NOTE: This case is important as it is based on the simple fact that the facility did not follow it’s own internal procedures regarding changes and construction. This incident also occurred via a “TEMPORARY CHANGE” where the MOC called for a check-valve, the spec’s called for a check-valve; yet a check-valve was NOT installed. This construction error was not captured before the change was put into service and this allowed for the discharge to occur.
Respondent owns and operates a petroleum refinery where Respondent operates the Number 12 Pipestill (No. 12PS), which Respondent began operating in June of 2013. No. 12PS fractionates crude oil into various products and sends these products to other refinery units for further processing. Respondent operates a “Once Through Cooling Water (OTCW)” system at the Facility. The OTCW system is used as non-contact cooling water throughout the Facility. The OTCW system flows through a piping system to Six Separator for treatment. Six Separator is open to the ambient air and works by allowing time for oil, if any, to float to the surface based on the difference in density between oil and water. The OTCW flow ranges from 55 to 85 million gallons per day and the residence time varies from 50 to 90 minutes.
On March 24, 2014, a discharge of crude oil from the Facility to Lake Michigan occurred from the Facility’s OTCW system outfall located at Six Separator. Respondent conducted an investigation of the March 24, 2014 crude oil discharge to Lake Michigan and issued an “Incident Investigation Report” (“Report”) dated August 20, 2014, that described the findings and recommendations from the investigation.
Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, provides that owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, handling, or storing substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA, or any other extremely hazardous substance, have a general duty, in the same manner and to the same extent as 29 U.S.C. § 654, to identify hazards which may result from accidental releases of such substances using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and to minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur. Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA is known as the “General Duty Clause.”
Factual Allegations and Alleged Violations
Respondent’s Report explains that the source of the crude oil discharge originated at No. 12PS due to the installation of a temporary quench line that connected the No. 12PS brine line to the OTCW system. Due to abnormal conditions at No. 12PS, pressure in the brine line exceeded the pressure in the OTCW system, at which time the check valves on the temporary quench line failed, allowing a mixture of brine and crude oil to flow backwards through the quench line into the OTCW system, Six Separator, and Lake Michigan.
Respondent installed the temporary quench line on October 11, 2013 and removed the temporary quench line on March 25, 2014.
Respondent’s Facility is a stationary source that produces, processes, handles, and/or stores regulated substances within the meaning of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA. The crude oil processed at No. 12PS contains “regulated substances” under Sections 112(r)(2) and (r)(3) of the CAA, including ethane, pentane, butane, propane, and hydrogen sulfide.
- Respondent did not install a two-inch check valve on one end of the temporary quench line, as indicated by the proposed design of the temporary quench line. Respondent created an email containing a list of materials for the temporary quench line installation that included the two-inch check valve, but the installed temporary quench line did not include the two-inch check valve.
- Respondent did not develop a “Job Note” containing detailed instructions for the installation of the temporary quench line, which Respondent’s internal procedures required for this type of work.
- Respondent did not create a “Job Plan” for the installation of the temporary quench line, which Respondent’s maintenance work process requires for all work completed at the Facility.
- Respondent’s “management of change” internal review process failed to determine whether the temporary quench line was properly installed and the process did not identify the risk of oil entering the OTCW system, passing through Six Separator, and subsequently reaching Lake Michigan before the change was implemented.
- Respondent did not include key stakeholders affected by the installation of the temporary quench line or knowledgeable of its risks in meetings where the risks of installing the temporary quench line were discussed, and Respondent did not complete internally required paperwork that assessed the risks of crude oil back flowing into water systems.
In September of 2015, Respondent implemented enhanced procedures for making connections to the OTCW system, including additional approval processes, risk assessment measures, and training requirements.
Respondent failed to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent accidental releases, in violation of the General Duty Clause at Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA.
Civil Penalty
Based on an analysis of the factors specified in Section 113(e) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), the facts of this case, and the Combined Enforcement Policy for Clean Air Act Sections JJ 2(r)(l), 112(r)(7), and 40 CF.R. Part 86, dated June 12, 2012, Complainant has determined that an appropriate civil penalty to settle this action is $50,313.
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