Respondent owns and operates an anhydrous ammonia sales facility. On or about June 1, 2017, representatives of the EPA inspected Respondent’s Facility to determine compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA and 40 C.F.R. Part 68. Information gathered during the EPA inspection revealed that Respondent had greater than 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in a process at its facility. From the time Respondent first had on site greater than 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in a process, Respondent was subject to the requirements of Section 112(r) of the CAA and 40 C.F.R. Part 68 because it was an owner and operator of a stationary source that had more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a process. From the time Respondent first had on site greater than 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in a process, Respondent was subject to Program 2 prevention program requirements because pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.l0(c), the process does not meet the eligibility requirements of either Program 1 or Program 3, as described in 40 C.F.R. § 68.l0(b) and (d), respectively.
The complainant at this moment states and alleges that Respondent has violated the CAA and federal regulations promulgated thereunder as follows:
Count 1
The regulation at 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(c)(2) requires the owner or operator of a stationary source with a process subject to Program 2 to conduct a hazard assessment as provided in 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.20 through 68.42.
The EPA inspection revealed that Respondent failed to conduct a hazard assessment as provided in 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.20 through 68.42, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(c)(2). Specifically:
- Respondent failed to estimate the population within a circle with its center at the point of the release and a radius determined by the distance to an endpoint defined in 40 C.F.R. § 60.22(a), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.30(a); and
- Respondent failed to maintain records on the offsite consequence analyses assumptions and rationale for the selection of the worst case and alternate release scenarios, as required by 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.39(a) and (b).
Count 2
The regulation at 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(c)(3) requires the owner or operator of a stationary source with a process subject to Program 2 to implement the Program 2 prevention requirements provided in 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.48 through 68.60, or the Program 3 prevention requirements provided in 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65 through 68.87.
The EPA inspection revealed that Respondent failed to implement Program 2 prevention requirements provided in 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.48 through 68.60, or the Program 3 prevention requirements provided in 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65 through 68.87, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(c)(3). Specifically:
- Respondent failed to ensure that the process was designed in compliance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices with respect to emergency signage, vegetation/weeds under bulk vessels and nurse tanks, vehicle barriers, and distance from bulk vessels and nurse tanks to nearby homes, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.48(b), or 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2);
- Respondent failed to identify all hazards associated with the process, including the proximity of the facility to a home and the firehouse, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.50(a), or 40 C.F.R. § 68.67; and
- Respondent failed to implement maintenance procedures to maintain the ongoing mechanical integrity of the process equipment by failing to keep maintenance records including the nurse tank pressure relief valve maintenance records per their maintenance operating procedures, as required by 40 C.F.R. §68.56(a), or 40 C.F.R. § 68.73.
Respondent agrees that, in settlement of the claims alleged herein, Respondent shall pay a civil penalty of Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($6,250), and shall perform
the SEPs as outlined in this Consent Agreement and Final Order. The SEPs are further described below.
Respondent shall complete each of the following SEPs, which are designed to assist in mitigating and minimizing the consequences of an accidental release of anhydrous ammonia from Respondent’s facility and the attendant benefits to emergency planning and preparedness:
- A comprehensive upgrade to the bulk facility plant, including underground piping leak testing, state-of-the-art leak prevention system with updated piping and valves with actuators on all existing emergency shutoff valves to make the system easier to contain (SEP No. 1). SEP No. I also include the installation of a more robust shutoff switch, which will be placed in a recognized location near the bulk tank facility;
- Improvement of the grounds where the Respondent’s bulk facilities are located to keep the grounds free and clear from any combustible material such as dry grass and brush. The work consists of procuring, transporting and the strategic spreading of approximately 380 tons of 2 and 3-inch treated run rock gravel on the entire grounds of the facility including the nurse tank field (SEP No. 2); and
- Comprehensive safety training focused on the possible dangers ofNH3 and will be designed specifically for first responders serving the subject facility (SEP No. 3).
SEP No. 1, SEP No. 2, and SEP No. 3 shall collectively cost at least Twenty-Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($23,500). Respondent in good faith estimates that the cost to implement SEP No. 1 is approximately Twenty-Three Thousand One Hundred-Twelve Dollars ($23,112). Respondent in good faith estimates that the cost to implement SEP No. 2 is approximately Seven Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-One Dollars ($7,361). Respondent in good faith estimates that the cost to implement SEP No. 3 is approximately Two Thousand Seven Hundred-Twenty Dollars ($2,720).
Respondent agrees that SEP No. 1 shall be completed within nine months of the Effective Date of this Consent Agreement and Final Order. Respondent agrees that SEPs No. 2 and three shall both be completed within six months of the Effective Date of this Consent Agreement and Final Order.