SPECIAL NOTE: the Cl2 was generated by a truck unloading incident that was a WRONG CHEMICAL-WRONG TANK event (phosphoric acid to sodium hypochlorite) which produced 973 pounds of Cl2.
Respondent owns and operates two amino acid manufacturing facilities located near each other (the Facilities). One Facility specializes in food and beverage industries (Foods), and the other Facility specializes in animal nutrition. At all times relevant to this CAFO, Respondent produced, processed, handled, and/or stored hydrogen chloride (hydrochloric acid) < 37% (Chemical Abstract Service [CAS] 7647-01-0) and phosphoric acid (CAS 7664-38-2) at the Facilities; and produced, processed, handled and/or stored sodium hypochlorite (CAS 7681-52-9).
Each of the substances above, is an “extremely hazardous substance” within the meaning of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C § 7412(r)(1), commonly known as the General Duty Clause. Respondent is subject to the requirements of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, because it is the owner and operator of stationary sources that are producing, processing, handling, or storing substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(3), and/or extremely hazardous substances pursuant to Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1).
On August 21, 2021, a valve on a storage tank at the Foods Facility failed, resulting in a release of approximately 177,256 pounds of hydrochloric acid, employee evacuations, and a shelter-in-place order for the city. Hydrochloric acid is corrosive and can cause eye damage, severe burns, and injury to the mouth, throat, esophagus, and stomach.
On September 23, 2022, a delivery truck driver unloading phosphoric acid connected to a sodium hypochlorite fill line pipe at the Facility. The mixing of phosphoric acid and sodium hypochlorite resulted in a release of approximately 973 pounds of chlorine gas, employee evacuations, a shelter-in-place order for employees, and the treatment and release of approximately 15 Heartland employees at a nearby hospital. Chlorine (CAS 7782-50-5) is a poisonous gas that is corrosive and a strong oxidizing agent that can react explosively with or support the burning of other common materials, and can be lethal and create hydrochloric acid in the lungs.
The unanticipated emissions from extremely hazardous substances into the air described in Paragraphs 35 and 37, above, at the Facilities constitute “accidental releases” as defined by Section 112(r)(2)(a) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(A).
Respondent uses anhydrous ammonia at the Facilities to manufacture amino acids. Anhydrous ammonia (CAS 7664-41-7) is a “regulated substance” pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. The threshold quantity for anhydrous ammonia, as listed in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, is 10,000 pounds.
At all times relevant to this CAFO, Respondent had great than 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in a process at both Facilities.
Alleged Violations
Complainant hereby states and alleges that Respondent has violated the CAA, EPCRA, and federal regulations promulgated thereunder as follows:
Failure to Identify Hazards
The EPA inspection revealed that Respondent did not identify hazards which may result from releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques at the Heartland Facility, including the failure to identify hazards associated with the incompatible mixing of sodium hypochlorite and phosphoric acid, which when mixed react and produce chlorine gas. Recognizing the hazards associated with mixing sodium hypochlorite and phosphoric acid is an industry standard identified by the Chlorine Institute, Pamphlet 96, Sodium Hypochlorite Manual, 4th ed.; The Chlorine Institute: Arlington, VA, October 2011 – Appendix D Accidental Mixing Guidance.
Respondent’s failure to identify hazards which may result from accidental releases using appropriate hazard techniques is a violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1).
Failure to Design and Maintain Safe Facilities
The EPA inspection revealed that Respondent’s design and maintenance of the chemical unloading area at the Heartland Facility were inadequate to prevent the truck unloading phosphoric acid from connecting to the sodium hypochlorite fill line pipe and tank. The sodium hypochlorite unloading pipe connection was located directly next to the phosphoric acid unloading pipe connection, there was inadequate legible signage to identify the chemical unloading pipe, and inadequate operating procedures for truck unloading. Appropriate design for chemical unloading bulkheads, tank citing and spacing, legible signage and unloading procedures for these chemicals are industry standards identified by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for Chemical Process Safety: Mixing Incompatible Materials in Storage Tanks, February 2017; and Chemical Safety Board Case Study No. 2917-01-I-KS,
December 2017: Key Lessons for Preventing Inadvertent Mixing During Chemical Unloading Operations.
The EPA inspection revealed that Respondent failed to ensure that maintenance materials, spare parts, and equipment were suitable for the process application for which they were used at the Foods Facility. Respondent’s investigation into the August 2021 hydrochloric acid release found that the original valve on the hydrochloric acid tank had been replaced with a used valve without reviewing information on the valve’s remaining service life or its compatibility with the tank. Regularly inspecting and maintaining the mechanical integrity of tanks and equipment are industry standards identified in the American Petroleum Institute
Standard 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, and Standard 574, Inspection Practices for Piping System Components.
Respondent’s failures to design and maintain the chemical identify hazards which may result from accidental releases using appropriate hazard techniques are violations of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1).
Program 3 Violations
The EPA inspection revealed that Respondent failed to implement the Program 3 prevention requirements of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65 through 68.87, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3). Specifically:
a. At both Facilities, the process hazard analyses (PHA) failed to address engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases and the consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(3) and (4). Specifically, the PHAs referenced standards that do not exist and did not identify any associated controls or the consequences of failure of those controls.
b. At both Facilities, failures to comply with the mechanical integrity requirements of Program 3 at 40 C.F.R. § 68.73. The Heartland Facility failed to implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of the ammonia vent line to the vent tank, which was expired, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b). The Foods Facility failed to perform and/or document mechanical integrity inspections of the anhydrous ammonia distribution process piping, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d).
c. At both Facilities, failures to include the date each investigation began in the incident investigation reports for the August 2021 hydrochloric acid release and September 2023 chlorine release, in violation of 40 C.F.R.
§ 68.81(d)(2).
d. At the Heartland Facility, failure to establish management of change procedures that address the necessary time period for the change, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(b)(4).
e. At the Foods Facility, failure to ensure and document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices for the emergency shower and eyewash locations, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2). In particular, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) provides that emergency showers and eyewash stations shall be installed within 10 seconds walking time from the location of a hazard (approximately 55 feet). At the Foods Facility, an emergency shower and eyewash station were located downstairs from a process injection point that could lead to employee exposure. Respondent did not ensure and document that the equipment complied with the ANSI standard.
Respondent’s failures to comply with Program 3 prevention requirements of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65 through 68.87, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), are violations of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7).
Emergency Response Violations
At both Facilities, Respondent did not coordinate at least annually response needs with local emergency planning and response organizations.
Respondent’s failures to coordinate at least annually response needs with local emergency planning and response organizations, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.93, are violations of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7).
Risk Management Plan Violations
The EPA inspection revealed that Respondent had not updated the 24-hour telephone number for the Facilities’ emergency contact within one month of a change to the emergency contact.
Respondent’s failures to correct the emergency contact information within one month of any change to that information, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.195(b), are violations of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7).
Failure to Submit Tier II Forms
Section 312(a) of EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a), and the implementing regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 370, require the owner or operator of a facility which is required by OSHA to prepare or have available a SDS for a hazardous chemical, to prepare and submit to the SERC, community emergency coordinator for the LEPC, and fire department with jurisdiction over the facility annually by March 1, an emergency and hazardous chemical inventory form for the previous calendar year. The form must contain the information required by Section 312(d) of EPCRA, covering all hazardous chemicals present at the facility at any one time during the preceding year in amounts equal to or exceeding 10,000 pounds.
The EPA inspection revealed that Respondent did not submit an emergency and hazardous chemical inventory form to the three response entities for the twenty-two hazardous chemicals identified above for the calendar year 2021.
Respondent’s failures to submit an emergency and hazardous chemical inventory form to the SERC, community emergency coordinator for the LEPC, and fire department with jurisdiction over the facility for each of the twenty-two chemicals identified above for calendar year 2021, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 370.40(a), are violations of Section 312(a) of EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a).
Respondent agrees that, in settlement of the claims alleged herein, Respondent shall pay a civil penalty of $458,265 as set forth below.
Supplemental Environmental Project
In response to the violations of the CAA and EPCRA alleged in this Consent Agreement and Final Order and in settlement of this matter, although not required by the CAA, EPCRA, or any other federal, state, or local law, Respondent shall complete the SEP described in this Consent Agreement and Final Order, which the parties agree is intended to secure significant environmental or public health protection and improvement.
Respondent shall complete the following SEP: Install and operate an anhydrous ammonia water deluge system with an upgraded sump basin and pump to contain high water flow from the system at its anhydrous ammonia Program 3 covered process at the Foods Facility.
Respondent shall spend no less than $227,589 on implementing the SEP. Respondent agrees that the SEP shall be completed on or before July 31, 2025.
Respondent selected the SEP identified in this Consent Agreement and Final Order. This Consent Agreement and Final Order shall not be construed to constitute EPA approval or endorsement of the equipment or technology purchased and installed by Respondent
in connection with the SEP.
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