This week we saw another fatal hot work explosion associated with welding on a container/vessel. This time we lost a 29-year-old father, who was supposedly standing on or next to the tank when it exploded. He was found 75′ away deceased and two other contractors were transported to the hospital with serious injuries. The Augusta Fire Chief has said that the explosion was caused by a welding accident (a welder can be seen in the picture). The tank involved was said to be a waste-water collection tank. Investigators have stated that the tank was leaking into its dike and the facility hired a contractor to fix the leak(s); although at the time of the explosion, the welders were said to have been welding a plate onto the outside of the tank in preparation for installing a handrail around the top of the tank. The source is claiming that the atmosphere surrounding the outside of the tank was tested, but the atmosphere inside was not. They still don’t know what the gas/vapor was, but it obviously was flammable.
The FD has stated they used a placard on the tank to identify the material as:
UN/NA 3265, Corrosive liquid, acidic, organic, n.o.s.
This COULD make this a repeat of another waste tank that contained sulphuric acid that exploded when hot work was being performed on it.
See Motiva Enterprises Sulfuric Acid Tank Explosion
This may be the 2nd fatal incident involving contractors performing hot work on or in the vicinity of a tank that exploded. On 2/8/2017 there was a fatal explosion in Deridder, LA at a containerboard plant/paper mill. Preliminary results show the 30-foot-tall tank that exploded had been left with about 10-feet of water in it. This left 20-feet of vapor space. The liquid in the tank is primarily water, but other materials, some of which are flammable, also exist in the vapor space. The facility decided to leave 10-feet of foul condensate (mainly water, but also methanol, hydrogen sulfide, turpentine, and other sulfur components) in the tank because there was no work being performed on the tank and resources were being used for the mill’s annual outage. Workers above the tank were doing some welding and it appears that a spark from the welding flashed into the tank, which caused combustion, and resulted in lift-off of the tank.
And that was NOT that businesses first hot work explosion, on July 29, 2008, three workers died and a fourth was injured when an explosion occurred inside an 80-foot-tall storage tank. The workers were on a catwalk above the tank and performing hot work (welding) at the time of the explosion. The storage tank held a mixture of recycled paper pulp and water which the CSB found decomposed to form flammable hydrogen.
In this weeks explosion, it appears at this stage that had the facility and contractor followed OSHA minimums, this incident could have been prevented:
1910.252(a)(3) Welding or cutting containers.
1910.252(a)(3)(i) Used containers. No welding, cutting, or other hot work shall be performed on used drums, barrels, tanks or other containers until they have been cleaned so thoroughly as to make absolutely certain that there are no flammable materials present or any substances such as greases, tars, acids, or other materials which when subjected to heat, might produce flammable or toxic vapors. Any pipe lines or connections to the drum or vessel shall be disconnected or blanked.
1910.252(a)(3)(ii) Venting and purging. All hollow spaces, cavities or containers shall be vented to permit the escape of air or gases before preheating, cutting or welding. Purging with inert gas is recommended.
UPDATED 10/4/2017 with Fire Department Run Report info:
All units responded to the report of a structure fire at the stated location. E1 and Battalion 1 arrived on scene. Batt 1 established command and E1 spoke with security. E1 responded to the location inside the facility where the fire was thought to be. E5 arrived and responded to E1’s location. E1 advised an explosion had occurred involving a stationary liquid tank with no visible fire. E1 advised that there was one patient and one person missing at that time. T1 arrived and responded to E1’s location to assist with victim removal. Lt. Dukes assumed the safety officer role. Safety team members at the facility removed one victim from the tank. Med 27 was on scene and transported. Additional med units were requested. Med 28 and Gold Cross 505 arrived. Med 28 transported one additional victim. The missing victim found approximately 75 feet from the tank that had exploded. This victim was deceased. Plant personnel advised that the content of the tank involved was wastewater. The tank was labeled with DOT number 3256. The tank involved was leaking but was located within containment dyke. The scene was determined to be safe and plant personnel began monitoring the leak and air quality . No safety issues found. E5 and T1 released from command. E1 remained on scene. All other units in staging placed back in service. Plant personnel consulted. Batt 1 and E1 cleared the scene and command terminated.