Respondent operates a facility where it processes fish to produce ingredients used by pet food manufacturers (the “Facility”). The Facility is located in a designated industrial area within approximately 300 feet (0.05 mile) of JFK Memorial Highway, less than 500 feet (0.09 mile) from the nearest residence, and approximately 600 feet (0.11 mile) from Buzzard’s Bay. At the time of the violations alleged herein, a worst-case release of ammonia from the Facility could have seriously injured people off-site. At the time of the EPA inspection, 8,400 pounds of ammonia and 1,007 pounds of sulfuric acid were present at the Facility.
This CAFO resolves the following CAA and EPCRA violations that EPA alleges occurred in conjunction with Respondent’s storage and handling of anhydrous ammonia at its pet food-making facility:
a. failure to identify hazards which may result from accidental releases of extremely hazardous substances, in violation of the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1);
b. failure to design and maintain a safe facility, taking such steps as are necessary to prevent such releases, in violation of the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1);
c. failure to minimize the consequences of accidental releases, should they occur, in violation of the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(l); and
d. failure to timely submit Tier 2 hazardous chemical inventory forms to the proper authorities, in violation of Section 312(a) of EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a), and its implementing regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 370.
Pursuant to Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, handling, or storing substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA, or any other extremely hazardous substance, have a general duty, in the same manner, and to the same extent as 29 U.S.C. § 654, to
(a) identify hazards which may result from accidental releases of such substances using appropriate hazard assessment techniques;
(b) design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and (c) minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur.
This section of the CAA is referred to as the “General Duty Clause.”
The extremely hazardous substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(3), include, among others, anhydrous ammonia. The term “accidental release” is defined by Section 112(r)(2)(A) of the CAA, as an unanticipated emission of a regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance into the ambient air from a stationary source.
EPCRA Statutory and Regulatory Authority
In accordance with Section 311(a) of EPCRA, the owner or operator of a facility who is required to prepare or have available an SDS for a hazardous chemical under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) of 1970 shall submit to the state emergency response commission (“SERC”), local emergency planning committee (“LEPC”), and the fire department with jurisdiction over the facility an SDS for each chemical present at the facility in quantities equal to or greater than the chemical-specific minimum threshold level. Section 311(b) of EPCRA, authorizes EPA to establish eliminate or reduce the hazard.
The SDSs must be submitted within three months after the owner or operator of a facility first becomes subject to OSHA’s requirements for hazardous chemicals and following discovery by an owner or operator of significant new information concerning an aspect of a hazardous chemical for which an SDS was previously submitted.
In accordance with Section 312(a) of EPCRA, the owner or operator of a facility that is required under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) to prepare or have available an SDS for a hazardous chemical must prepare and submit an emergency and hazardous chemical inventory form (“Tier l” or “Tier 2” form) to the state emergency response commission (“SERC”), the local emergency planning committee (“LEPC”), and the local fire department. Tier 1 or Tier 2 forms must be submitted annually on or before March 1 and are required to contain chemical inventory information with respect to the preceding calendar year. Additionally, Section 312(b) of EPCRA, authorizes EPA to establish minimum threshold levels of hazardous chemicals for the purposes of Section 312(a) of EPCRA.
Under 40 C.F.R. §§ 370.30-370.33, the owner or operator of a facility must report the presence of hazardous chemicals exceeding the minimum threshold level by submitting an SDS or by submitting a list of all hazardous chemicals grouped by health and physical hazards to the LEPC, SERC, and the fire department with jurisdiction over the facility within three months after the facility becomes subject to reporting requirements and after discovering significant new information about a hazardous chemical for which an SDS was submitted.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
At the time of the violations alleged herein, the Facility had a refrigeration system, which cycled approximately 8,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia through various physical states to cool Respondent’s products. Accordingly, Respondent “stored” and “handled” anhydrous ammonia.
Anhydrous ammonia is an “extremely hazardous substance” subject to the General Duty Clause.
Ammonia and sulfuric acid are “hazardous chemicals” subject to requirements under EPCRA Sections 311 and 312.
Due to the dangers associated with anhydrous ammonia, the ammonia refrigeration industry has developed industry standards to control the risks associated with the use of ammonia. In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“IIAR”) has issued (and updates)
“Standard 2: Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems,” along with other applicable standards and guidance.
Bulletins and guidance include without limitation:
- IIAR Bulletin No. 109, Guidelines for IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria/or a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System (1997);
- IIAR Bulletin No. 110, Guidelines for Start-Up, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (rev. 2002);
- IIAR Bulletin No. 114, Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components (1991 and 2014 editions);
- IIAR Bulletin 116, Guidelines for Avoiding Component Failure in Industrial Refrigeration Systems Caused by Abnormal Pressure or Shock (1992); and
- 2005 Ammonia Refrigeration Management Program (“IIAR ARM Program”), which is intended for systems containing less than 10,000 pounds of ammonia.
Also in collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 15: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems.” These standards are consistently relied upon by refrigeration experts and are sometimes incorporated by reference into state building, mechanical, and fire codes.
On August 9, 2016, EPA visited the Facility to determine whether the Respondent was complying with Section 112(r) of the CAA and Section 312 of EPCRA. The EPA inspectors toured the following areas of the Facility with the Plant Controller, and New Bedford Fire Department Training Officer:
- the processing room,
- the cold storage freezer,
- the refrigeration system ammonia machinery room (AMR),
- the maintenance room, and
- the perimeter of the Facility.
At the time of the violations alleged herein, Respondent’s ammonia refrigeration system (“System”) had several components typically found in such systems, some of which are described below:
a. Compressors: After being allowed to evaporate, ammonia gas flows at low pressure to a compressor where it is compressed to a higher pressure. This compression process also raises the temperature of the gas. The hot, compressed vapor is then in a thermodynamic state known as a superheated vapor and is at a temperature and pressure at which it next will be condensed with either cooling water or cooling air. Oil is used in the compressors to help seal them and lubricate the compressor’s parts. Used oil must be regularly removed from the compressors.
b. Automatic purgers (“Auto-Purger”): A mechanical device integrated into a system that gathers, separates, and expels non-condensable gases (gases, commonly including air, nitrogen, hydrogen, and hydrocarbons, that will not liquefy at the temperatures and pressures present in condensers consistent with industrial refrigeration system) from multiple points in the refrigeration system without operator assistance.
c. Pumps and valves: Like most ammonia refrigeration systems, the System had multiple pumps and valves to move and control the flow of ammonia through the System. Receivers have “king valves” that can be used to stop the flow of ammonia from the receivers to the rest of the System during an emergency. Closing the king valve can shorten the duration of any continuing ammonia releases. Often solenoid valves near these king valves can be activated by emergency switches outside the building so that emergency responders do not have to enter a building filled with ammonia vapors to tum off a system. This System did not have any such emergency switches.
d. Piping: Pipes throughout the Facility and on the roof carried ammonia in all its various physical states.
e. Ammonia detectors: These devices, typically placed in ammonia machinery rooms, detect ammonia vapors that have been released at certain concentrations. They activate alarms to warn of a release, and they activate ventilation systems to prevent vapors from building up to dangerous levels. It is essential for detectors to be properly placed, maintained, calibrated, and connected to alarms and ventilation systems so that they can fulfill their function.
f. Emergency controls: An emergency control box, typically placed outside the designated machinery room door, allows emergency responders to control releases by actuating key refrigeration system equipment, such as compressors, ventilation, and king valves.
g. Evaporators: These are the units in which the ammonia is allowed to evaporate (at a low -28°F boiling point), drawing and absorbing the heat from a room as the ammonia evaporates, thereby cooling a room.
During the inspection, the compressors at the Facility went into shutdown mode. The inspection team observed the ammonia detection levels to be one part per million (ppm) in the Ammonia Refrigeration Room (AMR) and nine ppm in the pressure relief valve (PRV) vent line. Piping from the Auto-Purger discharged into a 33-gallon plastic container underneath the Auto-Purger. The container was filled with water and smelled of ammonia, indicating that ammonia had been released at some point from the Auto-Purger. After further investigation by the Facility, it was determined that the system went into emergency shutdown mode due to overheating of a Variable Speed Drive, a liquid-cooled motor transistorized PWM inverter that is the motor starter and capacity control for the System’s compressor. Additionally, the Vent Line Sensor that showed a reading of nine ppm was determined to be out of calibration.
EPA alleges that during the August 9, 2016 inspection, the EPA Inspectors observed potentially dangerous conditions relating to the System. The alleged potentially dangerous conditions are listed in the chart attached hereto as Attachment A, which is incorporated by reference into this CAFO.
During the closing conference of the inspection, the EPA Inspectors identified areas of concern to be addressed by the Facility, including the following:
a. Lack of information about System: There were no standard operating procedures and no piping and instrumentation diagrams to help employees, contractors, emergency responders, or regulators understand the System.
b. No Hazard Review: There was no hazard analysis/review to identify all the hazards associated with the system.
c. Piping not protected from physical damage: There were no safeguards in place to protect piping that was at risk of damage due to close proximity to pallets and potentially fork lifts.
d. Widespread corrosion: Multiple sections of uninsulated piping showed signs of surface rust. Portions of the insulation on a pressure vessel were missing or damaged, and ice had built up underneath the insulation of a surrounding tank and piping. There was substantial corrosion on the support beams supporting the condensers.
e. AMR not separate from the remainder of Facility: The AMR was not sealed off from other parts of the building using tight-fitting construction and tight-fitting doors.
f. Combustible materials in AMR: Combustible materials were stored between the AMR vessels, including welding equipment and extra cylinders of ammonia.
g. Inadequate labeling of pipes and valves: The piping and valves were not all properly labeled to indicate contents, the direction of flow, the physical state of the refrigerant, and pressure level.
h. Inadequate visual/audible alarms: The ammonia detection system alarm outside of the primary door to the AMR did not contain an audible alarm. There were no other audio/visual alarms in the Facility.
i. Inadequate signage throughout Facility: The ammonia detection system alarm outside of the primary door to the AMR was not labeled. Several doors did not have adequate signs identifying the presence and hazards of ammonia. Machinery did not contain permanent signs displaying the required information about the operation of the System and Facility personnel. Access openings on condensers lacked confined-space warnings.
j. No spring-loaded valve for safe oil draining: The oil drain system did not have either a self-closing or manual quick-closing emergency stop valve, or other suitably engineered system that is intended to immediately close the system in the event of a problem, minimizing a release of ammonia and reducing the likelihood that a mechanic will face injury from exposure to ammonia when draining oil from the System.
k. Inadequate ventilation capacity: The Facility’s maximum ventilation calculations were based only on the area that holds the refrigeration equipment and the maintenance area.
The emergency exhaust fan may not have the minimum required capacity because the calculations did not include all areas open to the AMR.
l. Excessive storage of ammonia: The facility is storing a minimum of 400 lbs. of ammonia inside the AMR.
m. Lack of safety showers: There was no safety shower in the AMR.
n. Improperly placed discharge relief The ammonia system PRV discharges downward through a pipe that was not higher than the building roofline.
o. No emergency action plan: The Facility did not provide an action plan detailing procedures for responding to an ammonia release.
p. Failure to submit EPCRA Tier II Reports for reporting years 2011-2015: The Facility failed to submit the required Inventory Forms to the appropriate LEPC, the SERC, and the local fire department.
On November 10, 2016, EPA issued a Potential Notice of Violation and inspection rep01t to Respondent, providing notice of potential General Duty Clause violations. Respondent was responsive to the letter and began taking steps to address alleged deficiencies at the Facility. According to Respondent, Respondent has completed the following actions:
a. Installed a higher ammonia relief stack with a diffuser that extends above the roof line and meets UAR standards;
b. Commissioned and mounted a set of P&IDs;
c. Commissioned a full 3rd Party Mechanical Integrity Inspection and is addressing identified concerns;
d. Designed and constructed a tight wall to separate the AMR from the dock and facility;
e. Established a monthly maintenance contract with American Refrigeration Co. to ensure that ammonia detectors are inspected monthly and tested every six months per manufacturer recommendations;
f. Waterproofed and maintained the exterior condenser;
g. Purchased additional Personal Protective Equipment;
h. Maintained and painted piping;
i. Disposed of six empty 100-pound cylinders of ammonia;
j. Re-calibrated the Vent Line Sensor and ordered a replacement sensor;
k. Removed the ancillary maintenance equipment and combustible materials from AMR;
l. Replaced degraded insulation;
m. Removed four 100-pound cylinders of ammonia;
n. Ordered replacement parts for the Variable Speed Drive that overheated during August 9, 2016 inspection;
o. Drafted Emergency Plans;
p. Undertook employee training;
q. Filed Tier II Report for RY 2015;
r. Developed Limited Process Safety Management Program/ARM Program;
s. Obtained a Massachusetts Hazardous Materials Processing Permit from the XXXXXXX Fire Department;
t. Completed upgrade of the detection system, including audio/visual alarms, additional emergency shutdown/ventilation controls, and upgrades to system software;
u. Protected pipes from physical damage;
v. Improved signage and labeling;
w. Installed a quick-closing valve on all system oil pots;
x. Sealed machinery room doors and walls; and
y. Installed safety showers and eyewash stations.
As a result of EPA’ s inspections and review of information provided by Respondent, EPA alleges the following violations:
COUNT I – FAILURE TO IDENTIFY HAZARDS IN VIOLATION OF THE CAA’S GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE
Respondent owns or operates a stationary source that handled and stored anhydrous ammonia, an extremely hazardous substance. Accordingly, at the time of the violations alleged herein, Respondent was subject to the General Duty Clause.
Industry standards and guidelines with respect to ammonia refrigeration systems are found in, among other places, ANSI/IIAR Standard 2, ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15, IIAR bulletins, the IIAR ARM Program, and other materials consistently relied upon in the refrigeration industry.
The recommended industry practice and standard of care for identifying, analyzing, and evaluating potential hazards associated with ammonia refrigeration systems of the same size and type as Respondent’s System is to use, among other things, standard, industry developed hazard identification checklists, a “What If’ analysis, or a Hazard and Operability (a/k/a “HAZOP”) study. IIAR has developed checklists for this purpose. See, e.g., IIAR ARM Program, Section 10 and Appendix 10.1. See also IIAR’s Bulletin No. 110, Startup, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems, Section 5.2.1; and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance for Implementation of the General Duty Clause Clean Air Act Section II 2(r)(l), May 2000 (“EPA’s GDC Guidance”), Section 2.3.1, currently available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/gendutyclause-rpt.pdf.
According to EPA’s GDC Guidance, the General Duty Clause’s duty to identify hazards that may result from hazardous releases includes determining
(a) the intrinsic hazards of the chemicals used in the processes,
(b) the risks of accidental releases from the processes through possible release scenarios, and
(c) the potential effect of these releases on the public and the environment.
The document that contains this analysis is often referred to as a process hazard analysis or process hazard review (“Process Hazard Review”).
EPA alleges that EPA Inspectors and the Expert observed potentially dangerous conditions at the Facility that indicated a failure to identify hazards associated with the System. Moreover, Respondent was not able to produce any Process Hazard Review while the EPA inspectors were at the Facility during the inspection.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated the General Duty Clause’s requirement to identify hazards associated with the refrigeration system using industry recognized hazard assessment techniques, in violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
COUNT II-FAILURE TO DESIGN AND MAINTAIN A SAFE FACILITY IN VIOLATION OF THE CAA’S GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE
The recommended industry practice and standard of care for designing and maintaining a safe facility with an ammonia refrigeration system of the same size and type as Respondent’s System is to base design considerations upon applicable design codes, federal and state regulations, and industry guidelines to prevent releases or minimize their impacts as well as to develop and implement standard operating procedures, maintenance programs, personnel training programs, management of change practices, incident investigation procedures, self audits, and preventative maintenance programs. HAR, ASHRAE and others have developed standards and guidelines for this purpose, such as the IIAR Bulletins, ANSI/IIAR Standard 2, the IIAR ARM Program, and ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15. See also EPA’s GDC Guidance, Section 2.3.2 and National Fire Protection Association 1, Fire Code, Section 53.
At all times relevant to the allegations in this CAFO, Respondent failed in its general duty to design and maintain the Facility as a safe facility, taking such steps as were necessary to prevent a release of an extremely hazardous substance, in at least the respects listed in the subparagraphs below. Attachment A provides more information about each listed hazard, such as examples of industry standards of care that address each type of hazard, and an explanation of how each hazard could result in a harmful release or exacerbate the consequences of a release. The industry standards of care illustrate how the ammonia refrigeration industry has recognized hazards associated with designing and maintaining an ammonia refrigeration system and developed measures to reduce such hazards. Some of the hazards listed in the subparagraphs below also have resulted in violations of the General Duty Clause’s third duty, as further discussed in Count III.
a. Inadequate information available about System: At the time of the EPA inspection, inadequate documentation was available about the technology and equipment of the ammonia refrigeration system. For example, there was no Process and Instrumentation Diagram or floor plan that would allow Facility personnel, inspectors, or emergency responders to identify the location of key System equipment, piping, and valves. Such information is critical to conducting a Process Hazard Review, writing standard operating procedures, and setting up an appropriate preventative maintenance program. Attachment A, pages 1 to 2, lists examples of industry standards of care for documenting ammonia refrigeration system information.
b. Piping not protected from physical damage: There were no safeguards in place to protect piping on the mezzanine level and evaporators in the cold storage freezer that was at risk of damage due to close proximity to pallets and potentially forklifts. The mezzanine and freezer room contained pallets with drums on them, and the only way to get palleted materials on the mezzanine level was via forklift and hydraulic jack lift in close proximity to ammonia piping and evaporators. This
risks an ammonia release from accidental damage to the system components. Attachment A, pages 6 to 7, lists examples of industry standards of care for safeguarding refrigeration system equipment.
c. Widespread corrosion: At the time of the EPA inspection, there were severely corroded pipes and components throughout the facility, risking ammonia release if corrosion continues to the point of failure. EPA Inspectors found surface rust on specific uninsulated pipes and piping components, reducing the useful life of the equipment. Multiple sections of uninsulated piping showed signs of surface rust. Portions of the insulation on a pressure vessel were missing or damaged, and ice
had built up underneath the insulation of a surrounding tank and piping. There was substantial corrosion on the support beams supporting the condensers. Attachment A, pages 7 to 10, lists examples of industry standards of care for avoiding corrosion.
d. Combustible materials and extra ammonia in AMR: At the time of the EPA inspection, there were combustible materials stored in the machinery room, including at least 400 pounds of extra ammonia stored in cylinders and portable welders. These conditions increase the risk of fire or explosion in the event of an ammonia release because ammonia is flammable at certain concentrations. A fire or explosion also could cause a much bigger release of ammonia that would otherwise occur. Accordingly, this condition also was a violation of the duty to minimize the consequences of releases that do occur, as alleged in Count III, below. Attachment A pages 13 to 15, lists examples of industry standards of care for fire safety in ammonia machinery rooms and for use and storage of ammonia cylinders in ammonia machinery rooms.
e. Inadequate visual/audible alarms and detectors: At the time of the EPA inspection, the ammonia detection system alarm outside of the primary door to the AMR did not contain an audible alarm. There were no other audible/visual alarms or detectors in the Facility. Ammonia detectors and alarms provide early warning that a release is taking place, enabling a quick system shutdown and response, and protecting workers, emergency responders, and the public from a larger release. Failure to have a vapor detector also was a violation of the duty to minimize consequences of releases that do occur, as alleged in Count III, below. Attachment A, page 10 to 11, lists examples of industry standards of care for visual and audible alarms and detectors in ammonia machinery rooms.
f. Inadequate signage and labeling on System: There was inadequate signage and labeling on various parts of the System, which meant that workers maintaining the system and emergency responders responding to releases did not have the information needed to safely perform their jobs. Signs and posted information can provide a level of protection in addition to training and operating procedures, keeping workers from inadvertently causing releases and allowing responders to quickly understand the System. Examples of deficient labeling and signage include the following:
I. There was not a legible, permanent sign anywhere on the System indicating the name and address of the installer, the refrigerant number and amount of refrigerant in the System, lubricant identity and amount, and the field test pressure(s) applied;
II. The piping and valves were not labeled to indicate contents, direction of flow, physical state (i.e., liquid or vapor), pressure level (i.e., high or low). Nor were there distinctive markers for other system components (e.g., high-pressure receiver, accumulator, etc.);
III. The door to the machinery room lacked appropriate hazard warning labels and signage (including emergency procedures), increasing the chance of inadvertent exposure to ammonia and potentially frustrating efforts to react quickly and safely during an ammonia release.
IV. There were no tags or other documentation for pressure relief valves showing the date of installation and when they had last been inspected.
V. The ammonia detection system alarm outside of the primary door to the AMR was not labeled.
VI. Access openings on condensers lacked confined space warnings. Some of the labeling and signage deficiencies also violated the duty to minimize the consequences of releases that do occur, as alleged in Count III, below. Examples of industry standards of care for a permanent, legible sign on the System are provided in Attachment A, page 5; on pages 2 to 4 for piping and component labeling; on page 4 for door labeling; on pages 10 to 11 for alarm labeling; and on page 18 for confined-space labeling.
g. Poor design of oil drain system: At the time of the EPA inspection, Respondent did not have an oil drain system that was self-closing, a manual quick-closing emergency stop valve, or other suitably engineered systems. A spring-loaded valve would immediately close the System in the event of a problem during oil draining, minimizing a release of ammonia and reducing the likelihood of catastrophic injury to a mechanic draining oil from the System. This condition also was a violation of the duty to minimize the consequences of releases that do occur, as alleged in Count III, below. Attachment A, page 10, lists examples of industry standards of care for oil drain systems.
h. Inadequate ventilation capacity: The Facility’s maximum ventilation calculations were based on the rectangular room that includes the refrigeration equipment and the maintenance area. The calculations did not include the other areas of the Facility that are open to the AMR without separation, including the loading dock/hallway and the processing room. Due to the inaccurate calculations, the installed emergency exhaust fan may not meet ventilation requirements. Inadequately-sized pressure relief valves and header could result in a buildup of ammonia vapors to levels that present significant inhalation and dermal hazards or that risk causing fire or explosion. The buildup of dangerous levels of toxic and flammable vapors in a machinery room can delay the entry of emergency response personnel to shut off the system, resulting in a prolonged release. Accordingly, in addition to being a violation of the duty to design and maintain a safe facility, this condition also was a violation of the duty to minimize consequences of releases that do occur, as alleged in Count III, below. Attachment A, pages 12 to 13, lists examples of industry standards of care for ventilating ammonia machinery rooms.
COUNT III-FAILURE TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASES THAT DO OCCUR IN VIOLATION OF THE CAA’S GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE
Industry standards and guidelines for minimizing the consequence of an accidental release from ammonia refrigeration systems are found, among other things, in the IIAR ARM Program, ANSI/UAR Standard 2, ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15, IIAR bulletins, and other materials (including updates and revisions) consistently relied upon by refrigeration experts. They include design and maintenance measures to minimize the severity and duration of releases that do occur, such as, among other things, standards for vapor detection, alarms, equipment and door labeling, emergency shut-off switches, ventilation, keeping combustible materials and electrical hazards away from ammonia, safe oil drain systems, tight construction of machinery rooms; designing safe pressure relief valves and associated piping; reducing obstructions for responders; and having emergency eye wash stations and showers.
In addition, EPA’s General Duty Clause Guidance discuss the standard of care for emergency response planning at facilities that have extremely hazardous substances, such as anhydrous ammonia. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for emergency planning at ammonia refrigeration systems of this size is to inter alia, design and implement an emergency response plan that specifically addresses release scenarios developed from hazard analyses and facility-based knowledge; identifies emergency response equipment and its whereabouts, includes communication with and involvement of emergency planning and response officials (e.g., the Local Emergency Response Planning Committee); incorporates accident training for employees; and involves conducting periodic exercises to ensure that the plan is adequate to address emergency scenarios. EPA’s GDC Guidance at 16-18, referencing items from EPCRA Section 303(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11002. IIAR, ANSI, ASHRAE, and other organizations have developed standards and guidelines for this purpose, including, among other things, ANSI/HAR Standard 2, the IIAR ARM Program (2005), and ANSI/ ASHRAE Standard
For example, Section 7 of IIAR’s ARM Program for smaller ammonia refrigeration systems provides that refrigeration facilities should develop an up-to-date, facility specific emergency response plan that accurately describes the facility and the potentially affected population. Such a plan should include, among other items, types of evacuation; evacuation procedures and routes; procedures for employees who remain to maintain critical operations; procedures for accounting for evacuated employees; any employee’s rescue and medical duties; and means for reporting emergencies. An adequate emergency response program should also identify procedures for responding to an ammonia release, including shutting the system down; starting emergency ventilation; and coordinating with relevant off-site emergency responders. IIAR’s ARM Program, Section 7.
Respondent failed in its general duty to minimize the consequences of an accidental release of an extremely hazardous substance at or from the Facility, in accordance with applicable industry standards for systems of this size, in at least the following respects. Examples of industry standards of care are found in Attachment A.
Design and maintenance measures to minimize releases that do occur
Inadequate emergency ventilation system in machinery room: As explained in Count II, the ammonia machinery room had an inadequate emergency ventilation system. Without adequate ventilation, vapors are more likely to build up to levels that are hazardous to human health or that risk causing fire or explosion. Moreover, a buildup of vapors makes it difficult to turn off equipment in the machinery room. Responders and employees cannot enter the machinery room to tum off the equipment until vapors have been ventilated, resulting in a prolonged release.
Inadequate visual/audible alarms and detectors: As explained in Count II, the ammonia detection system alarm outside of the primary door to the AMR did not contain an audible alarm. There were no other audio/visual alarms or detectors in the Facility. Ammonia detectors and alarms provide early warning that a release is taking place, enabling quick response and protecting workers, emergency responders, and the public from a larger release.
Poor design of oil drain system: As discussed in Count II, Respondent did not have an oil drain system that was self-closing, a manual quick-closing emergency stop valve, or other suitably engineered system. A spring-loaded valve would immediately close the System in the event of a problem during oil draining, minimizing a release of ammonia and reducing the likelihood of catastrophic injury to a mechanic draining oil from the System.
Combustible materials and extra ammonia in AMR: As discussed in Count II, there were combustible materials stored in the machinery room, including at least 400 pounds of extra ammonia stored in cylinders. These conditions exacerbate the risk of fire or explosion if there is an ammonia release because ammonia is flammable at certain concentrations. A fire or explosion could result in a much bigger release of ammonia than would otherwise occur.
Inadequate signage and labeling on System: As discussed in Count II, above, there was inadequate signage and labeling on various parts of the System, including doors, pipes, valves and equipment. The lack of signage and labeling could prevent workers and emergency responders responding to releases from having the information they would need to safely and timely perform their jobs. Signs and posted information provide a level of protection in addition to worker training and operating procedures.
Machinery room door and walls not sealed tight: At the time of the EPA inspection, the AMR was not sealed off from other parts of the facility with tight-fitting construction. A door from the chemical storage rooms into the AMR had a gap at the bottom of the door and was not tight-fitting. In the event of a release, this risks the spread of ammonia vapors to other parts of the Facility and outdoors, putting employees and responders at risk.
Attachment A, pages 15 to 16, lists examples of industry standards of care for machinery room doors and construction.
Emergency response and preparedness planning to minimize releases
Inadequate emergency action plan or coordination with fire department:
Respondent did not report the presence and amounts of ammonia ( or other chemicals) to emergency response and planning agencies as required by EPCRA. Also, the Facility had no emergency action or response plan. Examples of industry standards of care for emergency planning and coordination are found in Attachment A at page 18 and in paragraph 57, above.
Lack of safety showers: At the time of the EPA inspection, there were no safety showers inside or directly outside of the AMR. There was an eyewash station inside the AMR.
The lack of adequate safety showers and eyewash stations would make it difficult for emergency responders and workers to safely respond to releases and wash off ammonia, a corrosive and toxic chemical, in the event of exposure. Examples of industry standards for the placement of eyewashes and safety showers are found in Attachment A at page 16.
Improperly placed discharge relief: At the time of the EPA inspection, the ammonia system PRV vent header piping discharged through a gooseneck pipe that exits the east wall of the AMR. The discharge point for the pipe was not higher than building roofline, and the line discharged downward. Improperly placed discharge reliefs can result in ammonia being sprayed on people during a release, further exacerbating the consequences of a release. Examples of industry standards for the placement of pressure relief device discharge piping are found in Attachment A on page 17.
Accordingly, Respondent violated the requirement to minimize the consequences of any accidental release of anhydrous ammonia which does occur, as required under the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(1) by failing to:
notify emergency planners and responders about the presence and amount of ammonia on-site; develop and implement adequate emergency response procedures;
have adequate ventilation;
have adequate detector and alarm systems;
have a proper oil draining system;
have proper signage on machinery room doors, piping, and System components;
control fire hazards in and around the AMR;
seal the machinery room and doors tightly;
properly place discharge relief pipes; and
have eye wash stations and showers inside and outside of the AMR.
COUNT V: FAILURE TO SUBMIT CHEMICAL INVENTORY FORMS IN COMPLIANCE WITH EPCA SECTION 312
Pursuant to Section 312 of EPCRA, and 40 C.F.R. Part 370, commencing on or before the March 1 following the date upon which Respondent was required to prepare or have available an SDS for anhydrous ammonia and sulfuric acid at or in connection with the Facility, and on or before the March I of each year thereafter, Respondent was required to submit “emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms,” containing the data regarding anhydrous ammonia and sulfuric acid at the Facility, required under Section 312, for the preceding calendar year (“Inventory Form”), to the appropriate LEPC, the SERC, and the fire department with jurisdiction over the facility.
At the time of the EPA inspection, 8,400 pounds of ammonia and 1,007 pounds of sulfuric acid were present at the facility. Respondent had not reported the presence of either hazardous chemical at the Facility.
Specifically, Respondent was required to submit Inventory Forms to the appropriate LEPC, the SERC, and the fire department with jurisdiction over the Facility, at least on or before the following dates:
a. March 1, 2012 for reporting year (“RY”) 2011;
b. March 1, 2013 for RY 2012;
c. March 1, 2014 for RY 2013;
d. March 1, 2015 for RY 2014; and
e. March 1, 2016 for RY 2015
At the time of the EPA inspection, Respondent had never submitted Inventory Forms to the appropriate LEPC, the SERC, and the fire department with jurisdiction over the Facility.
Accordingly, Respondent’s failure to submit the required Inventory Forms for reporting years 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 violated Section 312 of EPCRA and 40 C.F.R. Part 370.
Supplemental Environmental Project
Respondent shall provide emergency response equipment to the XXXXXXXX Fire Department according to the specifications described in Attachment C. The purpose of this SEP is to enhance the chemical spill response capabilities, including those for an ammonia release, for local first responders.
The cost of this SEP is approximately $99,000.
Respondent shall provide the emergency response equipment described in Attachment C to the New Bedford Fire Department in three installments within twelve months of issuance of this CAFO.
The facts alleged in this CAFO, the SEP, and such other circumstances as justice may require, EPA has determined that it is fair and proper to assess a civil penalty of $89,140 for the violations alleged in this matter.
Respondent shall pay the penalty of $89,140 in two installments over four months from the effective date of this CAFO. The first payment of $8,000 shall be made within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this CAFO. The second and final payment of $82,154.25, an amount that includes $1,014.25 in interest at a rate of five percent per month shall be made within 120 days of the effective date of this CAFO.