The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in response to Executive Order 13650, requests comment on potential revisions to its Risk Management Program regulations and related programs. In this Request for Information (RFI), the Agency asks for information and data on specific regulatory elements and process safety management approaches, the public and environmental health and safety risks they address, and the costs and burdens they may entail. The EPA will use the information received in response to this RFI to inform what action, if any, it may take. During the 90-day comment period, EPA asks for information and data on specific regulatory elements and process safety management approaches to enhance public health and safety, and aid local fire, police, and emergency response personnel to prepare for and respond to chemical emergencies. The information received will be used when reviewing chemical hazards covered by the RMP and to determine how this program should be expanded to improve chemical facility safety. The RFI does not commit the agency to rulemaking. The RFI addresses potentially updating the list of RMP regulated substances, and adjusting threshold quantities and toxic endpoints based on Acute Exposure Guideline Level (AEGL) toxicity values. The RFI seeks comment on strengthening or clarifying several existing process safety elements under the RMP including compliance audits, maintenance of safety critical equipment, managing organizational changes, emergency response capabilities, and incident investigation. It also seeks comment on adding additional risk management program elements, such as consideration of using inherently safer technology, process safety metrics, automated monitoring of releases, emergency drills, stop work authority, and addressing facility location (siting) risks. Some of the items under consideration were discussed at the public listening sessions held on the EO or in comments received on the January 2014 EO Section 6(a) options for policy, regulations and standards modernization to improve chemical facility risk management. The public will have 90 days to submit written comments online, www.regulations.gov (the portal for federal rulemaking), or by mail. EPA requests information on the following questions:
1. Update the List of Regulated Substances
a. Adding Other Toxic or Flammable Substances
EPA requests information on the following questions:
i. What other chemical lists or other sources of information should be reviewed to identify acutely toxic or flammable chemicals meeting the RMP listing criteria?
ii. What chemicals, if any, should EPA add to the RMP list of regulated toxic and flammable substances?
Please provide references to the acute toxicity studies, sources of flammability information or summary results of such studies, information showing that the chemical meets the listing criteria or examples of incidents related to the hazards associated with the chemicals.
iii. Please provide any information on the annual amount of the individual substance manufactured, imported or used, the extent of its availability in commerce and the types of U.S. industries that manufacture, import, or use the substance.
iv. What would be the economic impacts of adding other toxic or flammable chemicals to the RMP list of substances?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to adding such chemicals to the RMP list of substances?
b. Adding High and/or Low Explosives
EPA requests information on the following questions:
i. Should EPA reconsider listing explosives on the RMP list? What are the safety gaps in current regulations and practice (e.g., EPCRA, other federal programs, state programs, and industry efforts) that can best be filled by the expansion of the RMP?
Are there other approaches for filling any such safety gaps?
What type of explosive materials should be covered and why?
How many facilties manufacture, store or use explosives and what are the typical quantities stored on-site by type of facility or industry?
What TQs should be established, and what should be the basis for the TQs?
If EPA were to list explosives and establish a TQ at 5000 pounds (the same TQ that was established for explosives in the 1994 list rule), how many facilities would exceed that TQ and potentially be regulated?
ii. Are there other incidents involving the manufacture and processing of explosive materials that should be reviewed to determine if covering these operations under the RMP would decrease the risk of an accidental explosion affecting an off-site community?
Does the presence of explosives impose unique risks on rural, disadvantaged, or otherwise environmentally burdened communities?
iii. Should the RMP regulation apply to manufacturers of explosives, end users, and/or explosive recyclers?
iv. If the RMP regulation is amended to cover explosives, should EPA consider establishing requirements for safe separation distances between explosive and public receptors similar to those required by ATF and OSHA (see section II.D.4 of this RFI for additional discussion of stationary source location requirements)?
What other requirements should EPA consider? Which if any of these requirements could have prevented or minimized the impacts of specific historical accidents?
v. What would be the economic impacts of adding explosives to the RMP list of substances?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to adding explosives to the RMP list of substances?
vi. As an alternative to expanding the scope of the RMP, would expanded use of EPCRA information (such as better integration of information on explosive hazards into local emergency plans) and other governmental and industry programs (including voluntary programs) be able to address safety gaps?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach relative to expansion of the RMP?
c. Adding Ammonium Nitrate
EPA requests information on the following questions:
i. Are there safety gaps in the current regulations for AN that could be addressed using regulations under CAA section 112(r)?
Should EPA regulate AN under CAA section 112(r) authority to improve chemical safety practices at facilities handling AN?
What types of AN and AN facilities should be subject to the RMP regulations to prevent chemical accidents involving AN that could have adverse effects, such as blast overpressure, on the public, environment and off-site property?
Should EPA consider safety regulations to cover the storage and handling of AN fertilizer only and continue to rely on ATF regulations and OSHA standards to cover AN in explosives and blasting agents?
What role should voluntary industry programs (such as the one undertaken by IME for high explosives) have in a decision on whether safety gaps exist that warrant regulation under the RMP?
Please discuss the economic impacts associated with the potential regulation of AN under CAA section 112(r), including any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider.
ii. Should EPA amend the RMP requirements to address the hazard posed by AN?
If so, what specific requirements would be appropriate for AN?
Alternatively, should EPA use its regulatory authority under CAA 112(r)(7)(A) to require more tailored safety steps for facilities handling AN and list AN at a high threshold to better focus these requirements on fewer holders of large quantities that pose the greatest risk?
What would be the benefits of regulating AN under the RMP regulations as opposed to only maintaining the current SDS and hazardous chemical inventory reporting already required under EPCRA?
iii. If EPA were to regulate AN under 40 CFR part 68, what quantity of AN poses a sufficient hazard to be covered?
What would be the basis for establishing this TQ?
iv. Does your facility store, handle, or manage AN?
If so, in what form (e.g., solid, liquid) and in what grade (e.g., high density, low density)? If you are not a manufacturer of AN, how does your facility process or use AN?
What quantities of AN are typically stored at your facility at one time?
v. Are there any other standards, including consensus standards, applicable to AN storage, handling, and management that your facility follows?
If so, which ones?
vi. Please provide any data or information on accidents involving the storage, handling, and management of AN that affected people or property.
vii. Please provide data on the population surrounding AN sites, including socioeconomic information and other environmental burdens on surrounding communities.
viii. If EPA were to regulate AN under CAA Section 112(r), should EPA exempt farmers who store AN for use as a fertilizer?
How many farmers would be eligible for such an exemption?
Should there be any limits on such an exemption, such as maximum quantity on-site at any given time?
Please provide the reasoning and any available data supporting your views.
d. Adding Reactive Substances and Reactivity Hazards
EPA requests information on the following questions:
i. What are the best criteria to use in classifying reactive hazards?
How do you identify a reactive chemical or a reactive mixture?
ii. Should EPA add reactive chemicals to the list of RMP-covered chemicals in 40 CFR 68.130?
If so, which chemicals? What criteria should EPA consider using to establish TQs for reactive chemicals?
Should EPA add only specific chemicals, or groups of chemicals defined by particular chemical characteristics?
iii. Should EPA list additional chlorosilanes as toxic substances on the RMP list due to their reactive hazard due to formation of hydrochloric acid when a chlorosilane is accidentally released into the air and reacts with moisture?
iv. If your facility is covered by the New Jersey TCPA, have those requirements been effective in protecting human health and the environment from reactive hazards?
Please describe any economic impacts associated with TCPA coverage (e.g., costs and benefits, cost savings, shifts in usage of reactive chemicals, special circumstances involving small entities, etc.).
v. Should EPA revise the RMP regulation to use chemical functional groups similar to those in the TCPA20 to define hazardous reactive mixtures?
If so, which chemical functional groups should EPA use?
vi. Does your facility follow NFPA 400 for reactive hazards?
If so, please describe the economic impacts associated with following NFPA 400 (e.g., cost of additional equipment, cost of additional training, benefits of quality management, special circumstances involving small entities, etc.).
Is following NFPA 400 an effective way of protecting human health and the environment from reactive hazards?
Please explain.
vii. Has your facility implemented a reactive-hazards management program other than a program specified by the TCPA and NFPA 400?
If so, please describe your facility’s program, whether it protects human health and the environment more or less than the TCPA and NFPA 400, whether it is voluntary or mandatory and, if the latter, under what authority, any economic impacts associated with the program, and any special circumstances involving small entities.
viii. What alternative regulatory approach to TCPA or NFPA 400, if any, should EPA consider using to address reactive hazards?
What would be the economic impacts of this approach and would there be any special circumstances involving small entities?
Are there specific requirements that EPA should consider adding to the RMP regulations to ensure that owners and operators adequately manage reactive hazards?
ix. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety related incidents involving reactive hazards not covered under the existing RMP regulation.
What reactive-hazards management requirements might have prevented these incidents if they had been included in the RMP regulation?
e. Adding Other Categories of Substances
EPA requests information on the following questions:
i. Should EPA consider adding organic peroxides, oxidizers, combustible dust, flammable solids, or other additional types of chemicals to the RMP list?
Are there any particular chemicals belonging to these or other classes which present a high hazard that could cause adverse effects beyond a facility’s fence line in the event of an accidental release?
ii. If a particular new category of chemicals should be considered for inclusion on the RMP list, what criteria should be used to prioritize the hazard(s) and determine which chemicals should be listed?
iii. If EPA were to add combustible dusts to the lists of covered chemicals, are there categories of dusts, such as agricultural dusts (e.g., grain dust, pesticide dust, etc.), that should be excluded?
What factors, such as existing handling practices, accident history, and potential risk to surrounding communities should EPA consider in evaluating potential exclusions?
f. Removing Certain Substances from the List or Raising their Threshold Quantity
EPA requests information on the following questions:
i. Would it be appropriate for EPA to delete TDI (a substance mandated by Congress to be included on the initial RMP list) from the RMP toxic substances list because its vapor pressure does not meet the vapor pressure listing criteria established by EPA?
ii. If it is not appropriate to delete TDI, would it be appropriate for EPA to continue to list TDI on the RMP list but with a higher TQ for RMP reporting?
Should the methodology for assigning TQs account for the much lower vapor pressure of TDI, and if so, how should this be done?
Currently, the TQ for all three TDI listings is 10,000 pounds.
iii. If it is not appropriate to delete TDI because it is a sensitizer, should EPA continue to list TDI on the RMP list but with a lower TQ because of its unique toxicity, and if so, what should be the basis for setting a lowered TQ?
iv. Are there other listed substances that should have a higher TQ?
If so, which ones, what are the appropriate TQs, and why?
v. Should EPA delete from the RMP list any of the six substances for which the Agency has not received any RMP report if the Agency believes that they are not widespread in commerce or only stored in quantities well below the RMP TQ?
EPA requests any available information about the extent of these six chemicals’ manufacture and use in commerce, including any annual amounts manufactured, imported or used in the U.S.
vi. Is there any reason that EPA should not delete 1, 3-pentadiene from the RMP list as it does not meet the listing criteria for flammable substances and was erroneously listed?
Are there any other RMP substances that are known to be listed based on erroneous data?
g. Lowering the Threshold Quantity for Substances Currently on the List
EPA is also seeking information on whether the TQ for any substances currently on the list should be reduced:
i. Are the current TQs protective of human health and the environment, or are there certain substances for which the TQ is too high?
If so, which substances? For such substances, what TQ should EPA establish and what would it be based on?
ii. What would be the economic impacts of any lowering of the TQ which might be warranted?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to lowering of a TQ?
2. Additional Risk Management Program Elements
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Does your facility follow any management-system elements not required under part 68 for RMP-regulated operations?
If so, please describe the additional management system elements, the safety benefits, any economic impacts associated with following the elements, and any special circumstances involving small entities.
b. Would expanding the scope of the RMP regulation to require additional management system elements, or expanding the scope of existing RMP management-system elements, improve the protection of human health and the environment?
Should EPA require safety culture assessments, job safety analyses, or any of the other new management system elements described above?
If so, please describe the elements, the safety benefits, any economic impacts associated with expanding the scope of the RMP regulation in this way, and any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider.
Would current staff at a facility be able to implement these additional elements or would new staff need to be hired?
c. In systems using management and metrics, how do facilities develop useful leading indicators?
Do you track the frequency of events such as process upsets, accidental releases, and “near miss” incidents?
Does tracking such events allow managers and employees to make changes that prevent accidental releases?
What other metrics and indicators do you use, and how do they help prevent releases?
d. Would requiring RMP facilities to conduct periodic safety culture assessments meaningfully strengthen the safety culture incentives that already exist, such as avoidance of deaths, injuries, property and environmental damage, production loss, community impacts, damage to company reputation, etc., that may result from accidents?
e. Would expansion of the RMP employee participation provision to include requirements such as the SEMS II stop-work authority, or other efforts to involve employees in all management-system elements, enhance protection of human health and the environment?
f. Are there any other management-system elements in the existing RMP regulation that EPA should expand or clarify (e.g., a new requirement that facilities perform a rootcause analysis for incidents under § 68.81, clarify PHA and hazard review requirements, require more frequent PHA and hazard review updates, strengthen contractor requirements, or require pre-startup reviews prior to all process startups)?
If so, please describe the additional requirements, the safety benefits, any economic impacts associated with expanding the RMP regulation in this way, and any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider.
g. Are there any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety-related incidents that the facility could have prevented by following management-system elements not currently required under the RMP regulation?
h. What would be the paperwork burden associated with the revisions to management system elements discussed above?
What special skills or training would employees need to implement these elements, including associated reporting and record-keeping requirements?
What would be the costs of additional reporting and record-keeping requirements, including costs for worker training and any required data management system upgrades?
3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. What does your facility use as a definition for RAGAGEP?
Would adding a definition for RAGAGEP to the RMP rule improve understanding of RMP requirements and prevent accidental releases?
If so, what specific definition for RAGAGEP should EPA add to the RMP rule?
What would be the economic impacts of adding such a definition?
b. From what sources (e.g., codes, standards, published technical reports, guidelines, etc.) does your facility select applicable RAGAGEP for operations covered by the PSM standard?
c. Does your facility evaluate updates to its selected RAGAGEP?
If so, how does your facility monitor any updates, and how often do you evaluate them?
d. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving failure to evaluate and/or implement updates to applicable RAGAGEP for RMP-covered processes.
Would requiring employers to evaluate and/or implement updates to applicable RAGAGEP prevent such accidental releases?
e. Should owners or operators covered by the applicable provisions of the RMP regulation be required to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP?
Should owners and operators be required to comply with new RAGAGEP requirements that occur after the owner or operator’s initial compliance with the applicable provision of the RMP regulation?
How would such updates or new requirements be identified?
What would be an appropriate time period in which to conduct this evaluation and/or to comply with updated RAGAGEP?
What would be the economic impacts of this change?
f. Would a requirement to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP be more appropriate in another paragraph of the RMP rule?
For example, should such a requirement become part of the Process Hazard Analysis revalidation requirements at § 68.67(f), or the management of change requirements at § 68.75?
How would EPA incorporate such a requirement for Program 2 processes?
4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements to Cover Any Safety-Critical Equipment
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Should EPA amend the mechanical integrity provisions of the RMP rule to explicitly cover all safety critical process equipment?
If so, what type(s) of equipment?
Did you identify safety-critical equipment not explicitly covered under § 68.73?
If so, how did your facility determine that the equipment was safety-critical, and does your facility treat the equipment as if it were RMP-covered for safety or other reasons?
Did you identify the equipment as safety-critical through an RMP process hazard analysis?
b. Please provide any data or information on accidental releases, near misses, or other safety-related incidents related to the mechanical integrity of safety-critical equipment not explicitly covered under § 68.73.
c. Would expanding the scope of § 68.73 to explicitly cover the integrity of all equipment critical to process safety make it more likely to prevent accidental releases?
d. Should EPA add additional requirements to the mechanical integrity provisions, or clarify any existing provisions?
For example, should the Agency require that certain types of covered facilities install emergency shutdown systems, such as redundant power supplies, emergency flares, vents, or scrubbers, etc., in order to prevent accidental releases resulting from uncontrolled emergency shutdowns?
e. Are there any other provisions of this section that should be enhanced or clarified?
Does labeling § 68.73 as “Mechanical Integrity” cause owners and operators to disregard or neglect the maintenance, functionality, or integrity of process components that would not typically be considered “mechanical” components, such as electrical and computer systems?
f. What would be the economic impacts of revising the mechanical integrity provisions as discussed above?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to revising the mechanical integrity provisions of the RMP?
5. Require Owners and Operators to Manage Organizational Changes
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. What do you consider to be an organizational change within the context of process safety management practices?
For example, would you consider the following, or similar, changes to be organizational changes:
-
- reducing the number of operators in a shift;
- changing from 5-day to 7-day operations;
- changing from 8-hour to 12-hour operator shifts;
- replacing a unit manager;
- reducing the facility operations or maintenance budget;
- relocating a technical group to a remote corporate location;
- changing a supervisory or compensation structure; or
- hiring contractors to do work formerly performed by employees of the regulated facility?
Are there other examples of organizational changes that may be relevant to safety management practices?
b. If your facility has established and implemented written procedures for management of organizational changes, please describe any economic impacts associated with the procedures.
Please note any implementation challenges that may be associated with requiring that such procedures be developed and followed.
c. Would clarifying § 68.75 with an explicit requirement that employers manage organizational changes prevent accidental releases?
What would be the economic impact of such a clarification?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to this option?
d. Please describe any organizational changes made in your facility that have had the potential to affect process operations.
Were management-of-change procedures followed before making the changes?
e. What do you consider to be the best safety practices concerning management of organizational change?
f. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety related incidents involving the failure to manage organizational change.
Would following management-of-change procedures under § 68.75 have prevented these incidents?
6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Does your facility use a third-party for conducting compliance audits under § 68.58 and § 68.79 for safety or other reasons?
What was the basis for that decision? How has it affected the overall safety record of your facility?
b. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety related incidents that could have been prevented by conducting more effective compliance audits for operations covered under § 68.58 and § 68.79.
What were the deficiencies in those audits?
Were the audits in question conducted by in-house staff or a third party?
c. Would revising § 68.58 and § 68.79 to require owners and operators of RMP regulated facilities to use a third-party for compliance audits help prevent accidental releases?
What would be the economic impacts of revising § 68.58 and § 68.79 in this way (e.g., typical consultant fees, additional work hours required, special circumstances involving small entities, etc.)?
d. Should EPA revise § 68.58 and § 68.79 to require owners and operators to use compliance auditors (internal or third-party) with certain minimum credentials or certifications?
If so, what minimum credentials or certifications should the Agency require?
e. How should owners/operators of RMP-regulated facilities address the findings of the third-party auditor?
Should EPA amend the RMP rule to require owners/operators to document how they addressed each of the findings of the third-party auditor?
Should a timeframe for addressing those findings be included in the RMP regulation?
Should EPA include a procedure for how an owner/operator may appeal the findings of the third-party auditor?
f. Should EPA require facilities that have incidents or near misses to conduct a full compliance audit under § 68.58 or § 68.79, as appropriate?
Would such a requirement create a perverse incentive to underreport incidents or near misses?
g. During compliance inspections at multiple-process sources, EPA inspectors have noted that some owners or operators have audited only a subset of covered processes at the source.
Should EPA clarify § 68.58 and § 68.79 to explicitly indicate that all covered processes must receive a full compliance audit at least every three years?
h. Does the identity of the auditor (e.g., in-house, contractor, professionally-certified, party licensed by EPA) affect the credibility of the audit for potentially impacted communities?
7. Effects of OSHA PSM Coverage on RMP Applicability
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Do you currently operate a facility with Program 2 covered processes?
Please indicate what type of Program 2 process your facility operates.
Do you implement accident prevention measures that go beyond RMP Program 2 for this process?
If so, why?
What additional prevention elements do you use?
Do you believe Program 2 requirements are necessary for the safe operation of this process?
Do you have any Program 2 processes that may be adequately managed under Program 1?
Please explain the basis for your views.
b. Do you operate a water or wastewater treatment plant that is subject to the RMP regulation?
If so, what level of accident prevention requirements do you believe are warranted for such facilities?
If you operate a Program 2 process at a water or wastewater treatment plant, how much additional burden would be involved in implementing the additional RMP elements required for Program 3 processes?
c. Should RMP-covered municipal water and wastewater plants that are not eligible for Program 1 always be subject to RMP Program 3, regardless of whether or not they are located in a state with a Federally-delegated OSHA program?
Why or why not?
d. If OSHA restricts its retail exemption to facilities selling regulated substances in small containers, should EPA eliminate RMP Program level 2 entirely or alternatively, modify Program 2 prevention elements or otherwise change the eligibility criteria for Program 2?
If so, why?
e. Would eliminating Program level 2 simplify rule compliance for the regulated universe and improve human and environmental health and safety, or does the current three-tiered prevention program framework under the RMP provide an appropriate level of protection?
f. What would be the economic impacts of modifying or eliminating Program level 2?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to modifying or eliminating Program 2?
Additional Items for which EPA Requests Information
1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis
EPA is planning the following steps to advance safer technologies and alternatives:
- Publishing a joint alert with OSHA illustrating the concepts, principles and examples of safer technology and alternatives to make industry more aware of this information, while providing sources of information for further investigation and review,
- Publishing a voluntary guidance document with OSHA for operators on how to reduce risks by employing safer technology and alternatives, by offering a more thorough examination of alternative measures and safety techniques, including examples of safer technology and alternatives or practices,
- Based on the evaluation of feedback from the alert, guidance, and this RFI, EPA would consider proposing an amendment to the RMP regulations that requires:
- An analysis and documentation of safer technologies and alternatives
- Integration of the safer technologies and alternatives analysis into the PHA
- Implementation of safer technologies and alternatives where feasible;
EPA would not make any determination regarding the specific analysis, technology, design, or process selection by chemical facility owners or operators.
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Should EPA require a safer alternatives options analysis either as a new prevention program element, as part of the existing PHA/Hazard Review element, or as a separate new requirement under CAA section 112(r)?
b. How should safer alternatives be defined if it were to be a requirement under CAA section 112(r) regulations?
What specifically should a safer alternatives analysis require and how would this differ from what is already required under other provisions of the RMP?
c. How should industries determine if a safer alternative exists for their particular process?
What safer alternative chemicals are available for the listed RMP chemicals and for ammonium nitrate?
d. What should facilities consider when determining if such technologies, when identified, are effective, available, and economically justified for their particular process or facility?
Can the RMP national database, Lessons Learned Information System or other federal databases be structured to promote the exchange of information both within industry and with other stakeholders on potentially safer technologies?
e. If EPA were to require facilities to undertake an evaluation of the potential to incorporate safer alternatives, what minimum criteria should this evaluation be required to meet?
How would the evaluation determine if a particular alternative is feasible, cost effective and results in less risk?
What requirements or incentives, if any, should there be for implementation of identified safer alternatives?
How should any such requirements be structured and enforced?
f. Should EPA require facilities to use a safer alternatives evaluation method such as the CCPS Inherently Safer Technology Checklist?
g. How should EPA and facilities address the risk tradeoffs that could result when changing a process to incorporate safer alternatives?
h. Should EPA consider requirements similar to those used by the State of New Jersey or Contra Costa County, California, and if so, why?
What have been the benefits of such programs in risk reduction or process safety for the facilities covered under these requirements?
What have been the limitations or drawbacks of these programs?
i. If EPA were to develop regulatory requirements for safer alternatives, which facilities should be subject to those requirements?
Should all RMP facilities be subject to such requirements, or only “high risks” facilities, such as refineries and large chemical plants?
How would “high risk” be defined?
Are there particular processes or chemicals that should be targeted or prioritized for implementation of such requirements?
j. What barriers exist for industry to adopt safer alternatives?
What incentives can be used by the government to have facilities implement safer alternatives?
Should the Agency provide special recognition to companies that implement safer alternatives?
k. What are other options (other than regulatory requirements) exist to encourage facilities to investigate, develop or implement safer alternatives and how can EPA further these efforts?
l. If RMP facilities are required to perform safer alternative options analyses and implementation plans, should EPA require that the analyses and/or implementation plans be submitted to the Agency?
Should EPA have any role in approving such analyses or plans?
In lieu of an approval, can EPA promote safer alternatives through reporting and the dissemination of information on potentially applicable practices?
m. If RMP facilities are required to consider safer alternative options, what role should local communities have in these analyses?
Should facilities be required to disclose these analyses or recommendations resulting from such analyses to local authorities or the public prior to the selection of options?
Are there any other disclosure options that will ensure that decisions on implementing safer technologies are made with transparency?
Are there any means of oversight other than the disclosure that would ensure that safer alternatives analyses are thorough and implementation decisions are appropriate?
n. What would be the economic impacts of requiring facilities to analyze safer alternative options?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider?
2. Emergency Drills to Test a Source’s Emergency Response Program or Plan
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Are RMP-regulated facilities currently exercising their emergency response plans?
If so, are they doing these exercises to comply with other federal, state or local regulatory requirements?
What references or guidelines were used to develop the exercise program?
b. What should be the scope of an exercise/drill program?
Should the exercise/drill program include internal (emergency response, notifications, and evacuation) and external elements (involving the community and federal and state responders, as appropriate)?
What elements should be exercised as part of the drill/exercise program?
For example, should the program include communications, coordination, logistics, and evacuations/accounting for personnel, etc?
What response scenarios should be considered for the exercise/drill program?
c. How frequently should drills/exercises be performed?
d. Who should be involved in the exercise program?
How should the management team be engaged as part of the drills/exercises?
How should contractors be included in the exercise/drill planning and when conducting exercises/drills?
Who should be the designated official responsible for coordinating the exercises and drills conducted at the RMP facility?
How should other federal, state and local agencies be included in the exercise/drill program?
e. Should all RMP facilities be required to participate in some type of exercise/drill program or only those who are required to develop an emergency response program?
Should Program 1 facilities (and Program 2/Program 3 facilities that do not respond to accidental releases with their own employees) be required to conduct external exercises with community responders and test notification procedures?
Should Program 2 and Program 3 facilities whose employees respond to accidental releases conduct both internal and external exercises?
f. How should lessons learned and recommendations be documented and addressed?
What timeframe should be considered for completing such records?
How long should records of exercises/drills be maintained?
g. Should stationary source operators be required to document and address lessons learned and recommendations when they respond to an actual accidental release?
h. Should information such as the date of the most recent exercise involving the emergency response plan be required to be reported to EPA in the facility’s RMP?
i. What would be the economic impacts and paperwork burden of requiring an exercise/drill program for all or a subset of RMP facilities?
Would such a requirement substantially improve preparedness for dealing with emergency situations?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to an exercise/drill program?
3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated Substances
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Should facilities be required to install monitoring equipment or sensors to detect releases of RMP regulated substances or the conditions that could lead to such a release?
Should the systems provide for continuous detection and monitoring?
How should any such requirements be crafted to provide appropriate site-specific flexibility?
b. Are there specific issues that need to be considered for unmanned and/or remote facilities?
c. Should an automated mechanism to notify, alert and warn the local responders and surrounding public of an incident be considered as part of any detection andmonitoring system requirement?
If so, how should the potential for false alarms be addressed within such a requirement?
d. How can a requirement for automated detection and monitoring systems be best coordinated with the community emergency response plan?
What are the advantages/disadvantages between continuous monitoring conducted by automated systems in contrast to third-party alarm agencies?
e. How would a requirement for appropriate detection thresholds be best established for activating alarms and/or alerts?
f. How would the significance and appropriate protective response action of the alarms/alerts be best communicated to responders and the public (including shelterin- place and evacuations)?
g. What involvement should LEPCs and SERCs have in the development of the emergency response plan, particularly with respect to what actions are to be taken in the event of an incident where and alarm/alert is activated?
h. How frequently should monitoring equipment or sensors to detect releases of RMPregulated substances be tested?
How should these tests be documented?
How long should records of such tests be maintained?
Should automated monitoring records for periods of normal operations be maintained, so that past records may serve as an aid in determining what may have gone wrong prior to an accident (e.g., a gradual increase in emissions)?
Should EPA specify requirements in this area, or are these aspects of program implementation best left to the facility?
i. Leak detection and repair programs are common under the CAA’s routine emission programs.
Can these programs be integrated with the accidental release preventionprogram to reduce accidental releases and to simplify requirements for stationary sources subject to both the RMP and these other programs?
Are there jurisdictional issues that prevent integration?
j. What would be the economic impacts of specifying additional monitoring and detection requirements in the RMP?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to such monitoring and detection requirements?
4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Would additional specifics on stationary source siting and occupancy siting under the RMP minimize the impacts of chemical accidents to local communities?
How should RMP stationary source siting requirements relate to OSHA PSM and other industry standards?
b. What guidance should EPA consider in the development of stationary source siting requirements?
c. What information should EPA consider in the development of stationary source buffer or setback zones for different risks?
How should EPA address siting when limited space is available?
d. What administrative processes and controls should be incorporated into stationary source siting requirements?
e. What safety and process devices, instruments and controls should be incorporated into stationary source siting requirements?
f. What criteria are appropriate for siting of occupancies (such as offices, control rooms, cafeterias, etc.) near an RMP-regulated process?
g. How often should stationary source siting be evaluated for effectiveness? What criteria should be used?
h. What documentation should be required for evaluating stationary source siting determinations?
i. Is it appropriate to reflect the environmental burden of the surrounding community in siting criteria for either new facilities or expansions within an existing site?
Is it appropriate to consider chronic burdens or only burdens associated with accidental releases?
j. What challenges would the agency face in specifying uniform siting requirements for the wide variety of covered sites?
What site-specific factors would need to be addressed?
k. If EPA mandated siting criteria, how should EPA account for local zoning codes when establishing such criteria?
Would set federal requirements to overstep into the normal state and local zoning process, or would it act as a supplemental measure ensuring minimal safety standards across the country?
l. What would be the economic impacts of specifying additional siting requirements?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to siting requirements?
5. Compliance with Emergency Response Program Requirements in Coordination with Local Responders
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Do you own or operate an RMP-regulated facility that relies on public authorities to respond to accidental releases of regulated substances at the facility?
What steps do you take to ensure that public responders are prepared to properly respond to accidental releases at your facility?
Should EPA clarify what steps RMP facilities should take in order to properly coordinate their emergency response plan with the community emergency response plan?
b. If your facility uses its own employees or response contractors provided by the facility to respond to emergencies, what factors led to your decision to use your ownemployees or contractors to conduct emergency response operations?
What steps have you taken to coordinate with local responders on emergency response planning?
c. Are you a member of an LEPC, municipal fire department or municipal hazardous materials response team?
If so, do you believe that “non-responding” RMP facilities in your jurisdiction have generally provided the appropriate information and support to your organization to ensure an appropriate response to hazardous substance emergencies at those facilities?
Is your organization capable of responding appropriately to such events at RMP facilities?
How often do you visit RMP facilities in your jurisdiction?
Do you conduct emergency drills at RMP facilities?
Do you believe that RMP facilities should generally respond to emergencies using their own employees, or rely on public responders?
Should EPA clarify what is necessary for RMP facilities to adequately coordinate their emergency response plan with the community emergency response plan?
Would new regulations in this area significantly improve emergency response planning in your area?
d. Are there certain substances or types of facilities that present particular response challenges for local authorities?
If so, which substances or types of facilities?
Should such facilities be required to prepare and implement comprehensive emergency response programs instead of relying primarily on public responders?
Do public responders in your area have adequate existing authority to require this now?
e. If public responders are not capable of responding to a particular type of chemical or release event at an RMP-regulated facility, should the owner or operator of the facility be required to provide for an effective response, either with the facility’s own employees, response contractors, a mutual aid agreement with nearby facilities, or some other means?
f. What would be the economic impacts of expanding the emergency response requirements as discussed above?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to modifying emergency response requirements?
6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements
EPA requests detailed information on the following questions:
a. Are the RMP incident investigation requirements too narrowly focused?
Would identifying a broader range of incidents requiring investigation (e.g., near misses) help prevent additional accidental releases?
Please provide specific examples where possible.
EPA requests information on alternative definitions or incidentclassifications that could be included within the rule’s incident investigation requirements.
b. Are there any data or information on process upsets, near misses or other incidents that were not required to be investigated, but where an investigation and resulting changes in management systems might prevent accidental releases?
c. Does your facility routinely investigate incidents not required to be investigated under part 68?
If so, please describe the types of incidents investigated, and the effects these investigations have had on facility operations.
d. Would a specific time frame for incident investigations to be completed benefit overall safety?
What should be the basis for establishing an appropriate timeframe requirement for an incident investigation to be completed?
What are the challenges and limitations to completing an incident investigation within a specified timeframe?
e. Are there benefits from requiring that investigations must be performed even in cases where the owner/operator elects to decommission the process involved, where the process is destroyed in the incident, or where a facility determines there were no actual or potential off-site consequences?
Would such a requirement provide a disincentive to decommission potentially risky processes?
f. Would a modification of the definition of “catastrophic release” assist in addressing the concerns regarding the appropriate scope of incidents that require investigation?
g. Would a modification of the accident history reporting requirements to reflect a broader range of incidents being investigated assist in disseminating lessons learned across industry?
h. Should EPA require facilities that have incidents or near misses to conduct a full compliance audit under § 68.58 and § 68.79?
i. Is it appropriate for facilities to share the results of accident investigations with the local community or alternatively a summary of the accident, and its root cause?
Is there an appropriate role for the local community in conducting investigations?
j. What would be the economic impact of broadening the RMP incident investigation requirements to require root cause investigations of near misses?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider?
Would small businesses have the capacity to investigate near miss incidents?
7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Requirements for Processes Involving Numerous Small Vessels Stored Together
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Should EPA revise § 68.25(b) to require the owner or operator of any regulated process involving numerous small containers stored together to consider as the worst case release quantity the sum of the quantity of all containers in the process, or a subset of such containers, or the containers within one storage area of the process?
b. Would revising the worst case scenario quantity determination requirement in this manner better represent the true worst case scenario for such processes?
c. Would this change promote stronger process safety controls and help prevent accidents?
d. In situations where numerous small containers are stored together, are there any kinds of protective barriers or other methods of storage that would reduce the likelihood of a release from one container causing additional releases from adjacent or nearby containers?
Should such barriers or storage methods be incorporated into the rule’s worst case scenario requirements, and if so, how?
Would revising § 68.25(b) cause any type of additional burden on facilities where large amounts of chemicals are stored together?
e. If EPA were to revise § 68.25(b) to take into account numerous small vessels being stored together, what types/kinds of vessels should be covered?
Should there be any limits on the size of containers subject to the aggregation requirement?
What would such limits be based on?
Similarly, should there be a specific distance between vessels established in order to consider them as grouped together for purposes of worst case scenario calculations?
What would that distance be based on?
f. Should EPA revise § 68.25 to require the owner or operator of a regulated process to consider the potential for worst case release scenarios to involve adjacent facilities or other nearby facilities that are interconnected through pipelines?
Would this change raise any confidentiality or security issues?
How would EPA adjust its worst case scenario modeling requirements to account for such a change?
g. What would be the economic impacts of modifying the worst case scenario analysis requirements as discussed above?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to worst case scenario analysis?
8. Public Disclosure of Information to Promote Regulatory Compliance and Improve Community Understanding of Chemical Risks
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Should EPA amend the RMP regulation to require RMP-regulated facilities to post chemical hazard-related information on their websites (if they have one) such as RMP chemical names, chemical quantities, executive summaries, links to LEPCs, community emergency plans, Safety Data Sheets (SDS) for hazardous chemicals present on site, EPCRA Tier 2 reports, release notification reports, accident history and cause and other similar information?
What requirements should be considered for facilities that do not have a website?
b. Would requiring facilities to make this information available on the company website promote improved regulatory compliance?
What additional economic burden would be associated with such a requirement?
c. Do RMP-regulated facility owners/operators have any safety or security concerns with posting the executive summary from the RMP, or linking to EPCRA reports and community response plans on the company websites?
Please explain any concerns regarding specific elements of this information.
d. Would posting the RMP executive summary on a website cause facility owner/operators to remove important information from the executive summary?
Does EPA need to better define the contents of an executive summary in order to allay security concerns?
e. Is there other information (web-based or otherwise) that would assist local communities, emergency planners, and responders in understanding facility risks that should be made publicly available?
For example, would disclosure of the facility’s PHA or compliance audit to local authorities such as the LEPC result in improved safety?
f. Does your facility interact with community groups (e.g., a citizen advisory panel)?
If so, what information do you provide to such groups?
g. Are there other activities or measures that RMP-facility owner/operators can use to ensure that communities, planners, and responders have access to appropriate information?
h. Can the use of social media or other forms of community outreach be incorporated into hazard assessment, prevention, and response to leverage community involvement in oversight?
For example, would increased public disclosure of RMP-related information, such as accidental releases, near misses, and subsequent safety enhancements, or increased community involvement in facility emergency responseplanning, lead to improvements in facility safety?
Please identify aspects of the RMP rule where there are opportunities for community involvement.
9. Threshold Quantities and Off-site Consequence Analysis Endpoints for Regulated Substances Based on Acute Exposure Guideline Level Toxicity Values
EPA is considering recalculating the current IDLH-based TQs for the following reasons:
- The IDLH is based upon response of healthy male worker-population and does not take into account the exposure of more sensitive individuals, such as the elderly, pregnant women, children or people with various health problems.
- The IDLH is based upon a maximum 30-minute exposure period which may not reflect (may underestimate) actual exposures to accidental airborne releases.
- The IDLH may not reflect the concentration that could result in serious but reversible injury because IDLHs were designed only to protect workers against concentrations that would prevent death or irreversible health effects or would prevent other deleterious
EPA requests information on the following questions regarding recalculating reporting thresholds and/or toxic endpoints using AEGLs (or EPRG values when AEGLs are not available):
a. Would revising the RMP rule to incorporate AEGL-2 and ERPG-2 values (when an AEGL is not available), as the basis for TQs and toxic endpoints make the RMP rule more protective of human health and the environment?
Would it result in significant changes to the universe of RMP-regulated facilities due to potential changes in TQs?
If so, what number and types of facilities would be most affected and what changes would occur?
b. The IDLH values used for setting the existing TQs are based on an exposure period of 30 minutes. If the IDLH was not available, the acute toxicity data used to determine the equivalent IDLH varied depending on the chemical and actual study, and these numbers typically ranged from 1 to 8 hours. The ERPG-2 values used for the toxic endpoints represent an exposure period of 1 hour.
Given that AEGLs are establishedwith five different exposure periods (10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours), which exposure time should be used if the AEGL is used to determine the TQs and/or toxic endpoints?
c. What should be the hierarchy for developing an alternative or equivalent LOC when an AEGL value has not been established for a toxic substance?
Should ERPG values be used instead if they exist?
If no ERPG value exists, should an LOC based on the IDLH value be used instead if it exists?
If there is no IDLH value, how should the LOC be calculated for either the TQ or toxic endpoint?
Is there an alternate method for establishing an equivalent LOC for those chemicals not having an AEGL or ERPG that will result in an appropriate TQ?
d. Currently, RMP worst-cast scenarios can be based on 10-minute or 60-minute release times.
Because many AEGL-2 values are established for 1-hour, 4-hour and 8-hour exposure periods, should requirements for determining the worst-case and alternative release scenarios also incorporate four and eight hour release times using the 4-hour and 8-hour AEGL-2 values for a particular toxic chemical?
e. Should EPA consider using AEGL-1 rather than AEGL-2 values for calculating reporting thresholds and toxic endpoints in order to address acute effects that are transient and reversible (such as discomfort and irritation)?
f. What would be the economic impacts of recalculating TQs as discussed above?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to recalculating TQs effects (e.g. disorientation or incoordination) that would prevent escape.
10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Should industry sectors represented in RMP data as those with the most accidental releases be used to update and replace the existing set of Program 3 NAICS codes with a new set?
b. How can the RMP accident history data best be used to update the current list of NAICS codes that trigger Program 3 requirements?
Should the agency take into account the number of sources in each sector, or the severity of reported accidents, or other factors, in selecting updated Program 3 NAICS codes?
Is the methodology used to develop the SIC/ NAICS code list applicable to the RMP accident history database?
c. Would limiting the data analysis or the selection of NAICS codes to only those industry sectors represented in the RMP data provide a complete and accurate picture of high risk industry sectors?
d. Should an analysis of the RMP data be combined with an analysis of other current accident history databases to inform any revisions/updates?
If so, what otherdatabases should be used?
How much weight should be given to the RMP data set in comparison to other sources?
e. Should the original NAICS codes continue to be included?
Would not including the NAICS codes historically identified under Program 3 cause increase risks to those industry sectors by having them no longer subject to the more stringent measures?
f. Should an analysis of accident history data be limited to a specific time frame?
g. Would it cause confusion within the regulated community to change the list of NAICS codes for which Program 3 is required?
h. What would be the economic impacts of modifying the list of NAICS codes for which Program 3 is required?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to modifying the list of covered NAICS codes?
11. The “Safety Case” Regulatory Model
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. If you own or operate any RMP or PSM-covered facilities and also own or operate facilities in countries that use a safety case regulatory regime, please describe the process of developing and obtaining approval for your safety case. How long does development and approval of a safety case take for a large petroleum refinery or chemical processing facility? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the safety case approach in comparison to the existing U.S. regulatory regime for chemical process safety?
Is there any evidence that the safety case approach reduces the frequency and severity of accidental releases and near misses?
If so, please provide any information, data, or studies to EPA that demonstrate these effects.
How expensive is it for facility owners to implement the safety case approach in comparison to implementing RMP or PSM?
Do you already incorporate aspects of the safety case approach in your risk management program?
b. The CSB Draft Regulatory Report on the Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire68 highlights the NRC as a U.S. regulator that has established a safety case approach for licensing and oversight of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States.
The NRC oversees approximately 100 nuclear reactor and 3000 nuclear materials facilities in the U.S.69; the NRC has nearly 4000 employees and an annual budget of over $1 billion70.
What additional resources would be required by EPA and OSHA in order to establish and oversee a safety case regulatory regime for RMP and PSM-covered facilities?
c. Is the safety case approach suitable for all RMP and PSM covered facilities, or, if adopted, should it be limited to only the most high-risk facilities, such as petroleum refineries and other high-risk chemical processing facilities?
d. What would be the economic impacts of moving to a safety case based regulatory regime for chemical facility safety?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to safety case based approach?
12. Streamlining RMP Requirements
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Are there steps that EPA could take to simplify the process of determining whether the RMP rule applies to particular facilities?
Are there other potential revisions to the rule that would make it easier for regulated entities to comply with its provisions?
b. Are there steps that EPA could take to simplify the RMP submission process?
For example, are there advances in electronic reporting or information technology that EPA could use in order to make RMP submissions easier?
c. Should EPA require that RMP submissions be certified by a senior corporate official, such as the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operations Officer, or the equivalent to ensure corporate-wide awareness and accountability in the RMP submission?
d. Is the three-tiered program level structure of the RMP regulation appropriate, or should EPA consider simplifying the rule to make only two program tiers, or only a single prevention program applicable to all facilities?
e. Are the accident prevention program elements clearly defined?
Should EPA further clarify any of the existing elements?
f. Are the regulatory terms and definitions contained in section 68.3 sufficiently clear?
Are there additional terms that EPA should define in this section?
EPA News Releases: http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/2014%20Press%20Releases!OpenView
Office of Emergency Management: http://epa.gov/emergencies/eo_improving_chem_fac.htm
OSHA: https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/index.html
Notice: http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/RMPRFI_20140724.pdf
To view EPA’s RFI and provide public comment, visit http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/eo_improving_chem_fac.htm