At all times relevant to this CAFO, Respondent operated at a facility that refined transmix. Transmix is a mixture of refined products such as gasoline, diesel, and/or jet fuel that results when refined materials are transported in pipelines. The intermingling of products at portions of a pipeline stream can result in the material of an uncertain quality that is collected and sent to a transmix refinery to be separated.
The Respondents operated a refining process at the Facility that contains more than 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia, 5,000 pounds of sulfur dioxide, and 10,000 pounds of hydrogen, at the Facility since before May 1, 2017, and that contains more than 10,000 pounds of a mixture of other flammable substances at the Facility seasonally since February 28, 2005.
On July 11, 2018, an authorized representative of the EPA inspected the Facility to determine the Respondents’ compliance with the Risk Management Program regulations. The inspection conducted by EPA confirmed that the Facility has more than a threshold amount of anhydrous ammonia, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen, and a mixture of flammable substances. The inspection conducted by EPA also identified the alleged violations of CAPP requirements at the Facility described below:
Process Safety Information (40 C.F.R. § 68.65)
The Facility failed:
- to document safe upper and lower limits of the technology of the process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1)(iv).
- to document the consequences of deviations of the technology of the process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1)(v).
- to have accurate Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams, including block valves and safety relief valves, as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(ii).
- to document the design code and standards employed for the pressure relief valves on the sulfur dioxide storage tank as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(iv).
- to document the design codes and standards for the equipment in the process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(vi).
- to document the safety systems for the equipment in the process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(viii).
Process Hazard Analysis (40 C.F.R. § 68.67)
The Facility failed:
- to include the hazards in the process inherent in the standard operating procedures during the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(1).
- to complete initial PHA recommendations in a timely manner of the Hydrotreater process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e).
- complete initial PHA recommendations in a timely manner of the sulfur removal and conversion process developed by ThioSolv LLC known as the SWAATS process (the SWAATS process) as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e).
Operating Procedures (40 C.F.R. § 68.69)
The Facility failed:
- to develop and implement complete and accurate written operating procedures for conducting activities covered in the process including procedures for emergency shutdown and sampling hazardous streams as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a).
- to include consequences of deviation from operating limits in operating procedures for the process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2).
- to include safety and health considerations in operating procedures for the process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(3).
Training (40 C.F.R. § 68.71)
The Facility failed:
- to train each employee in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures including emergency shutdown and safe work practices as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(a)(1).
- to document employee training including ascertaining that the employee understood the training as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(c).
Mechanical Integrity (40 C.F.R. § 68.73)
The Facility failed:
- to include pressure vessels and storage tanks in the mechanical integrity program as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a)(1).
- to include piping systems in the mechanical integrity program as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a)(2).
- to include the anhydrous ammonia storage tank Pressure Safety Valves (PSVs) in the mechanical integrity program as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a)(3).
- to include the emergency shutdown systems in the mechanical integrity program as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a)(4).
- to include controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks) in the mechanical integrity program as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a)(5).
- to include the hydrogen storage process in the mechanical integrity program as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73.
- to train each employee involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of process equipment as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(c).
- to include the required information in the documentation of inspections performed on process equipment as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4).
Management of Change (40 C.F.R. § 68.75)
The Facility failed
- to implement the written management of change (MOC) procedures as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a).
- to address the technical basis for the changes addressed in the August 7, 2017, MOC as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(b)(1).
- to address the impact of the changes addressed in the August 7, 2017, MOC on safety and health as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(b)(2).
- to have proper authorization for the changes on August 7, 2017, MOC prior to enacting those changes as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(b)(5).
- to inform employees and contractors in operating and maintenance affected by the change documented in the August 7, 2017, MOC prior to the start-up of the process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(c).
- to update process safety information from the change documented in the August 7, 2017, MOC as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(d).
- to update operating procedures resulting from the change documented in the August 7, 2017, MOC as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(e).
Pre-Startup Review (40 C.F.R. § 68.77)
The Facility failed
- to confirm safety, operating, maintenance and emergency procedures were in place prior to start-up of the process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.77(b)(2).
- to confirm the recommendations from the PHA had been resolved prior to start-up of the process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.77(b)(3).
- to confirm the training of each employee operating the SWAATS process has been completed prior to start-up of the SWAATS process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.77(b)(4).
- to confirm the training of each employee operating the Hydrotreater process has been completed prior to start-up of the Hydrotreater process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.77(b)(4).
Hot Work (40 C.F.R. § 68.85)
The Facility failed to document the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.252(a) prior to conducting hot work as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.85(b).
Contractors (40 C.F.R. § 68.87)
The Facility failed
- to obtain and evaluate information regarding the contractor owner or operator’s safety performance and programs as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(1).
- to inform the contractor owner or operator of the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to the contractor’s work as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(2).
- to explain to the contract owner or operator the applicable provisions of the emergency action program as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(3).
- to develop safe work practices to control contractors’ entrance, presence, and exit in the process area as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(4).
- to evaluate the performance of the contractor owner or operator as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(5).
Light Gas Bullet (LGB) Storage Tanks
The Facility failed
- to file a Risk Management Plan for the LGB storage bullets as required under 40 C.F.R. Part 68 Subpart G.
- to develop and implement an accident prevention program for the LGB storage bullets as required by 40 C.F.R. Part 68 Subpart D (§§ 68.65-68.87).
- to perform a PHA on the LGB storage process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.67.
- To develop and implement written operating procedures for conducting activities covered in the LGB storage process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a).
- to train each employee in an overview of the LGB storage process and in the operating procedures, including shutdown and safe work practices as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(a).
- to establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of the LGB storage process as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73.
- to conduct an audit on the prevention program to evaluate compliance with the prevention program requirements and verify that procedures and practices are adequate and being followed on the LGB storage process as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.79.
- to conduct a hazard assessment of the LGB storage bullets as required by 40 C.F.R. Part 68 Subpart B (§§ 68.20 -68.42).
Civil Penalty
Based on an analysis of the factors specified in Section 113(e) of the Act, the facts and circumstances of this case, and other factors such as cooperation, EPA has determined that an appropriate civil penalty to settle this action is $299,389.
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