The Respondent’s facility consists of a large distribution warehouse, including a cold storage area, over 100 truck loading bays, 80 trucks, a truck maintenance garage, a diesel fueling depot, an administrative office, and an employee cafeteria and locker rooms. There is an approximately 1,500 square foot ammonia refrigeration machinery room (the “Machinery Room”) located at the northwest end of the warehouse. The refrigeration equipment in the Machinery Room includes compressors, evaporators, condensers, and other machinery described below. The diesel fueling depot located on the west end of the truck maintenance garage contains a 10,000-gallon aboveground storage tank (“AST”) and a 5,000 gallon AST that each contain diesel fuel. The Facility is located in an industrial park, with a high school and a large residential community located less than one-quarter mile away. At all times relevant to the violations alleged herein, the Facility’s ammonia refrigeration system used approximately 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. A sign on the control panel outside the machinery room stated that the system was charged with 9,995 pounds of ammonia, a charge that is within 0.05% of the threshold amount of 10,000 and therefore likely to sometimes exceed the 10,000 pound threshold. Accordingly, Respondent “stored” and “handled” anhydrous ammonia.
The Facility’s ammonia refrigeration system was installed at the time that the Facility was built. Facility was built in about 2010; however, on the roof of the Facility, the Respondent’s surge drum has a pressure relief valve with a tag stating that the valve was manufactured on 1/12/1988.
EPA visited the Facility on August 12, 2014 (the “August 12, 2014 Inspection”) to assess whether Respondent was complying with Section 112(r) of the CAA and Section 302-312 of EPCRA. At the time of the inspection, the EPA Inspector observed some potentially dangerous conditions relating to Respondent’s ammonia refrigeration system (“System”), including that Respondent:
- Had no documentation showing that it had performed any hazard analysis or review in order to identify all of the hazards associated with its System.
- Had no warning signs identifying ammonia hazards on the two outside doors to the Machinery Room, and on the double-doors to the Machinery Room.
- Had vent pipes along the west wall in the Machinery Room that were not labeled to show the direction of the flow or the contents in the pipes.
- Had no “confined space” warning signs on the hatchway on the top of the water dispersion tank for the ammonia venting control system, and on both entry ports into the condenser.
- Had several sections of exposed ammonia piping and fitting on the roof of the Facility with signs of corrosion.
- Had no audio/visual alarms next to the double-doors entering the Machinery Room or on the north wall door to the Machinery Room.
- Had no visual alarm on the outside door on the west wall of the Machinery Room, but had an audible alarm in this location that was not labeled as to its purpose.
- Had a windsock that was not easily visible to emergency responders.
- Had a main shut-off valve for the System (“King Valve”) that was not identified with a prominent sign and did not contain a handle allowing for manual operation. In addition, the King Valve was located eight to ten feet off the ground behind the high pressure receiver and was inaccessible.
- Had no emergency eyewash or safety shower stations located inside or outside of the Machinery Room.
- Had two sets of doors to the Machinery Room that opened inward rather than outward.
- Had a one-inch gap at the bottom of the double-doors to the Machinery Room from which ammonia vapors could escape to other parts of the building in the event of an emergency.
- Had a steel support girder located between the Machinery Room and the fire water public room that was not tightly sealed to the cinderblock wall
- Had an open viewing port, or peephole, into the Machinery Room, from which ammonia could leak or from which ammonia fumes could burn an employee’s eyes.
- Had a water dispersion tank vent discharge that was located less than 7.25 feet above the adjacent roof line.
At the conclusion of the Inspection, the EPA Inspector advised Respondent of the potential violations at the Facility. Respondent was responsive to the concerns raised by the EPA Inspector and thereafter began addressing the deficiencies at the Facility, including filing a risk management plan for the refrigeration system.
On April 4, 2016, EPA obtained a waiver from the Department of Justice pursuant to the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l), to address the penalty stage of this action administratively. As a result of EPA’ s inspection and review of information provided by Respondent, EPA alleges that the following violations occurred at the Facility:
COUNT I – FAILURE TO IDENTIFY HAZARDS IN VIOLATION OF THE CAA’S GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE
Respondent owns or operates a stationary source that handled and stored anhydrous ammonia, an extremely hazardous substance. Accordingly, at the time of the violations alleged herein, Respondent was subject to the General Duty Clause.
Industry standards and guidelines with respect to ammonia refrigeration systems are found in, among other places, IIAR Standard 2, ASHRAE Standard 15, IIAR bulletins, the IIAR ARM Program, and other materials consistently relied upon in the refrigeration industry.
The recommended industry practice and standard of care for identifying, analyzing, and evaluating potential hazards associated with ammonia refrigeration systems of the same size and type as Respondent’s System is to use, among other things, standard, industry-developed hazard identification checklists, a “What If’ analysis, or a Hazard and Operability (a/k/a “HAZOP”) study. IIAR has developed checklists for this purpose. See, IIAR ARM Program, Section 10 and Appendix 10.1. See also IIAR’s Bulletin No. 110, Startup, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems, Section 5.2.1 ; and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance for Implementation of the General Duty Clause Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(l), May 2000 (“EPA’s GDC Guidance”), Section 2.3.1, currently available at http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/gdcregionalguidance.pdf.
According to EPA’s GDC Guidance, the General Duty Clause’s duty to identify hazards that may result from hazardous releases requires determining (a) the intrinsic hazards of the chemicals used in the processes, (b) the risks of accidental releases from the processes through possible release scenarios, and ( c) the potential effect of these releases on the public and the environment. The document that contains this analysis is often referred to as a process hazard analysis or process hazard review (“Process Hazard Review”).
Respondent was not able to produce any Process Hazard Review while the EPA Inspector was at the Facility.
Accordingly, Respondent violated the General Duty Clause’s requirement to identify hazards associated with the refrigeration system using industry-recognized hazard assessment techniques, in violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
COUNT II – FAILURE TO DESIGN AND MAINTAIN A SAFE FACILITY IN VIOLATION OF THE CAA’S GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE
The recommended industry practice and standard of care for designing and maintaining a safe facility with an ammonia refrigeration system of the same size and type as Respondent’s System is to base design considerations upon applicable design codes, federal and state regulations, and industry guidelines to prevent releases or minimize their impacts as well as to develop and implement standard operating procedures, maintenance programs, personnel training programs, management of change practices, incident investigation procedures, self audits, and preventative maintenance programs. IIAR, ASHRAE and others have developed standards and guidelines for this purpose, such as the IIAR Bulletins, IIAR Standard 2, the IIAR ARM Program, and ASHRAE Standard 15. See also EPA’s GDC Guidance, Section 2.3.2. and National Fire Protection Association (”NFP A”) 1, Fire Code, Section 53.
Respondent failed in its general duty to design and maintain the Facility as a safe facility, taking such steps as were necessary to prevent a release of an extremely hazardous substance, in at least the respects listed below. The industry standards of care illustrate how the ammonia refrigeration industry has recognized hazards associated with designing and maintaining an ammonia refrigeration system and developed measures to reduce such hazards. Some of the hazards listed in the paragraphs below also have resulted in violations of the General Duty Clause’s third duty, as further discussed in Count III.
Inadequate Signage and Labeling
Respondent had no warning signs identifying ammonia hazards on the two outside doors to the Machinery Room, and on the double-doors to the Machinery Room. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to post signs warning of the presence of ammonia and restricting entry to authorized personnel at each entrance to the machinery room. 11&_, NFPA 1 (2012), § 53.2.4.1 (refrigeration systems shall be provided with approved hazardous identification signs); ASHRAE-15 (2010), § 8.11.8 ( doors to the machinery room shall have signs posted at each entrance restricting access to authorized personnel); IIAR 2-2008 (Add. A), § 13.1.2.4 (access doors to the machinery room shall have signs posted at each entrance restricting access to authorized personnel).
Respondent had vent pipes along the west wall in the Machinery Room that were not labeled to show the direction of the flow or the contents in the pipes, although they were labeled with the name of the vessel they were servicing. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to label all system pipes and valve systems. E.g., ASME, § 13.1-2007 (this “Scheme for the Identification of Piping Systems” establishes a common system to assist in the identification of hazardous materials conveyed in piping systems); ASHRAE-15 (2010), § 11.2.2 (systems containing more than 110 pounds of refrigerant shall label the kind of refrigerant or secondary coolant contained in exposed piping outside the machinery room); IIAR 2-2008 (Add. A), § 10.5 (all piping mains, headers and branches shall be identified as to, among other things, the direction of the flow); IIAR Bull. 109 (1997), § 4. 7 .6 (all ammonia piping shall have appropriate pipe markers attached to indicate the
use of the pipe, and arrows to indicate the direction of the flow). See generally IIAR Bull. 114 (2014), Guideline for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components.
Inadequate Maintenance
Respondent’s Facility had several sections of exposed ammonia piping and fitting on the roof of the facility with visible signs of corrosion. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to prevent corrosion on ammonia piping and insulate designated piping to prevent condensation and corrosion. Ji&, IIAR 2-2008 (Add. A), Appendix H, § H.6 and H.7 (describing methods to take to minimize corrosion). IIAR Bull. 110 (1993), § 6.7 (requiring inspection, repair, and replacement of piping).
Inadequate Basic Safety Practices
Respondent had no audio/visual alarms, to notify workers in the event of an ammonia release, at the entries to the Machinery Room or next the double-doors to the Machinery Room. In addition, Respondent had no visual alarm on the outside door on the west wall of the Machinery Room, but had an audible alarm in this location that was not labeled as to its purpose. Adequate alarms provide early warning that a release is taking place, enabling quick responses and protective workers, emergency responders and the public from a larger release. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to equip detectors to activate visual and audible alarms inside the machinery room and at each of its entrances, including clearly marked signage to explain the meaning of each alarm. NFPA 1 (2012), §§ 53.2.3.1.2 (“Audible and visual alarm signaling devices shall be located inside the refrigeration machinery room and outside the room at each entrance to the room.”) and 53.2.3.1.3 (requiring a prescribed level of audibility for alarms); ASHRAE 15-2010, § 8.11.2.1 (” … [the alarm required by this Section] shall annunciate visual and audible alarms inside the refrigerating machinery room and outside each entrance to the refrigerating machinery room. “); IIAR 2-2008 (Add. A), §§ 13.2.1.2 (“The detectors shall activate visual and audible alarms inside the refrigerating machinery room and outside each entrance to the refrigerating machinery room.”) and 13.2.4.1 (“The meaning of each alarm shall be clearly marked by signage near the visual and audible alarms.”).
Respondent had a King Valve that was not identified with a prominent sign, was missing a handle, and was inaccessible, making it difficult for employees or responders to quickly isolate the high pressure receiver in the event of an incident and prevent a larger release. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to ensure that critical valves are labeled, directly operable, and easily accessible. NFPA 1 (2012), § 53 .2.4.2 (systems containing more than 110 pounds of refrigerant shall have signs designating the main shutoff valves to each vessel); IIAR 2-2008 (Add. A),§ 13.1.2.3 (isolation valves that are part of an emergency shutdown procedure shall be directly operable or chain operated from a permanent work surface); IIAR Bull. 109, § 4.10.3 (the main shut off valves should be readily accessible and identified with a prominent sign).
Accordingly, by failing to have (a) adequate signs and labels; (b) adequate maintenance; and ( c) adequate basic safety practices, Respondent failed to design and maintain a safe facility in violation of the General Duty Clause, Section 122(r)(1) of the CAA
COUNT III – FAILURE TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASES THAT DO OCCUR IN VIOLATION OF THE CAA’S GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE
Industry standards and guidelines for minimizing the consequence of an accidental release from ammonia refrigeration systems are found, among other things, in the IIAR ARM Program, IIAR Standard 2, ASHRAE Standard 15, IIAR bulletins, and other materials (including updates and revisions) consistently relied upon by refrigeration experts. They include design and maintenance measures to minimize the severity and duration of releases that do occur, such as, among other things, standards for vapor detection, alarms, equipment and door labeling, emergency shut-off switches, ventilation, keeping combustible materials and electrical hazards away from ammonia, safe oil drain systems, tight construction of machinery rooms; designing safe pressure relief valves and associated piping; reducing obstructions for responders; and having emergency eye wash stations and showers.
Respondent had no emergency eyewash of safety shower stations located inside or outside of the Machinery Room. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to locate an emergency eye wash or safety showers immediately outside the machine room exit door. .Ii&, IIAR 2-2008, § 13.1.6; and IIAR Bull. 109, §§ 4.10.10 (“An emergency eye wash station and deluge body shower shall be located just outside the machine room exit door. An additional emergency eye wash station and deluge body shower should be readily accessible inside the machine room.”) and 7, General Safety Checklist Item (v).
Both sets of doors to the Machinery Room opened inward rather than outward. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to provide that each machinery room door opens outward to allow for swift egress in the event of an emergency. IIAR 2-2008, § 13.1.10.1 (“Each refrigerating machinery room shall have… doors opening outward …”); ASHRAE 15 (2010), § 8.11.2 (requiring outward opening doors).
Respondent had double-doors that provided entry to the Machinery Room which were not tight-fitting. Specifically, there was a one-inch gap at the bottom of these doors from which ammonia vapors could escape from the Machinery Room in the event of an emergency. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to ensure that each machinery room door is tight-fitting. ASHRAE-15 (2010), §§ 8.11.2 (each machinery room shall have a tight-fitting door); IIAR 2-2008 (Add. A), §§ 13.1.1.6 (access doors to a machinery room shall be tight-fitting), 13.1.10.1 (machinery room shall have a tight fitting door), and 13.1.10.2 (doors shall be tight-fitting).
Respondent had a steel support girder located between the Machinery Room and the fire water public room that was not tightly sealed to the cinderblock wall. As described above in paragraph 37(mo), Respondent had an open viewing port, or peephole, into the Machinery Room, from which ammonia could lead and from which ammonia fumes could bum an employee’s eyes. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to require walls, floor and ceiling to be tightly sealed. ASHRAE-15 (2010), § 8.12 (walls, floor and ceiling shall be tightly constructed); IIAR 2-2008 (Add. A), § 13 .1.1.3 (walls, floor and ceiling shall be tightly constructed).
Respondent had a water dispersion tank vent discharge that was not located more than 7.25 feet above the adjacent roofline. The recommended industry practice and standard of care at the time of the Inspection was to require pressure-relief devices to discharge at a location of 15 feet or more above the adjoining building level, although newer standards reduce that height to 7.25 feet. ~ ‘ NPFA 1-2012, § 53.2.2.1 .2(2) (discharge of vapor to the air shall be permitted, provided that the point of discharge is located outside the structure at not less than 15 feet above the adjoining grade level); ASHRAE 15-2010, § 9.7.8 (pressure-relief devices shall discharge to the atmosphere at a location not less than 15 feet above the adjoining ground level); IIAR 2-2008 (Add. A), §11.3.6.4 (the discharge from pressure relief devices to the atmosphere shall be not less than 15 feet above the adjacent roof level); IIAR 2-2014, § 15.5.1.3 (new standard is not less than 7.25 feet above the height of the adjacent roof).
These allegations describe deficiencies that not only constitute a failure to design and maintain a safe facility but also reflect a failure to minimize the consequences of any accidental release of ammonia. Each of these shortcomings could exacerbate the negative effects of any release of ammonia that does occur at the Facility.
Accordingly, by failing to have adequate emergency design mechanisms for the Facility, adequate signs and labels, and adequate basic safety practices, Respondent violated the requirement to minimize the consequences of any accidental release of anhydrous ammonia which does occur, in violation of General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA
COUNT IV: FAILURE TO SUBMIT A RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN
From at least the date of the Inspection to the date of this CAFO, Respondent stored, handled or used anhydrous ammonia in the refrigeration system at the Facility in an amount that exceeded the 10,000-pound threshold set forth in 40 C.F .R. § 68.130. Such storage, handling, or use of anhydrous ammonia, an RMP chemical, in the facility’s refrigeration system is a “covered process,” as that term is defined in 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.1O(a), 68.12, and 68.150, Respondent was required to prepare and submit a RMP for anhydrous ammonia documenting such compliance before it began using anhydrous ammonia at the Facility.
By failing to submit an RMP for anhydrous ammonia before using it at the Facility in an amount that exceeded the regulatory threshold, from at least August 12, 2014 until April 3, 2015, Respondent violated Section 122(r)(7)(E) of the CAA Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(e), and 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.1O(a), 68.12, and 68.150.
COUNT V: FAILURE TO SUBMIT ACCURATE CHEMICAL INVENTORY FORMS IN COMPLIANCE WITH EPCRA SECTION 312
At all times relevant to the violations cited herein, Respondent was storing approximately 10,425 pounds of lead contained in lead-acid batteries, and in excess of 3,791 pounds of sulfuric acid contained in lead-acid batteries and approximately 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia at the Facility.
For the calendar years 2011 , 2012, and 2013, Respondent reported on its Tier 2 Inventory Form that it was storing 3,791 pounds of sulfuric acid and 9,800 pounds of ammonia at the Facility, which failed to take into account the sulfuric acid stored in lead-acid batteries in the Respondent’s 80 trucks, and also under-reported the quantity of anyhydrous ammonia stored at the Facility.
By failing to report the storage of lead, and under-reporting the quantity of ammonia and sulfuric acid, on its Inventory Form for the years 2011 , 2012 and 2013 by March 1st of the following year to the SERC, LEPC, and the local fire department, Respondent violated Section 312(a) of EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a), and 40 C.F.R. §§ 370.20, 370.40, and 370.45.
TERMS OF SETTLEMENT
Respondent also certifies that it has analyzed ammonia inventories at its other facilities nationwide, following industry standards for ammonia inventory calculations, and has filed RMPs for those facilities that have over 10,000 pounds of ammonia in covered processes. The other facilities are located at the addresses listed on Attachment A. Furthermore, Respondent certifies that it is reviewing its other facilities nationwide to determine whether they have in place the following bare minimum safety measures, and if not, has developed a schedule to put them in place by twelve months after the effective date of this CAFO. It is EPA’s position that these measures must be in place, regardless of an ammonia refrigeration system’s age or size, for the system to meet the requirements of 40 C.F .R. Part 68 or the General Duty Clause, and that this is not intended to be a complete list of important safety measures.
a) Understanding the Hazards Posed by the System
- Facility has completed a process hazard review/analysis to identify the hazards posed by the System(s).
b) Operating Activities:
Hazard Addressed: High risk of release from operating or maintenance activity
- System(s) has self-closing/quick closing valves on oil pots.
- Facility has written procedures for System maintenance and operation activities.
- Only authorized persons have access to refrigeration machinery room and the ability to alter safety settings on equipment.
c) Maintenance/Mechanical Integrity:
Hazard Addressed: Leaks/releases from maintenance neglect
- A preventative maintenance program is in place to, among other things, detect and control corrosion, deteriorated vapor barriers, ice buildup, and pipe hammering to inspect the integrity of equipment/pipe supports.
- All piping system openings except the relief header are plugged or capped, or valve is locked.
- Equipment, piping, and valves are labeled for easy identification, and pressure vessels have legible, accessible nameplates.
- All atmospheric pressure relief valves have been replaced in the last five years with visible confirmation of accessible pressure relief valve [ note: replacement every five years is the general rule, but there are two other options in IIAR Bulletin 110.6.3.3].
d) Machinery Room
Hazard Addressed: Inability to isolate releases
- The System(s) have emergency shut off and ventilation switches outside machinery room.
- The machinery room(s) have functional, tested, ventilation. Air inlets are positioned to avoid recirculation of exhaust air and ensure sufficient inlet air to replace exhausted air.
- Documentation exists to show that pressure relief valves that have a common discharge header have adequately sized piping to prevent excessive backpressure on relief valves, or if built prior to 2000, have adequate diameter based on the sum of the relief valve cross-sectional areas.
e) Emergency Actions
Hazard Addressed: Inability to regain control and reduce release impact
- Emergency response communication has occurred with the local emergency planning committee and local responders.
- An Emergency Action Plan or Emergency Response Plan-has been developed.
- The System’s critical shutoff valves are accessible and identifiable, and a schematic is in place to show responders where to access them.
- If respirators are used, you know where the respirators are located, and the respirators are inspected and maintained per manufacturer or industry standards.
- Eyewash station(s) and safety shower(s) is/are present and functional.
- The facility’s EPCRA Tier II reporting is up to date.
Pursuant to Sections 113(e) and (d)(B) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(e) and (d)(B), and Section 325(c) of EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § l 1045(c), and taking into account the relevant statutory penalty criteria (particularly the economic impact of the penalty on the business), the facts alleged in this CAPO, and such other circumstances as justice may require, EPA has determined that it is fair and proper to assess a civil penalty of one hundred eighty-four thousand, seven hundred seventeen dollars ($184,717) for the violations alleged in this matter. The penalty shall be apportioned in the following manner: $172,055 for the alleged CAA violations and $12,662 for the alleged EPCRA violation.
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