Results of OSHA’s look back review of the LOTO standard docket S-012-B

This report presents the results of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) “Lookback” review of the Agency’s Control of Hazardous Energy Sources standard, also known as the Lockout/Tagout standard. The standard, which is codified in OSHA’s general industry standards at 29 CFR 1910.14 7, establishes requirements employers must follow to disable machinery and equipment and to prevent the release of potentially hazardous energy during the servicing and maintenance of that machinery and equipment. The Lockout/Tagout standard requires employers to develop and implement lockout/Tagout programs and to train their workers to follow required procedures during servicing and maintenance work. “Lockout” refers to the practice of installing a lock on an energy-isolating device, such as a circuit breaker or shut-off valve, so that mistake will not energize the equipment. The term ”tagout” refers to the practice of attaching a warning tag to an energy-isolating device to warn employees not to energize the equipment until the warning tag has been removed. OSHA issued the Lockout/Tagout standard in 1989.

In 1997, the Agency initiated a regulatory review of the standard, as required by Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) and Section 5 of Executive Order (EO) 12866. Section 610 of the RF A requires agencies to determine whether their standards should be continued without change or should be amended or rescinded, consistent with the objectives of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act}, to minimize any significant impact of the rule on a substantial number of small entities. Section 5 of EO 12866 requires agencies to determine whether, to reduce the regulatory burden on the American people, their families, communities, State, local, and tribal governments, and industries, the standard should be modified or eliminated to make it more effective in achieving its regulatory objectives, or less burdensome. or to bring it into better alignment with the President’s priorities and the principles set forth in the Executive Order.

Conclusion

Based Oil the comments and testimony of participants in this Lookback review process and other evidence submitted to the public docket (Docket S-012-B), OSHA concludes that the Agency’s Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout) standard should be continued without change. The evidence also demonstrates that the standard does not need to be rescinded or amended to minimize significant impacts on a substantial number of small entities. OSHA also finds that the Lockout/Tagout standard is necessary to protect employee safety and health, is compatible with other OSHA standards containing lockout/Tagout provisions, is not duplicative or in conflict with other Federal, State, or local government rules, is not inappropriately burdensome, and is consistent with the President’s priorities and the principles of EO 12866. In addition, although the standard is technically complex, compliance assistance materials will assist employers in interpreting the standard. Further, no changes have occurred in technological, economic, or other factors that would warrant revision of the standard at this time.

This regulatory review is organized into six chapters: Introduction, Regulatory Environment of the Standard, Continued Need for and Effectiveness of the Standard, Public Comments and Complaints Concerning the Standard, Changes in Technological and Economic Conditions, and Conclusions. These are briefly summarized below.

Chapter I of this review details the compliance assistance and outreach activities OSHA has undertaken to help employers and employees learn about the risks associated with hazardous energy sources and how to comply with the standard. OSHA personnel have given speeches, conducted training sessions, awarded !mining grants, developed compliance assistance materials, and disseminated documents, and are now testing a Lockout/ragout expert system designed to help employers comply with the standard.

Chapter II of this review describes changes in the populations affected by the standard since its promulgation, estimates the number of firms and employees currently covered by the rule, and discusses the compliance experience of businesses falling within the standard’s scope. The Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) performed in support of the final rule in 1989 identified covered industries as high-impact. low-impact, and negligible (“zero”) impact industries depending on the percentage of firms in each group potentially affected by the rule. The manufacturing sector was identified as the most heavily impacted sector, with all establishments in SIC codes 20-39 identified as potentially impacted. The transportation, utilities, trade, and services sectors were designated low impact industries, and retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate, and other industries in the service sector were classified in the negligible impact group.

The 1989 RIA estimated that about 640,000 establishments would be covered by the standard. According to 1994 Bureau of the Census data (provided by the Small Business Administration) and OSHA estimates of the proportion of firms in each impact group currently covered by the rule, the Agency estimates that nearly I million firms are now covered by the rule. About 358,000 of these firms have fewer than 20 employees. The number of workers covered has also risen since the rule went into effect: an estimated 2,962,000 authorized employees (authorized employees are those judged to be most at risk from lockout/Tagout hazards) were assumed to be covered when the final rule was issued; that number has increased to 3,286,000 authorized employees in the ensuing interval. This increase has occurred in the industries identified in the 1989 RIA as low impact.

The compliance experience of affected firms, and particularly of small businesses, was ascertained for this review on the basis of four sources of data: the docket for this Lookback review; an analysis of OSHA enforcement data; input from OSHA compliance staff and State plan officials; and a review of the literature on the standard. OSHA’s analysis of the Agency’s enforcement data shows that violations related to lockout/tagout are frequent: the Lockout/Tagout standard is routinely among the top five standards most frequently cited. Most of the citations were issued in manufacturing facilities, i.e., in those establishments identified by the RIA as being in high impact industries. Firms with fewer than 100 employees were inspected less frequently than the size distribution of such firms in the United States would suggest.

Representatives of small businesses who submitted comments to the docket indicated that small businesses often have difficulty complying with the rule’s requirements to develop, document, and use lockout/tagout procedures and in· understanding the compliance requirements of the rule. No small business commented that the standard had a significant impact on their business. OSHA and State-plan compliance personnel generally agreed that “even small employers are able to comply with … the LO/TO standard.” However, another compliance official stressed the importance of providing small employers with compliance assistance materials. In particular, assistance in complying with the procedures requirement of the rule would be helpful to some small businesses, according to some compliance personnel. Comments from State-plan personnel generally echoed these comments. Three of the State-plan States (Oregon, Kentucky, and Minnesota) have lockout/tagout standards that cover more workplaces than the Federal standard does or require the use of lockout procedures exclusively (rather than lockout and tagout procedures).

OSHA’ s review of the literature related to this standard failed to identify specific problems with the standard, although some articles postulated that compliance with the standard was generally poor. However, it is not possible to determine from the evidence in this record how extensive such noncompliance is, or whether it is due to a lack of understanding of the standard, simple non-compliance, or a lack of awareness that the standard exists.

Chapter III of this review evaluates the continued need for, and the effectiveness of, the Lockout/Tagout rule. OSHA bases its conclusion that the rule is effective and should be continued on four kinds of information: (I) data showing that even more workers are performing work that puts them at risk than was the case when the rule was published; (2) OSHA compliance data showing that workers continue to be injured and killed as a result of failure to follow lockout/tagout procedures properly; (3) data demonstrating the standard’s effectiveness; and (4) testimony from employer and employee representatives that the standard has been effective in preventing lockout-related deaths and injuries.

First, 600,000 more workers are exposed to lockout/related hazards than was the case in 1989. Moreover, testimony in the docket and other evidence suggest that more maintenance and servicing tasks are being performed by production workers, who generally have less skill and training in servicing and maintenance activities than maintenance workers. In addition, temporary workers, who are often less than adequately trained, may be performing more maintenance and servicing work than was formerly the case. Both trends-toward the use of production workers and temporary workers in lieu of specially trained maintenance workers may mean that workers exposed to lockout-related hazards may be at greater risk than was the case when the standard was issued.

Several recent OSHA enforcement cases, including one involving the deaths of eight workers, who were not following the appropriate lockout procedures at the time of the accident, point to the continued need for the standard and for better compliance with it. In addition, three sources of data were submitted to the docket that demonstrate the rule’s effectiveness: data from the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) fatality database; data from a similar database maintained by the United Steelworkers of America (USWA); and data from a study of sawmill injuries in Maine. The UAW database shows a significant decline in lockout-related fatalities. In the years between 1989 (when the final rule was published) and 1997, lockout-related fatalities declined by 20 percent per year; when the concomitant increase in the proportion of auto workers exposed to lockout hazards is taken into account, the UAW believes that a 30 percent annual decline in the rate of these fatalities has occurred.

The USW A database tells a similar story: over a seven-year period (1990-1997), a 55 percent reduction in lockout/tagout-related fatalities occurred at the 10 basic steel producing companies represented in the database. The third study involved an epidemiological analysis of wood product industry workers in Maine and included 157 cases involving injured workers (“cases”) and 251 cases involving uninjured workers (“controls”). This study showed that injured workers were three times less likely than uninjured workers to work in an establishment having a lockout/tagout program. Although the data from this epidemiological study do not establish a direct link between injuries and the absence of lockout programs, they do suggest an association between these factors.

In addition to these analyses, several commenters (including large companies like Bell Atlantic and Kodak), unions (such as the UAW, USWA, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers), employer groups (such as the Organization Resources Counselors), and professional societies, such as the American Society of Safety Engineers, supported the standard, either because it had been effective in saving lives and preventing injuries or because they recognized the importance of having a Federal standard addressing this widespread workplace hazard. These organizations represent small as well as large companies. The evidence presented in Chapter ID of this report indicates that lockout/tagout programs of the kind required by the standard have had measurable and positive impacts on worker safety.

The comments submitted to the docket for this regulatory review (Docket S-012B) are summarized in Chapter IV of this report. Most comments received supported the continuation of the standard because it had been effective in achieving its worker protection goal. Some participants suggested that OSHA revise certain provisions of the rule they felt were burdensome; however, most of these commenters urged OSHA to address these issues by providing compliance assistance materials rather than by reopening the rulemaking. Employee representatives urged OSHA to strengthen the rule and/or extend it to the construction. maritime, and agriculture industries. Other commenters urged OSHA to produce a plain language version of the standard. By and large, however, most commenters asked OSHA to increase its compliance assistance efforts or to add non-mandatory materials to the rule, rather than to alter the language of the standard itself.

Those commenters to the docket who represented small businesses, such as the National Association of Manufacturers, the Society of the Plastics Industry, and the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, also generally agreed that additional compliance assistance, rather than a reopening of the rulemaking, was an appropriate way for OSHA to address these commenters’ concerns. However, some small-business representatives urged OSHA to revise certain provisions to reflect performance rather than specification-based language, to rely to a greater extent on consensus standards, or to enforce the standard more consistently.
Lookback reviews must specifically evaluate the following factors:

  1. the continued need for the rule;
  2. the nature of public complaints or comments about the rule;
  3. the complexity of the rule;
  4. the extent to which the rule overlaps, duplicates, or conflicts with other federal rules; and
  5. the length of time since the rule was evaluated or the degree to which technology, economic conditions, or other factors have changed since the rule was promulgated.

Comments on each of these issues are summarized below.

Continued need for the rule

The overwhelming majority of commenters agreed that the standard should continue in effect. Many of those commenters who urged OSHA to revise the standard suggested the same revisions they had raised during the original rulemaking. Nature of Complaints and Comments. Comments touched on a range of topics, from the need to strengthen the standard by extending it to other sectors to the need for additional compliance assistance materials to the need to incorporate material ftom the compliance directive into a non-mandatory appendix to the rule.

Commenters from the process industries urged OSHA to include as a non-mandatory appendix to the standard the appendix to the compliance directive (Appendix C to STD 1-7.3). This appendix was negotiated by OSHA and representatives of the process industries as part of a settlement of a legal challenge to the standard when it was first published. These commenters stated that, if OSHA reopened the standard at this time, they would recommend modifications to the interpretations agreed to as part of that settlement.

 

Complexity of the Rule

Some commenters noted that the rule was complex. The suggestions for addressing this problem ranged from rewriting the rule in plain language to providing compliance assistance materials.

 

Extent of Overlap with o!her Federal or State Laws

No commenter identified overlap or duplication between the lockout/Tagout standard and other Federal or State laws. Some participants, however, believe that some of the hazard-specific lockout provisions in other OSHA standards duplicate provisions of the Lockout/Tagout standard.

 

Changes in Technology

Economic Conditions. and Other Factors. No comments specifically addressing these issues were received. Burdens on Small Businesses. No comments specifically addressed the standard’s impact on small businesses, and no comments suggested that such impacts needed to be minimized. Two comments described how some small businesses had been able to increase their profitability by implementing safety and health programs that included lockout/Tagout procedures. Another participant commented that the costs incurred by a small business to comply with the standard ” … will easily be returned by avoiding only one injury or fatality.” Chapter V of this review describes changes in the technological and economic environment since the Lockout/Tagout standard was issued. In general, advances in machine guarding technology and increased reliance by employers on predictive maintenance techniques and technologies have reduced the amount of machine and equipment servicing and maintenance required. In addition, the introduction of software designed specifically to assist employers in administering their lockout programs has facilitated compliance with the standard. This review also did not identify any changes in economic conditions that would have increased the impacts of the standard on small entities since the rule was issued. In addition, no evidence was identified in this review to suggest that the standard needs to be revised to make it more effective or less burdensome, or to bring it into better alignment with the President’s priorities.

 

Chapter VI of this review summarizes OSHA ‘s findings as a result of this Lookback review of the Agency’s Lockout/Tagout standard (29 CFR 19 10.147). The review was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Section 5 of Executive Order 12866. OSHA finds that the Lockout/Tagout standard: • Should be continued without change • Is necessary to protect the safety and health of employees • Does not need to be rescinded or amended to minimize any significant impact on a substantial number of small entities • Is compatible with other OSHA standards and is not duplicative or in conflict with other Federal, State, local, or tribal government rules • Is not inappropriately burdensome • Is consistent with the President’s priorities and the principles of EO 12866. In particular, OSHA notes that evidence in the record of this review demonstrates that, in at least two high-impact industries-automobile manufacturing and steel production-the standard is credited with reducing lockout-related fatalities by 20 to 55% in the years since the rule was issued.

Although not required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Executive Order to do so, OSHA has decided to respond to the comments and concerns expressed by participants in this regulatory review, most of whom asked OSHA to provide additional compliance assistance materials. Specifically, OSHA intends to undertake the: following actions and to complete them within two years (i.e., by the end of 2001): • Review and update of the Lockout/Tagout compliance directive, STD 1-7.3 • Review of existing interpretations relating to the standard and development of new letters of interpretations addressing many of the concerns raised by review participants 

  • Development, in conjunction with the National Automobile Dealers Association, of compliance assistance materials for industries engaged in vehicle maintenance and repair. OSHA has already completed several activities related to the Lockout/Tagout standard in response to comments made during this Lookback review.

These include:

  • A Lockout/Tagout Interactive Training Program consisting of three major components comprising a Tutorial, a group of abstracts called ”Hot Topics” and a group of Interactive Case Studies. The Tutorial explains the standard in a question/answer format. The “Hot Topics” consist of five abstracts containing a detailed discussion of major issues in which relevant highlighted sections of the all-inclusive documents are linked together. In the Interactive Case Studies, seven simulated Lockout/Tagout inspections are presented. • An Integrated Preamble which combines the final rule preamble published in the September I, 1989 Federal Register and the final rule corrections and technical amendments document published in the September 20, 1990, Federal Register.
  • The development of the Lockout/Tagout Plus Advisor consisting of an interactive, expert, diagnostic item of software. It allows users to be interviewed about their activities to determine whether workers might be exposed to hazards from moving machinery or electricity or other sources of energy. It asks questions to determine whether the work is covered by the Lockout/Tagout Standard or other standards concerned with hazardous energy. The software responds to the users’ facts to provide expert guidance, explanations, and assistance.

OSHA concludes that providing employers, especially small employers, with the compliance assistance tools listed above will make compliance with the Lockout/Tagout standard easier for these employers and will address many of the comments received during this Lookback review. Such compliance assistance should also increase the effectiveness of the standard in protecting workers from the significant risks associated with servicing and maintenance tasks in covered industries. As discussed in Chapter m of this review, information in the record from two databases credits the standard with achieving reductions in lockout-related fatalities of between 20% and 55%.

 

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