This case is interesting, as I have always challenged the concept that an engine room (membership required)with large roll-up utility doors and windows and personnel/fire doors that are found propped open more often than not would contain the “catastrophic release of NH3”. It seems this EPA inspector was one who attended one of my 5-Day Advanced Process Safety courses, and I was able to convince him/her of this limitation. (LOL)
Respondent operated a facility that utilizes anhydrous ammonia for cold storage and freezing peaches, nectarines, plums, and strawberries. On December 19-20, 2018, EPA performed an inspection of the Facility to evaluate compliance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) Section 103, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to Know Act (“EPCRA”) Sections 304-312, and CAA Section 112(r). Based upon the information gathered during the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent violated specific provisions of the CAA.
On May 26, 2023, Respondent reported an incident at the Facility involving two refrigeration employees, which resulted in a 0.57-pound release of anhydrous ammonia.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
Count 1 – Failure to Comply with Offsite Consequence Analysis and Process Safety Information Requirements
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent relied on a passive mitigation system (i.e. the building) but failed to demonstrate in its worst-case release scenario that the building would passively mitigate a release despite relying on passive mitigation in its hazard assessment.
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that the Facility did not document that the equipment complies with RAGAGEP. Specifically:
- Although section 8.11.2 of American National Standards Institute (“ANSl”)/American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) provides that “[e]ach refrigerating machinery room shall have a tight-fitting door or doors opening outward, self-closing if they open into the building and adequate in number to ensure freedom for persons to escape in an emergency … there shall be no openings that will permit passage of escaping refrigerant to other parts of the building,” the barn door stayed open during the duration of the Inspection, and did not appear to be tight- fitting;
- Although section 13.3.2.6 of International Institute of All-Natural Refrigeration 2-2021 states, “[s]hut-off valves connecting ammonia-containing equipment or piping to the atmosphere shall be capped, plugged, blanked, or locked closed during operating, service, or standby conditions when they are not in use,” there were open-ended pipes lacking plugs or caps in the engine room and the blast freezer;
- Although American Society of Mechanical Engineers Al3.1-15 section 3.1 states that “[p]ositive identification of the contents of a piping system shall be by lettered legend, giving the name of the contents in full or abbreviated form. Arrows shall be used to indicate the direction of flow. Where flow can be in both directions, arrows in both directions shall be displayed. Contents shall be identified by a legend with sufficient additional details such as temperature, pressure, etc., as are necessary to identify the hazard,” the Facility piping lacked adequate and consistent labeling, and
- Although ANSI/ASHRAE 15-2013, section 11.6 provides “(r]efridgerating systems shall be maintained by the user in a clean condition, free from accumulations of oily dirt, waste, and other debris, and shall be kept accessible at all times,” the ammonia machinery room did not have functional, tested ventilation.
For existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use, under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(3 ), the owner or operator must determine and document that the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner.
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that the Facility did not document that the equipment that did not comply with the RAGAGEP described above were designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to analyze and report in its RMP that the building would passively mitigate a release in a worst-case release scenario despite relying on passive mitigation, and by failing to comply with RAGAGEP or document that its exist in g equipment was safe, Respondent violated the offsite consequence analysis and process safety information requirements set forth at CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.25(h), 68.65(d)(2) and 68.65(d)(3).
Count 2 – Failure to Ensure Mechanical Integrity
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that Respondent did not have individualized checklist sheets for specific equipment/vessels. The inspection checklist only contained one task box to verify all nine pieces of equipment/vessels.
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, the EPA determined that several pieces of equipment had mechanical integrity deficiencies outside acceptable limits. Specifically, the EPA observed heavy ice buildup on compressors, recirculation, oil pots, pipes, and valves and rusty and corroded ammonia piping above the air purger.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment, and by failing to correct deficiencies with equipment that are outside acceptable limits before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.73(b) and (e).
Count 3 – Failure to Conduct Refresher Training
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to conduct annual fit testing training to ensure that respirators at the facility fit its employees properly since 2018.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to conduct annual fit testing training to ensure safe work practices applicable to the employee’s job tasks, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(b) and (c).
Count 4 – Failure to Comply with Compliance Audit Requirements
Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, EPA determined that although Respondent completed a compliance audit on October 25, 2018, on the date of the inspection there were 32 remaining action items, with 17 items still in progress and 19 items that neither had dates of completion nor status and only listed the name of the responsible party.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that by failing to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d).
CIVIL ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY
Respondent agrees to pay a civil penalty for TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($25,250) within thirty (30) days after the date the Final Order ratifying this Agreement is filed.
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
In response to the alleged violations of CAA, and in settlement of this matter, although not required by CAA, or any other federal, state or local law, Respondent agrees to implement a supplemental environmental project (“SEP”), as described generally paragraph 63, and more specifically in Attachment A, which is incorporated herein by reference.
Respondent shall complete an emergency planning and preparedness SEP, consisting of purchasing and providing equipment, as described in further detail below, to the Fresno Fire Department (“FFD”) in Fresno, California. FFD is an all-risk fire service organization that responds to emergency and hazardous materials incidents locally and regionally. The equipment will allow FFD to be better prepared and respond more effectively to incidents involving chemicals and other hazardous materials.
Respondent shall purchase and provide to the FFD the following equipment:
- One Honda Pioneer utility task vehicle (“UTV”) to assist the hazardous materials response team in entering exclusion zones further away from the decontamination reduction zone for safer and faster response;
- One 8.5×24 feet and 14,000-pound gross vehicle weight rating trailer to haul the Honda Pioneer UTV and associated tools and equipment needed;
- Personal protective hazmat gear which consists of six (6) level B suits and associated head protection gear, twenty (20) hardhats, which are rated for chemical splash protection in a hazardous materials response;
- Refrigerant detection equipment, which includes the lnficon R-134a detector and the Bacharach Leak Detector H-10 Pro to assist firefighters in detecting refrigerant concentrations and help to reduce potential exposure to areas considered immediately dangerous to life and health;
- Technology package for hazmat response, including two (2) iPads and the associated devices, to assist in transferring information from the exclusion zone to the support zone for the incident commander to make sound decisions for the safety of the responding crews; and
- Miscellaneous pack out tool and fifty-four (54) storage bins which will assist in transporting equipment to and from the scene and keep the equipment organized between responses .
Respondent shall spend no less than NINETY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN DOLLARS ($90,857) on implementing the SEP.
Respondent shall complete the SEP within twelve (12} months after the Effective Date of this CA/FO.
CLICK HERE for the CAFO