Maturity levels of the safety cultures (Parker, Lawrie & Hudson)

Westrum (1991, 2004) proposed a description of three (3) levels of safety culture advancement. Hudson (1999), and later Parker, Lawrie & Hudson (2006), built on these and developed five (5) levels of safety culture advancement.  Depending on its level of maturity, safety culture is either characterized as

  1. Pathological
  2. Reactive
  3. Calculative
  4. Proactive, or
  5. Generative

This classification into five levels was included in the OGP’s Hearts and Minds program (2010). It is presented in the table below:

 

Pathological

Reactive

Calculative

Proactive

Generative

Communication

No communication
beyond what is
legally required.

Communication is focused on accidents, otherwise, it is top-down only.

Lots of statistics,
top-down information, except where accidents are concerned – then it is bottom-up.

Management is
present at the sharp end and monitors.

Safety is discussed
in team meetings and workers are interested.

Safety has priority.

Lots of feedback loops.

Sharp-end workers actively seek out information.

Organizational
Attitudes

No trust.

Sanctions and micro-
management of workers

Responsibility is focused on individuals, who must be trained and follow procedures.

Sharp-end workers have little influence over procedures.

Management is perceived as being obsessed with safety but is not taken seriously.

Participation is encouraged, under supervision from
management.

Obsession with statistics.

Workers see management as partners and respect
them.

Workers identify problems and management works with them to address them.

HSE Organization

No HSE structure;
reliance on experience.

Legal and statistical
obligations with no follow-up.

Procedures are changed after an accident.

HSE specialists are well accepted.

Rewards and sanctions for HSE.

Lots of procedures with no concern as to their applicability.

HSE specialists endeavor to take into account the
constraints at the sharp end.

Safety is taken into account in design.

Small HSE department supporting management.

Procedures are drafted by the teams.

Continuous improvement.

Small number of procedures, included in training.

Organizational
behaviors

Denial of problems.

Focus is on profits.

Management overreacts after an accident.

Workers have little faith in actions from management.

Monitoring of numbers.

Conviction that the situation is under control.

Difficulty reassessing solutions.

Priority is given to safety over productivity (with competing goals).

Management is interested.

Analysis of near-misses.

Workers are given lots of free rein and there is trust between workers and management.

Behavior with regard to working conditions

Working conditions are
dangerous.

Management is not interested.

Legal obligations.

Improvements after an
inspection.

Clean environment.

Management does not always have sound knowledge of the sharp end.

Priorities and resources are discussed without waiting for an accident to occur.

Management has sound knowledge of the sharp end.

Workers influence the working environment.

Management disseminates best practices to the other sites.

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