A few years ago, I put forth the idea that workers pass through the 3 Cs in their decision-making process as they learn to take more and more risks. Those three (3) Cs were:
- Concerned (as they begin their job)
- Comfortable (as they get positive consequences from their at-risk behavior)
- Confident (they think they can do the job breaking the rules and nothing bad is going to happen)
That article stirred quite a bit of debate among the SAFTENG community and so I thought it was time to share my theory on how management personnel go through their 3 Cs:
- Culture
- Competency
- Complacency
Dare I even mention the word “Culture,” as many of my friends and colleagues often tell me that there is no such thing as a “safety culture.” My response to that… HOGWASH!
I see safety as part of a culture every month in my travels/work. I can get a feel of the culture by standing in the guard shack, watching an orientation video, and then observing my surroundings while waiting for my escort! Doing this every morning for five days begins to frame up one’s “opinion” of the culture of safety at the facility. And sadly, the gap between a poor safety culture and a good one is like night and day! But culture is driven by MANAGEMENT and management alone. It is a true reflection of what is important within the confines of each facility. I almost always HEAR the right words, but those words are in stark contrast to what I observed over a 5-day visit. This single and simple fact is a reflection of the safety culture… saying one thing but demonstrating something else.
What do I mean when I say Competency?
I see competency playing a significant role within far too many facilities. Recently, the SAFTENG team was doing a cultural assessment for a potential new client, and we were shocked to our core when we visited with the facility’s senior management. We recognized that the safety team was woefully ill-prepared and lacked the necessary experience to develop, build, and manage an OSH SMS. The management team was well aware of this skill/experience gap and stated this was the best they could do. They stated they could not hold onto a true safety professional for more than a year or less and that the revolving door of the safety office was hurting their credibility with their bosses. So their solution was to promote line and maintenance workers who had no formal training in Hazard ID, Hazard Analysis, Risk Assessments, and Corrective Action Plans to somehow build something they knew nothing about.
