Respondent owns and operates the winery facility that crushes grapes to produce wine, distilled spirits and juice for concentrate at its Facility. These products are stored prior to shipment to other facilities for further packaging and distribution. In September and November 2015, EPA performed inspections of the Facility pursuant to Section 112(r) of the, CAA, Sections 304-3 12 of EPCRA, and Section 103 of CERCLA. Based upon the information gathered during this inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent violated certain provisions of the CAA.
On March 29, 2018, EPA and the United States Department of Justice jointly determined that this matter, although it involves alleged violations that occurred more than one year before the initiation of this proceeding, is appropriate for an administrative penalty assessment.
EPA’S ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
COUNT I (failure to comply with management requirements)
40 C.P.R. § 68.15(c) requires that when owners or operators assign responsibility for implementing individual requirements of Part 68 to persons other than the person identified under paragraph §68.15(b), owners or Operators shall document the names or positions of these people and the lines of authority shall be defined through an organization chart or similar document.
EPA determined that Respondent did not adequately document Its management system with an organization chart or other similar document that sufficiently shows and assigns responsibility for implementing individual requirements of the RMP.
By failing to comply with management requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.15(o).
COUNT II (failure to comply with hazard assessment requirements)
40 C.F.R. § 68.39 requires that owners or operators maintain the following records on the offsite consequence analyses:
(a) for worst-case scenarios, assumptions and parameters used, and the rationale for selection;
(b) for alternative release scenarios, a description of the scenarios identified, assumptions and parameters used, and the rationale for the selection of specific scenarios.
40 C.F.R. 68.36(a) requires that owners or operators review and update the offsite consequence analyses at least once every five years. At the time of the inspection, Respondent documented its offsite consequence analysis in a September 5, 2004 report. In 2009, Respondent documented that Respondent reviewed the 2004 offsite consequence analysis and determined that a revision was not required. Respondent revised its offsite consequence on September 9, 2016 and updated it on May 31, 2017.
EPA determined that from 2004 to September 2016, Respondent did not maintain adequate records that addressed various factors described in 40 C.F.R. § 68.25(i) – Worst Case Scenario and 40 C.F.R. § 68.28(b) – Alternative Release Scenario.
EPA determined that Respondent did not update its offsite consequence analysis every 5 years to reflect
(a) the single vessel at the Facility with the greatest amount of regulated substance, and
(b) the updated 2010 census data. As such, EPA determined that Respondent should have updated the analysis in 2014.
By failing to maintain records that addressed the Worst-Case Scenario and Alternative Release Scenario and by failing to update its offsite consequence analysis, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.36(a) and 68.39.
COUNT III (failure to comply with process safety requirements)
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(iii) requires that owners or operators complete a compilation of written process safety information that includes the maximum intended inventory.
EPA determined that Respondent’s process safety information did not Provide the correct maximum intended inventory of ammonia for the eight processes at the Facility.
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(ii) requires that information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include piping and instrument diagrams (P&lDs).
EPA determined that the P&ID for Plant 20 showed the high—pressure liquid ammonia line on the high—pressure receiver color coded incorrectly and the P&lDs for Plant I did not show the new piping into the diffusion tank.
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2) requires that the owner or operator shall document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”), EPA generally determines RAGAGEP with reference to standards published by established industry organizations and manufacturers’ requirements and recommendations.
EPA determined that some of the anhydrous ammonia pipes, valves and equipment in the Facility were not labeled in accordance with industry standards as reflected in Section 5.14.5 of the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (IIAR)—2 —2014 “Standard for Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems” (specifies that ammonia piping mains, headers and branches to be identified) and Section 4.2 of the IIAR Bulletin No. 114 (2014) Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components (specifies that component markers bear the name of the equipment they identify, (e.g., RECEIVER, ACCUMULATOR, etc.), or equivalent.
During the inspection, EPA observed portable stairs near the high-pressure receiver associated with the king valve (or main shut off or isolation valve) in Plant 20 and that the Tower 2 king valve was not reachable from the ground because it was blocked by permanent equipment.
EPA also determined that the king valve in Plant 20 was not labeled. Section 6.3.3.2 of the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”)/IIAR 2—2014, specifies that at a minimum isolation valves are to be “directly operable from the floor or chain operated from a permanent work surface”.
Section 4.10.3 of the IIAR Bulletin No. 109 (1997) “IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System,” specifies the main shut—off (e.g., a king valve) of the ammonia system to be readily accessible and identified with a prominent sign having letters sufficiently large to be easily read.
Section 5.14.3 of the ANSI/IIAR-2-2014, specifies that “valves required for emergency shutdown of the system shall be clearly and uniquely identified at the valve itself…”
EPA determined that spilled grape press liquid on the ground and equipment in Plant I was not managed in accordance with industry standards, as reflected in Section 11.6 of ANSI/American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers 15-2016 “Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems” (specifies that refrigeration systems are maintained a clean condition, free from accumulation of oily dirt, waste, and other debris, and kept accessible at all times).
By failing to maintain accurate information pertaining to the maximum intended inventory, failing to maintain P&lDs to accurately reflect equipment in the process, and filing to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65.
COUNT IV (failure to comply with process hazard analysis requirements)
40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e) requires that owners or operators establish a system to promptly address the findings and recommendations in the process hazard analysis; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; and develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed.
EPA determined that Respondent did not adequately address all the findings and recommendations identified in the Process Safety Management/RMP Combined Action Item List for the 2011, 2012, and 2014 Process Hazard Analyses (“PHA”) in a timely manner.
By failing to promptly address PHA findings and recommendations, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R, §68,67(e).
COUNT V (failure to comply with operating procedure requirements)
40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)-(4) requires that owners or operators develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements, (2) operating limits, (3) safety and health considerations, and (4) safety systems and their functions.
EPA determined that
(1) Respondent’s written emergency shutdown procedure for the Facility failed to provide clear instructions, for safely conducting activities; and
(2) Respondent’s written emergency operations procedure for the Facility failed to include operating limits, safety and health considerations and safety systems and their functions.
40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c) requires that owners or operators review operating procedures as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice, including changes that result from changes in process chemicals, technology, and equipment, and changes to stationary sources; and further certify annually that these operating procedures ate current and accurate.
EPA determined that Respondent did not certify its operating procedures in 2013, 2014 and 2016. By failing to adequately comply with operating procedures requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69.
COUNT VI (failure to comply with mechanical integrity requirements)
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(2) requires that owners or operators follow RAGAGEP for inspection and testing procedures.
EPA determined that Respondent had not replaced or inspected and tested (i.e., recertified) some of the Facility’s pressure relief devices within a five-year period from installation consistent with RAGAGEP, as reflected in lIAR Bulletin 110 “Guidelines for Startup, Inspection and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems” Section 6.6.3.1 (2007) (specifies that “Pressure relief devices shall be replaced or recertified… every five (5) years from the date of installation”).
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e) requires that owners or operators correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits (defined by the process safety information in § 68.65) before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.
EPA determined that Respondent had not corrected some of the deficiencies identified in the 2013 Mechanical Integrity (“Ml”) Assessment Report that were outside acceptable limits, in a safe and timely manner.
By failing to comply with mechanical integrity requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73.
COUNT VII (failure to comply with compliance audit requirements)
40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a) (Compliance Audits) requires that owners or operators certify that they have evaluated compliance with the provisions of this subpart at least every three years to verify that procedures and practices developed under this subpart are adequate and are being followed.
Respondent documented its most recent compliance audits in reports dated May 11, 2011 and November 14, 2014.
EPA determined that Respondent did not certify that compliance was evaluated by May 2014, three years after the May 2011 Compliance Audit.
40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d) requires that owners or operators promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that deficiencies have been corrected.
EPA determined that Respondent did not document that some of the deficiencies identified in the 2011 and 2014 compliance audits have been promptly corrected.
By failing to certify that compliance was evaluated every three years and by failing to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the compliance audits, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.79.
COUNT VIII (failure to comply with incident investigation requirements)
40 C.F.R. §68.81(a), (d), and (g) require that the owner or operator investigate each incident which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a regulated substance, prepare a report at the conclusion of the investigation, and retain the report for five years.
EPA determined that Respondent did not investigate and prepare a report for the October 9, 2014 ammonia release.
40 C.F.R. §68,81(b) and (d)(2) requires that owners or operators initiate an incident investigation as promptly as possible, but not later than forty-eight hours following the incident and prepare a report at the conclusion of the investigation which includes at a minimum the date the investigation began.
EPA determined that Respondent did not include the date investigation began on its incident report for the ammonia releases that occurred on October 1, 2015 and May 10, 2016.
By failing to adequately investigate and document the above-described incidents, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. §68,81.
COUNT IX (failure to comply with contractor requirements)
40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(5) requires that owners or operators periodically evaluate the performance of their contract owner or operator in fulfilling their obligations as specified in paragraph (c) of this section.
EPA determined that Respondent did not periodically evaluate the performance of their main contractor in fulfilling their obligations.
By failing to comply with contractor evaluation requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b(5).
COUNT X (failure to comply with emergency response program requirements)
40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a) requires that owners or operators develop and implement an emergency response program for the purpose of protecting public health and the environment. Such program shall include the following elements:
(1) an emergency response plan, which shall be maintained at the stationary source and contain documentation of proper first—aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures; and
(2) procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance.
EPA determined that Respondent did not document in its emergency response plan for the Facility:
(1) the proper first—aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures; and
(2) procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing and maintenance (e.g., personal protective equipment and respirators).
By failing to comply with emergency response program requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a).
CIVIL PENALTY
EPA proposes that Respondent be assessed, and Respondent agrees to pay FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE DOLLARS ($57,839.00), as the civil penalty for the violations alleged herein.
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
As a condition of settlement, Respondent shall perform the supplemental environmental project (“SEP”) specified in this Section. Performance of the tasks detailed in this Section shall constitute the satisfactory performance of the SEP, which the parties agree are intended to provide significant environmental and/or public health protection and improvements.
The SEP is to install and integrate new controls and equipment to allow for remote shutoff of each ammonia refrigeration system with a computer elsewhere in the Facility. A total of eighteen (18) solenoid valves (“SVs”) will be installed on the ammonia high-pressure liquid (HPL) line of each high— pressure receiver (“HPR”). These SVs will be integrated into existing controls and equipment to allow for remote shut off. Each SV will be installed in series with an existing HPR hand isolation valve. In addition, eight (8) existing emergency shut off switches (“E-Stops”) will be replaced with new E-Stops: one for each ammonia refrigeration system. The functionality of the new E-Stops will be upgraded to allow for remote shutoff of the ammonia refrigeration system compressors. While equipped with high pressure automatic shut off equipment, the current system configuration, without the SEP equipment/control modifications, requires that an operator and/or emergency responder manually close the hand isolation valve(s) (or king valve(s)) and press an E-Stop to shut down an ammonia refrigeration system in certain emergency situations.
The SEP modifications described above will have the following environmental and safety benefits:
- allow for remote shut off control of the ammonia refrigeration systems for maintenance and/or emergency events;
- standardize the location of the e-stops in the Facility; and
- decrease emergency shutdown response time if ammonia refrigeration equipment leaks thus potentially reduce human exposure and the amount of ammonia released to the environment.
The SEP modifications are not required by 40 C.F.R. Part 68 or currently reflected in RAGAGEP references.
On or before August 1, 2020, Respondent shall complete the tasks described below in accordance with relevant industry codes and standards and regulations, including 40 C.F.R. Part 68. Any modifications to the design element below that may be required due to unforeseen field conditions shall be substantially equivalent and be consistent with industry standards, and shall not reduce the safety benefits of the intended project:
(1) Prior to equipment procurement document Management of Change which includes, at a minimum, updating the P&ID, and modifying or revalidating the PHA
(2) Install eighteen (18) SV groups on each HPR outlet HPL line (SV groups consist of solenoid valves and strainer assemblies, downstream isolation valves; service drain valves, and strainer drain valves) and replace tamper resistant e-stops on each of the Facility’s eight (8) ammonia refrigeration systems;
(3) Integrate electrical and controls service including integration of the new e-stops and SVs with existing computer controls and programming updates.
(4) Prior to adding ammonia to the system, complete Pre-Startup Safety Review which includes, at a minimum, updating all related operating procedures and conducting training on the modified emergency shutdown procedure; and
(5) Update the Facility’s RMP documentation including, Process Safety Information and Mechanical Integrity program, Emergency Response Program, and other documentation as required by 40 C.F.R. Part 68.
Respondent shall expend at least THREE HUNDRED FIFTY ThOUSAND DOLLARS ($350,000) to complete the SEPs described herein.
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