, EPA’s P&lD field verification of randomly selected equipment and instruments identified inconsistencies between Respondent’s P&ID and the actual field installation. In the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit, an 8″ manual valve on the discharge of the Depropanizer Feed Condenser that is shown on the P&ID as car-sealed open was not car-sealed open in the field. The Pressure Safety valve (PSV) – 051A on the acid relief vent from the Depropanizer shown on the P&ID was not present in the field. A Pressure Indicator gauge on the bottoms inlet to the No.1 Alky Reactor shown on the P&ID was not present in the field. Through its failure to properly document its equipment and instruments actually installed in the field in Respondent’s Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, as demonstrated by the inconsistencies found during the Risk Management Plan inspection, Respondent failed to document information pertaining to the equipment in the process in Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 (d)(1)(ii).

 

Count 2 Violation of 40 C.F,R. § 68.67(f)

A PHA revision was completed for the Gas Oil Unibon unit in January 2007. A PHA Revision was due to be completed in January 2012 for the Gas Oil Unibon unit. As of June 15, 2012, the date of the RMP inspection, the PHA for the Gas Oil Unibon unit had not been completed, making it six months overdue. The facility failed to revise the process hazard analysis (“PHA”) as required and was six months overdue at the time of inspection.  Through its failure to properly update the PHA by January 2012, Respondent failed to update the PHA within the required five year timeframe, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(f).

 

Count 3 Violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)

QPS-000-053 is an operating procedure that has been developed and implemented by respondent which covers loading operations in the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit.  QPS-000-053 is an operating procedure that has been developed and implemented by respondent which covers loading operations in the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit. Step 9 of OPS-000-053, requires operators, prior to start up, to ensure that vent or drain valves operated during the turnaround are properly closed, plugged and tags removed. May 16, 2012, there was an HF release because two HF 3/4” bleeder valves were left open. Step 9 of OPS-000-053 was overlooked.  Through its failure to properly implement step 9 of OPS-000-053, e.g. to ensure the bleeder valves were closed, Respondent failed to implement written operating procedures in violation of section of 40 CFR § 68.69(a). 

 

Count 4 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.69(c)

During the RMP inspection, EPA requested that respondent provide certified operating procedures for all covered processes. Respondent did not provide documentation of the of the facility’s annually certified operating procedures. Through its failure to properly maintain and document its annual certification of the facility’s operating procedures, Respondent failed to annually certify that the facility’s Operating procedures are current and accurate, in violation of 40 CFR § 68.69(c).

 

Count 5 Violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)

API Recommended Practice 751 (Safe Operation of Hydrofluoric Acid Alkylation Units; 3rd edition, June 2007), §2.3.4.2.2 states in relevant part “Sampling systems for streams that contain HF should be designed to minimize exposure of personnel to acid.” Respondent’s HF sampling process ill the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit is complex and involves several manipulations of 33 valves in the correct sequence to obtain adequate purging and clean sampling.  On June 15, 2012 a11 HF release occurred during sampling. The HF Acid sampling procedure and field sampling location does not include valve labeling for the manual operation.  Through its failure lo properly label the valves for manual use in its HF Acid Sampling procedure and in its field sampling location, Respondent failed to follow API Recommended Practice 751 though it’s failure to develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during the opening process equip1nent, in violation of 40 C.FR. § 68.69(d). Count 6 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.71(a) On February 3, 2011, a technician who was temporarily assigned to the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit was involved in a release at the unit. Prior to the new assignment, the technician was not trained for the process of line breaking, which was the technician’s required job in the Alky unit. According to

 

Count 6 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.71(a)

On February 3, 2011, a technician who was temporarily assigned to the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit was involved in a release at the unit. Prior to the new assignment, the technician was not trained for the process of line breaking, which was the technician’s required job in the Alky unit. According to documents the “short lead time did not lend itself to an effective HF safety training program commensurate with his new duties.”  Through its failure to properly train its technician in the process of line breaking before assigning the technician to the Alky unit to do line breaking, Respondent failed to train its employees before having the employees operate a newly assigned process, in violation of 40 CFR § 68.71(a).

 

Count 7 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.73(a)

During the inspection, EPA inspectors asked representatives at the facility for inspection and test records for randomly selected equipment. The inspection and test records were from the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit.

  • Equipment ID Number 83HV09, an automatic by-pass, installed as safety critical interlock alter a 2009 incident at the facility, falls within the 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a) category of emergency shutdown systems and controls. Equipment ID Number 831HV09 was listed as a “safeguard” in respondent’s September 2011 PHA revalidation and should have been included in a scheduled preventive maintenance to ensure the ongoing mechanical integrity and reliability of the equipment. Facility records indicated that equipment ID Number 83HV09 was missing one quarterly inspection/test for 2010 and 2011.
  • Equipment ID Number PI-1013/1012 on 083P008A, a high pressure alarm on double mechanical seals on isobutene recycle pump, falls within the 40 CFR § 68.73(a) category of emergency shutdown systems and controls. Equipment ID Number PI-1013/1012 on 083P008A was listed as a “safeguard” in respondent’s September 2011 PHA Revalidation and should have been included in a scheduled preventive maintenance program to ensure the ongoing mechanical integrity and reliability of the equipment. Facility records indicated that Equipment ID Number PI-1013/1012 on 083POO8A had no scheduled inspections/tests.  Equipment ID Number PI-1015/1014 on 083P008B, a high pressure alarm on double mechanical seals on isobutene recycle pump, falls within the 40 CFR § 68.73(a) category of emergency shutdown systems and controls. Equipment ID Number PI-1013/1012 on 083P008A was listed as a “safeguard” in respondent’s September 2011 PHA revalidation and should have been included in a scheduled preventive maintenance to ensure the ongoing mechanical integrity and reliability of the equipment. Facility records indicated that equipment ID Number PI-1013/1012 on 083P008A had no scheduled inspections/tests.
  • Equipment ID Number PI-950, a pressure indicator with alarm, falls within the 40 CFR 68.73(a) category of emergency shutdown systems and controls.
  • Equipment ID Number PI-950 was listed as a “safeguard” in respondent’s September 2011 PHA Revalidation and should have been included in a scheduled preventive maintenance to ensure the ongoing mechanical integrity and reliability of the equipment. Facility records indicated that Equipment ID Number PI-950 had only one repair work order available for review.
  • Equipment ID Number PC-2, a pressure indicator with alarm, falls within the 40 CFR §68.73(a) category of emergency shutdown systems and controls. Equipment ID Number PC-2 was listed as a “safeguard” in respondent’s September 2011 PHA Revalidation and should have been included in a scheduled preventive maintenance to ensure the ongoing mechanical integrity and reliability of the equipment. Facility records indicated that Equipment ID Number PC-2 had no scheduled inspections/tests.  Further, facility records indicated that there were only 2 repair work orders available to review for PC-2. 
  • Equipment ID Number LI-12, a level indicator with alarm falls within the 40 CFR §68.73(a) category of emergency shutdown systems and controls. Equipment ID Number LI-12 was listed as a “safeguard” in respondent’s September 2011 PHA revalidation and should have been included in a scheduled preventive maintenance to ensure the ongoing mechanical integrity and reliability of the equipment. Facility records indicated that Equipment ID Number LI-12 had no scheduled inspections/tests.
  • Equipment ID Numbers LSH-20B & LSH-22B, double mechanical seals with high level alarms, fall within the 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a) category of emergency shutdown systems and controls.  Equipment ID Numbers LSH-20B & LSH-22B, were both listed as “safeguards” in respondent’s September 2011 PHA Revalidation and should have been included in a scheduled preventive maintenance to ensure the ongoing mechanical integrity and reliability of the equipment. Facility records indicated that inspections of Equipment ID Numbers LSH-20B & LSH-22B were scheduled to be performed during the scheduled turnarounds at the facility.  Further, facility records indicated that the last two tests of Equipment ID Numbers LSH-20B & LSH-22B, performed on May 15, 2005, and June 1, 2011, noted that the system failed.
  • Equipment ID Number FI-119, a flow indication alarm, falls within the 40 CFR §68.73(a) category of emergency shutdown systems and controls.  Equipment ID Number FI-119 was listed as a “safeguard” in respondent’s September 2011 PHA Revalidation and should have been included in a scheduled preventive maintenance to ensure the ongoing mechanical integrity and reliability of the equipment. Facility records indicated that Equipment ID Number FI-119 had no scheduled inspections/tests.
  • Equipment ID Numbers MOV-4AS/MOV-4AD, the HF acid circulating pump’s safety shutdown equipment, falls within the 40 CFR § 68. 73(a) category of emergency shutdown systems and controls. Equipment ID Numbers MOV-4AS/MOV-4AD, were both listed as “safeguards” in respondent’s September 2011 PHA Revalidation and should have been included in a scheduled preventive maintenance to ensure the ongoing mechanical integrity and reliability of the equipment. Facility records indicated that Equipment ID Numbers MOV-4AS/MOV-4AD were to be tested every three months. Further, facility records indicated that there were no tests in 2011, one test in 2010, and none in 2009.
  • Equipment ID Numbers MOC-4CS/MOV-4CD, the HF acid circulating pump’s safety shutdown equipment, falls within the 40 CFR § 68.73(a) category of emergency shutdown systems and controls. Equipment ID Numbers MOC-4CS/MOV-4CD were both listed as “safeguards” in respondent’s September 2011 PHA Revalidation and should have been included in a scheduled preventive maintenance to ensure the ongoing mechanical integrity and reliability of the equipment. Facility records indicated that Equipment ID Numbers MOC-4CS/MOV-4CD were scheduled for testing every three months. Records at the facility indicated that there were no such tests in 2011, one test in 2010, and no tests in 2009.

Through its failure to put emergency shutdown systems and controls in a regularly scheduled preventative maintenance, Respondent failed to maintain the mechanical integrity of regulated equipment, in violation of 40 CFR § 68.73(a).

 

Count 8 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.73(b) The facility’s maintenance and inspection procedure contains a deferral process plan for the repair of covered process items. This deferral process plan places equipment on a high to low priority level to be repaired. Once the equipment is inspected, it is placed on a work order and maintenance receives a notice to repair. If the repair cannot be completed due to circumstances, a team is set up to analyze the situation and establish the priority status for the equipment. No documentation of repairs being performed was found during the review of the facility’s Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit records at the time of inspection. Through its failure to properly document work orders for the repair of process equipment, Respondent failed to implement its written procedures

The facility’s maintenance and inspection procedure contains a deferral process plan for the repair of covered process items. This deferral process plan places equipment on a high to low priority level to be repaired. Once the equipment is inspected, it is placed on a work order and maintenance receives a notice to repair. If the repair cannot be completed due to circumstances, a team is set up to analyze the situation and establish the priority status for the equipment. No documentation of repairs being performed was found during the review of the facility’s Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit records at the time of inspection. Through its failure to properly document work orders for the repair of process equipment, Respondent failed to implement its written procedures lo maintain the mechanical integrity of process equipment, in violation of 40 CFR § 68.73(b).

 

Count 9 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.73(c)

On February 3, 2011 a technician who was temporarily assigned to the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit was involved in a release in which the technician was exposed to HF at the unit. The technician was transferred to the Alkylation/Mole Sieve for turnaround from the BTX and Hydrar unit without the proper training for unit entry and without hands-on training in Level B PPE, which was required for line breaking. The root cause of this release was the technician’s failure to follow “Safe 709.1 HF Safe Operating Procedure.” Through its failure to properly train its technician before assigning the technician to the Alky unit, Respondent failed to train the technician in an overview of that process and its hazards and in the procedures applicable to the technician’s job tasks to assure that the technician would be able to perform the job tasks in a safe manner, in violation of 40 CFR § 68.73(c). Count 10 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.73(c)

 

Count 10 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.73(c) 

The March 5, 2012, incident report indicates almost sixty days elapsed between the leaking of HF in the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit and the building of scaffolding to address the leak. This lapse is documented in the “March 5, 2012, flange Leak at the Alkylation Unit XXXXXX Refining and Chemicals Company, L.P. Report of the Investigation Team, April 3, 2012.”  On September 8, 2011, the acid reactive paint had turned red, which indicated that there was HF leakage.
On February 10, 2012, a Management of Change was initiated to install a repair clamp on the inlet flange.  The release occurred on March 5, 2012, 24 days after the Management of Change had been initiated on February 10, 2012, and a total of 179 days after the acid reactive paint indicated HF leakage on September 8, 2011.
Through its failure to properly address and promptly correct the HF leakage that was initially indicated in September 2011, Respondent failed to correct the deficiencies in its equipment before the equipment was used further, and Respondent did not correct the deficiencies in its equipment in a safe and timely manner, in violation of 40 CFR § 68.73(e). 

Count 11 Violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(f)(2)

After the March 5, 2012, HF release in the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit, an examination revealed that a work order completed in March 2011 resulted in the misalignment of the bolt and flanges. The misalignment allowed HF to be released causing the bolt and the vessel flange to corrode. Through its failure to properly assemble the bolts and flanges, respondent failed to assure that equipment was installed properly and consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer’s instructions, in violation of section 40 CFR § 68.73(f)(2).

 

Count 12 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.75(b)(4)

Respondent’s MOCs fall into three categories: (1) Emergency, for changes that require immediate attention; (2) Temporary, for changes that are not to exceed six months; and (3) Permanent, for changes that exceed six months. On February 10, 2012, an MOC was initiated to install a repair clamp on the inlet flange in the Alkylation/Mole Sieve unit because a color change in the HF reactive paint indicated that hydrofluoric acid (HF) was leaking. This MOC did not have a deadline by which it had to be approved. On March 5, 2012, a release of HF occurred. In the twenty-four days that had passed since the MOC was initiated on February 10, 2012 and the HF release on March 5, 2012, the MOC had not been approved and no action had been taken to install the repair clamp.  Respondent’s MOC # 11-0160 from March 2011 addresses the installation of a reinforced sleeve over a 1.5” seal pan drain line located below the reboiler on the Depropanizer. MOC# 11-0160 states that an x-ray revealed a thin section of pipe wall on the 1.5″ seal pan drain and that the pipe sleeve was installed to maintain integrity of the drain line. The change is described as “Permanent,” yet the MOC implies that the change is temporary by using the description “Update Temporary Clamp List.” A photo in the MOC of the installed pipe sleeve shows that it was installed despite the fact that the MOC has inconsistent timing descriptions.

Through its failure to properly set timeframes or to use consistent timing descriptions in its MOCs before changes are made, Respondent failed to ensure that the procedures used for MOCs addressed the “necessary time period for the change” prior to any change, in violation of 40 CFR § 68.75(b)(4).

 

Count 13 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.77(b)(1)

On May 15, 2012, there was an HF release in the Alkylation/Mole Sieve process unit. The release occurred because two 3/4“ bleeder valves were left open during loading. The pre-Startup Safety Review, SAFE-710.7 Rev. 5 includes Level 3 MOC/Level 3 PSSR Checklist. Step 30 of the level 3 PSSR checklist asks “Valve positions checked?” Proper use and following of this procedure could have prevented the release. Through its failure to properly use and follow its level 3 MOC/Level 3 PSSR checklist to ensure the bleeder valves were closed, Respondent did not satisfy its duty to conduct a pre-startup safety review prior to the introduction of a regulated substance to a process to confirm that equipment is in accordance with design specifications, in violation of section of 40 CFR § 68.77(b)(1).

 

Count 14 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.79(a)

The facility completed a compliance audit in March 2012, more than three years after the facility’s last compliance audit in December 2008. Through its failure to properly complete a compliance audit every three years, respondent failed to evaluate compliance with the provisions of 40 CFR § 68.79 at least every three years, in violation of section of 40 CFR § 68.79(a). Count 15 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.79(d) The compliance audits that were conducted in 2012 had the same findings as the compliance audits that were conducted in 2008. Through its failure to properly address the findings in the 2008 compliance audit so that those same findings would not appear in the 2012 compliance audit, Respondent failed to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that the deficiencies have been corrected, in violation of 40 CFR § 68.79(d). PROPOSED PENALTY As indicated on the attached worksheets, Complainant proposes to assess a civil penalty in the amount of five hundred twenty-four thousand six hundred and

 

Count 15 Violation of 40 CFR § 68.79(d) The compliance audits that were conducted in 2012 had the same findings as the compliance audits that were conducted in 2008. Through its failure to properly address the findings in the 2008 compliance audit so that those same findings would not appear in the 2012 compliance audit, Respondent failed to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that the deficiencies have been corrected, in violation of 40 CFR § 68.79(d). PROPOSED PENALTY As indicated on the attached worksheets, Complainant proposes to assess a civil penalty in the amount of five hundred twenty-four thousand six hundred and

The compliance audits that were conducted in 2012 had the same findings as the compliance audits that were conducted in 2008. Through its failure to properly address the findings in the 2008 compliance audit so that those same findings would not appear in the 2012 compliance audit, Respondent failed to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that the deficiencies have been corrected, in violation of 40 CFR § 68.79(d). PROPOSED PENALTY As indicated on the attached worksheets, Complainant proposes to assess a civil penalty in the amount of five hundred twenty-four thousand six hundred and

 

PENALTY

As indicated on the attached worksheets, Complainant proposes to assess a civil penalty in the amount of five hundred twenty-four thousand six hundred and twenty-five dollars, USD ($524,625.00) for the violations alleged in this complaint.

CLICK HERE for the agreement

Related Posts

Scroll to Top