Respondent operates a petrochemical manufacturing facility (NAICS Code 32511) that produces vinyl chloride for use in the plastics industry. The production areas represent a single RMProgram covered process involving sixteen (16) RMProgram regulated chemicals. At its stationary source, the Respondent has 27,000,000 pounds of vinyl chloride and 6,700,000 pounds of chlorine. At its stationary source, the Respondent has one RMProgram level 3 covered process, which stores or otherwise uses regulated toxic and flammable substances in amounts exceeding applicable thresholds. The EPA began an investigation into releases of hazardous chemicals at the Respondent’s facility after EPA received a referral from the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s Department of Environmental Protection concerning a September 12, 2011, release of 11,000 pounds of vinyl chloride. In an CAA Section 114 letter dated March 15, 2016, EPA requested the Respondent to provide information on all chemical releases occurring after January 1, 2011, that the Respondent reported to the National Response Center, and/or to the State Emergency Response Commission and the Local Emergency Planning Committee. In its response, in addition to the September 12, 2011, vinyl chloride release, the Respondent provided information on reportable releases occurring on April 11, 2011; April 25, 2012; August 22, 2013; and June 20, 2014.
- On April 11, 2011, an accidental release of vinyl chloride occurred due to a valve failure on #2 quench bottoms line. Respondent had conducted non-destructive testing (NOT) on related piping but had not been performing NDT on the valves. Additionally, Respondent did not follow management of change (MOC) procedures when changes were made to the material of construction of the piping system.
- On September 12, 2011, an accidental release of vinyl chloride and 1,2-dichloroethane occurred at the North Cracking HCL columns bottoms line when a piping elbow fitting failed. Respondent had not been performing NDT on such piping. Additionally, Respondent failed to identify, evaluate and control the hazards associated with turbulent flow, even though this area of piping was subject to high turbulent flow. Finally, Respondent failed to perform inspections and testing in this area of piping to ensure process mechanical integrity.
- On April 25, 2012, an accidental release of vinyl chloride and 1,2-dichloroethane occurred dwing startup of#13 Furnace and #7 Quench after routine maintenance. Factors contributing to the release included operator error and the Respondent’s failure to consider differences in the design specifications and materials of construction when a gasket was replaced as part of a maintenance process. Respondent failed to implement MOC procedures for the gasket, did not perform any inspection or testing on piping in this area to ensure mechanical integrity and failed to document all the factors that contributed to the incident.
- On August 22, 2013, an accidental release of chlorine occurred occurred in VCL Tank Farm (i.e., Chlorine Bullet Area) when a rupture disc failed four days after it had been installed. Factors contributing to the release included Respondent’s failure to conduct tests and inspection to determine whether a required fitting plug had been installed in the new rupture disc holder assembly.
- On June 20, 2014, an accidental release of 1,2-dichloroethane and vinyl chloride occurred on the East Cracking #4 Quench bottoms piping. Respondent had performed NDT on quench bottom piping but did not perform NOT on draw off lines immediately following which are subjected to turbulent flow. Additionally, Respondent failed to identify, evaluate and control the hazards associated with turbulent flow.
EPA’s National Enforcement Investigations Center (NEIC) conducted an onsite inspection on December 8th through December 11, 2015, to determine the Respondent’s compliance with the Act’s chemical accident prevention provisions. At the time of the inspection, the Respondent’s NDT did not follow API Recommended Practice 574. This API establishes that non-destructive inspection/testing must be repeated at specified Condition (or thickness) Monitoring Locations (CMLs). The CMLs are designated locations (i.e., known/specified examination points) so designated for the purpose of repetitive thickness examinations over time on pressure vessels and piping to monitor the presence and rate of damage and corrosion.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW
Based on EPA’ s compliance monitoring investigation, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated the CAA Section 112(r)(7) of the Act and the implementing
regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 68 when:
- In association with the April 2011 release, it failed to perform inspections and tests on its covered process piping system to ensure process mechanical integrity as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(1), and failed to implement management of change procedures when changing piping system materials of construction, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a);
- In association with the September 2011 release, it failed to determine and evaluate the hazards associated with turbulent flow as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(b), failed to address the engineering and administrative controls applicable to turbulent flow as required 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(3), and failed to perform inspections and tests on covered process piping systems and their component parts to ensure process mechanical integrity as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(q);
- In association with the April 2012 release, it failed to perform inspections and tests on covered process piping systems and their component parts, including failure to ensure process mechanical integrity as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(1), failed to implement management of change procedures when changing piping system component parts’ materials of construction and design specifications, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a), and failed, as part of its incident investigation, to document all of the factors that contributed to the incident as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(d)(4);
- In association with the August 2013 release, it failed to perform inspections and tests on covered process piping systems and their component parts to ensure process mechanical integrity as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(1);
- In association with the June 2014 release, it failed to determine and evaluate the hazards associated with turbulent flow as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(b), and failed to address the engineering and administrative controls applicable to turbulent flow as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(3); and
- In relation to the December 2015, NEIC inspection, it failed to follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices when performing inspections and tests on covered process piping systems and their component parts to ensure process mechanical integrity as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(2).
Respondent agrees to pay the civil penalty of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT DOLLARS ($48,968)
Supplemental Environmental Project
Respondent shall undertake and complete the following Emergency Planning and Preparedness project within 45 days of the effective date of this CAFO. Respondent
shall expend no less than ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($183,500) for the purchase of
- two (2) AutoRAE 2 Kits with inCase Calibration configured with standalone AutoRAE 2 cradle for QRAE3 and custom foam for up to 3 instruments [kits include 2 QRAE 3s (O2/LEL/CO/H2S) with wireless,
- 1 cylinder of calibration gas,
- 1 regulator and supporting accessories], and two (2) Echo View Host Mini Controllers,
- 900 MHz, for the Marshall County Emergency Management Agency; and
- ten (10) MSA G 1 Control Modules with integrated thermal imaging cameras,
- twenty-four (24) MSA G1 SCBAs with spare low carbon wrapped cylinder with GSA quick connect remote cylinder connection and spare G 1 facepiece with speed-on head harness and nose cup, and
- one (1) MSA G 1 rechargeable battery charging station for the Livingston County Office of Emergency Management