Not recognizing “change of service” for Pressure Vessel(s) leads to catastrophic failure (Brittle Fracture Failure)

On September 19, 2002, Employee #1 was painting one (1) of six (6) tanks containing carbon dioxide when three (3) of them suddenly exploded. He was killed.

The tanks were originally built as railroad tank cars for liquefied petroleum gas and they were not designed to store carbon dioxide.

On or about September 19, 2002, at the carbon dioxide processing plant, located on FM Road 1760, seven miles west of Muleshoe, Texas, employees were exposed to a struck-by hazard associated with the sudden and catastrophic failure of two (2) carbon dioxide storage tanks and the launching of a third tank into a distant location. Subsequent analysis showed the explosion was related to a build-up of excessive pressure and brittle fracturing of the two tanks due to the extremely low temperatures to which the welded steel plates of the tanks were being exposed.

The employer could have avoided the explosion hazard by adhering to recognized and generally accepted good engineering control practices (RAGAGEP), such as the ASME Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, and the Compressed Gas Association Standards related to carbon dioxide systems and pressure relief.

Among other methods, one reasonable means of abatement would be to evaluate materials before placing them into service, conduct visual surveys and inspections, provide operating procedures outlining safe operating limits, establish an effective management communication system for shift orders, conduct a process hazard analysis, and implement the recommendations.

Source: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=304119696