EPA RMP citations @ specialty chemicals facility (Flammables and Toxics & $1.4M)

Respondent is the owner and operator of the facility. On October 15, 2022, there was an incident at the Facility that resulted in an accidental release of approximately 17,598 pounds of Aluminum Triethyl (ATE). The Incident resulted in an on-site chemical fire at the Facility and a shelter-in-place for the surrounding community.

The Respondent’s facility uses natural gas and by-products from refinery operations to produce specialty chemicals for detergents and cosmetics. The facility uses or produces several regulated flammables such as ethylene, propane, butane, propylene, ethane, hydrogen, methane, and pentane. The Respondent’s processes meet the definition of “process” and “covered process”, as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. The Respondent’s RMP program level 3 covered processes store or otherwise use a regulated substance in an amount exceeding the applicable threshold.

Ethylene Oxide, Hydrogen Flouride, and Chlorine are “regulated substances” pursuant to Section 112(r)(2)(B) of the CAA, and the regulation at 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. The threshold quantity for the regulated substance, Ethylene Oxide, as listed in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, is 10,000 pounds. The threshold quantity for the regulated substance, Hydrogen Flouride, as listed in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130 is 1,000 pounds. The threshold quantity for the regulated substance, Chlorine, as listed in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, is 2,500 pounds.

Respondent has greater than a threshold quantity of Ethylene Oxide, Hydrogen Flouride, and Chlorine in processes at the Facility, meeting the definition of “covered process” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.

EPA Findings of Violation

Count 1 – Process Hazard Analysis

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to assure that nineteen (19) recommendations of the 2016 Process Hazard Analysis were resolved in a timely manner and the actions were completed as soon as possible.

Respondent’s failure to assure that the nineteen (19) recommendations of the 2016 Process Hazard Analysis were resolved in a timely manner, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA

 

Count 2 – Mechanical Integrity

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to implement the inspection schedule required of its written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of various process equipment (mixing tees, injection points, the corrosion under insulation inspection, dead leg inspection, the soil/air interface system).

Respondent’s failure to implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 3 – Mechanical Integrity

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to perform external visual inspections and thickness examinations on various process equipment (circuits and piping lines).

Respondent’s failure to perform inspections and tests on various process equipment, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(1), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7).

 

Count 4 – Mechanical Integrity

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to perform and complete external piping inspections on Class 1 and Class 2 piping in the Alcohol and Ethoxylate (ETO) units as required by American Petroleum Institute (API) 570, failed to complete all Corrosion Under Insulation and Soil-Interface inspections for pressure vessels in the Alcohol Unit in accordance with API 510, and failed to perform internal inspections of pressure vessels T6-677-FB-613A, T6- 663-FB-805, and D7-324-FA-410, in accordance with API 510 and API 653.

Respondent’s failure to perform and complete inspections that follow RAGAGEP, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(2), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 5 – Mechanical Integrity

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to conduct the frequency of inspections and testing of process equipment consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices (various piping lines, piping circuits, and pumps were overdue for testing and inspections).

Respondent’s failure to conduct the frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 6 – Mechanical Integrity

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to correct deficiencies in the piping circuit equipment and the leaking flange located on the condensate line in the process unit, before further use or in a safe and timely manner, when necessary, means are taken to assure safe operation.

Respondent’s failure to correct deficiencies in the piping circuit equipment and the leaking flange located on the condensate line in the process unit, before further use or in a safe and timely manner, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 7 – Management of Change

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to implement written procedures to manage changes to process equipment in that a management of change was not performed for the installation of a pipe clamp, failing to assure that the following considerations were addressed: the technical basis for the proposed change; the impact of change on safety and health; modifications to operating procedures; and the necessary time period for the change.

Respondent’s failure to implement written procedures to manage changes to process equipment, and failing to assure that the following considerations were addressed: the technical basis for the proposed change; the impact of change on safety and health; modifications to operating procedures; and the necessary time period for the change to the stationary source that affected the covered process, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.75(a) & 68.75(b), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 8 – Compliance Audits

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to promptly determine an appropriate response for finding number thirty-five (35) and finding number thirty-eight (38) for the 2016 Compliance Audit and failed to document that the deficiencies had been corrected for the 2019 Compliance Audit findings.

Respondent’s failure to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that the deficiencies have been corrected, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 9 – Incident Investigation

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to establish an incident investigation team, that consisted of at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved for the incident investigations that took place on July 27, 2019, December 20, 2019, December 26, 2019, December 27, 2019, and February 2, 2020.

Respondent’s failure to establish an incident team that consisted of at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(c), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 10 – Incident Investigation

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to prepare an incident investigation report that included the factors that contributed to the incident, for the incident investigation report completed on December 20, 2019.

Respondent’s failure to prepare an incident investigation report that included the factors that contributed to the incident, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(d)(4), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 11 – Incident Investigation

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to prepare an incident investigation report that included any recommendations resulting from the investigation, for the incident investigation reports completed on July 27, 2019, December 20, 2019, December 26, 2019, December 27, 2019, and February 2, 2020.

Respondent’s failure to prepare an incident investigation report that included any recommendations resulting from the investigation, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(d)(5), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 12 – Incident Investigation

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to review the incident investigation reports with all affected personnel whose job tasks were relevant to the incident findings, for the incident investigation reports completed on July 27, 2019, December 26, 2019, December 27, 2019, and February 2, 2020.

Respondent’s failure to review the incident investigation report with all affected personnel whose job tasks are relevant to the incident findings including contract employees where applicable, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(f), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 13 – Mechanical Integrity

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to perform the appropriate checks and inspections to assure that the XV-50272 valve was consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer’s instructions, which resulted in a valve bonnet leak.

Respondent’s failure to perform appropriate checks and inspections to assure that equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer’s instructions, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(f)(2), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 14 – Operating Procedures

At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to implement written operating procedures that provided clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in the nitrogen purging process, as on January 11, 2020, only a single valve was closed, but the nitrogen purging process operating procedure requires double block isolation from atmosphere.

Respondent’s failure to implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 15 – Mechanical Integrity

At the time of the Incident, Respondent failed to establish a written maintenance procedure for the drying of equipment after cleaning and hydrotesting of a trombone cooler and associated piping using water, which would maintain the on-going integrity of the process equipment.

Respondent’s failure to establish a written maintenance procedure for the drying of equipment after cleaning and hydrotesting of a trombone cooler and associated piping using water, which would maintain the on-going integrity of the process equipment, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7).

 

Count 16 – Operating Procedures

At the time of the Incident, Respondent failed to develop and implement an operating procedure, prior to, and during startup following a turnaround, which provided clear instructions and the steps necessary for drying of equipment before safely introducing aluminum triethyl into regulated process.

Respondent’s failure to develop and implement an operating procedure, prior to, and during startup following a turnaround, which provided clear instructions and the steps necessary for drying of equipment before safely introducing aluminum triethyl into regulated process, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(vii), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 17 – Operating Procedures

At the time of the Incident, Respondent failed to develop and implement safe work practices relating to the drying of equipment to provide for the control of hazards associated with aluminum triethyl following the opening of process equipment and the subsequent introduction of aluminum triethyl to the process.

Respondent’s failure to develop and implement safe work practices relating to the drying of equipment in this regard, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 18 – Operating Procedures

At the time of the Incident, Respondent failed to develop and implement an operating procedure, prior to startup following a turnaround, which provided clear instructions and the steps necessary for safely drying the trombone cooler following hydrotesting and prior to start-up of the olefin system.

Respondent’s failure to develop and implement an operating procedure, prior to startup following a turnaround, which provided clear instructions and the steps necessary for safely drying the trombone cooler following hydrotesting and prior to start-up of the olefin system, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(vii), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Count 19 – Availability of Information to the Public

After the Incident, Respondent failed to hold a public meeting to provide information required under § 68.42(b), no later than 90 days after any RMP reportable accident at the stationary source with any known offsite impact specified in § 68.42(a), i.e., sheltering in place.

Respondent’s failure to hold a public meeting to provide information required under § 68.42(b), no later than 90 days after any RMP reportable accident at the stationary source with any known offsite impact specified in § 68.42(a), i.e., sheltering in place, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.210(b), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.

 

Penalty Payment

Respondent agrees that, in settlement of the claims alleged herein, Respondent shall pay a civil penalty of one million, four hundred and forty-one thousand, seven-hundred and twelve dollars ($1,441,712.00), as set forth below.

 

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