Respondent is the owner and/or operator of a resin manufacturing plant. Respondent has registered an RMPlan with the EPA for its Facility and has developed an RMProgram accidental release prevention program for the Facility. At all times relevant to the violations, Respondent had on-site for use 1,886,000 pounds of formaldehyde (solution) and 52,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. Respondent has six RMProgram level 3 covered processes, which store or otherwise use formaldehyde (solution) and anhydrous ammonia in amounts exceeding their applicable thresholds of 15,000 pounds and 10,000 pounds, respectively.
On April 18 – 20, 2023, the EPA conducted an on-site inspection of the RMProgram-related records and equipment for the purpose of assessing the Respondent’s compliance with the RMProgram requirements and the implemented recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) for its covered process at its Facility.
At the time of the inspection, EPA observed the following:
(a) Respondent was unable to produce documentation containing a material and energy balance for the formaldehyde manufacturing process that included the quantities of formaldehyde present, as well as the energy added or removed to/from the heat exchanger units, throughout all stages of the process.
(b) The following evidence of how Respondent’s process was designed and maintained:
i. Respondent was using methanol piping located on the support bridge near the second level of the formaldehyde absorber as the primary support for other piping. Using piping to support other piping can cause excessive stress on the supporting pipe, potentially lead to sagging, misalignment, and/or failure of one or both pipes and therefore is not in accordance with Section 321.1.1 of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B31.3 (2014), which states, among other things, “[t]he layout and design of piping and its supporting elements shall be directed toward preventing …excessive stresses in the supporting (or restraining) elements…” and Section 27.6.1 of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 30 (2021), which states,
“[p]iping systems shall be supported and protected against physical damage, including damage from stresses arising from settlement, vibration, expansion, or contraction….”
ii. The methanol and utility piping located on the support bridge near the second level of the formaldehyde absorber, as well as the ammonia piping from the vaporizer to the resin kettles, were not labeled to indicate contents, direction of flow, physical state (i.e., liquid or vapor), or pressure level (i.e., high or low). Section 60.5.1.6.2(2) of NFPA 1 (2021) states, “[p]iping, tubing, valves, fittings, and related components used for hazardous materials shall be… identified in accordance with ASME A13.1 to indicate the material conveyed.” Section 3.1 of ASME A13.1 (2015) states, “[p]ositive identification of the contents of a piping system shall be by lettered legend, giving the name of the contents in full or abbreviated form … [a]rrows shall be used to indicate direction of flow… [and] [c]ontents shall be identified by a legend with sufficient additional details such as temperature, pressure, etc., as are necessary to identify the hazard.”
iii. The pressure relief valve directly off the ammonia vaporizer, as well as the two pressure relief valves downstream of the vaporizer, discharged below the roof line and near an entrance to the resin manufacturing building. These pressure safety valve relief locations are inconsistent with Section 5.8.13 of the Compressed Gas Association (CGA) G2.1 (2014), which states, “[t]he discharge opening from any pressure relief valve shall not terminate inside any building or below the highest roof line of any such building.”
iv. Signage was not readily visible near the ammonia storage area, or anywhere else on the premises, to display emergency information to emergency response personnel. Lack of emergency notification information signage in a readily visible location for emergency response personnel is inconsistent with Section 6.8 of CGA G2.1 (2014), which states, “[a] legible sign shall be displayed on the premises at which a storage system is located, so as to be readily visible to emergency response personnel, with lettering not less than 2 inches in height, stating the following:
▪ EMERGENCY INFORMATION;
▪ name of facility;
▪ name or title of at least two responsible persons;
▪ area code and telephone number(s) of each person listed; and
▪ phrase, ‘the 911 address is’, and the appropriate 911 address.”
v. The entrances to the flammable chemical storage building as well as the chemical storage warehouse were not affixed with NFPA Hazard Identification signs to alert facility staff and emergency responders to the hazards associated with the stored chemicals. Lack of NFPA Hazard Identification Signs at the entrances to areas containing hazardous chemicals is inconsistent with Section 60.5.1.8.2.1 of NFPA 1 (2021), which states, “[v]isible hazard identification signs in accordance with NFPA 704 shall be placed at …entrances to locations where hazardous materials are stored, dispensed, used, or handled.”
vi. Four drums of sulfuric acid having a capacity of more than 5 pounds (lb.) (2.268 kilograms (kg)) or 1⁄2 gallons (gal) (1.89 Liters (L)) and four drums of a basic solution containing sodium hydroxide having a capacity of more than 5 lb. (2.268 kg) or 1⁄2 gal (1.89 L) were stored directly next to each other in the chemical warehouse. Acids and bases like these are incompatible materials and active storage in the same physical location without employing a method to separate them is inconsistent with Section 6.1.12.1 of NFPA 400 (2022), which states, “[i]ncompatible materials in storage and storage of materials incompatible with materials in use shall be separated when the stored materials are in containers having a capacity of more than 5 lb. (2.268 kg) or
1⁄2 gal (1.89 L).”
(c) The Respondent’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) did not provide clear instruction for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process. For example, one SOP directed operators to “[p]artially close the Circulation Valve (for SM-3: 21V425, for SM-4: 21V426, for SM-5: 21V427 or for SM-6: 21V428) at the assigned formaldehyde tank.” The SOP included a note, stating “[c]lose circulation only enough to enable a satisfactory flow to the kettle; do not completely close off circulation” but did not provide any information describing the consequences of failing to do so. Using terminology such as “partially close” or “satisfactory flow,” without more information, does not provide clear instructions to operators and can lead to varying interpretations between different operators. The rate of flow of material may have an adverse effect on temperature, pressure, etc.
(d) The Respondent had not completed non-destructive thickness testing on the methanol and formaldehyde process piping, which is piping that is covered by American Petroleum Institute (API) 570 (2016). Section 5.1.2 of API 570 (2016) states, “An inspection plan shall be established for all piping systems and/or circuits and associated pressure relieving devices within the scope of this Code. ….” Additionally, the Respondent had not reinspected its formaldehyde absorber within five years of its last mechanical integrity inspections. The spreadsheet that the Respondent was using to track completed tank inspection dates and upcoming inspection due dates for all tanks identified the formaldehyde absorber as subject to API 653 (Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction) when the proper standard for this vessel is API 510 (Pressure Vessel Inspection Code), as it is considered a pressure vessel. Section 6.4.1 of API 510 (2014) states, in relevant part, “Unless justified by an RBI [risk based inspection] assessment, each aboveground vessel shall be given a visual external inspection at an interval that does not exceed the lesser of five years or the required internal/on-stream inspection.” According to the tracking spreadsheet, the Respondent last completed the internal inspection of the formaldehyde absorber on October 29, 2019, the external inspection of the formaldehyde absorber on June, 28, 2019, and the ultrasonic thickness testing of the formaldehyde absorber on June, 28, 2019. Under API 510, the formaldehyde absorber should have been reinspected within five years, if not sooner, of each of these dates.
(e) The Respondent was using a spreadsheet (Item #21 Rupture Disk Inspection and Replacement Log.pdf) to document when it conducted visual inspections of the rupture disks at the Facility, but the Respondent was not able to provide documentation of the results of each visual inspection.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
Based on EPA’s compliance monitoring investigation, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. Part 68, the codified rules governing the Act’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions and Section 112(r) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r), when it:
(a) Failed to compile written process safety information pertaining to equipment in the process that sufficiently included material and energy balances, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(vii);
(b) Failed to ensure and document that its process is designed and maintained in compliance with RAGAGEP, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2);
(c) Failed to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a);
(d) Failed to conduct inspections and testing procedures on piping, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(1), and following RAGAGEP for pressure vessels, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(2); and
(e) Failed to document the results of each inspection and test that has been performed on process equipment, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4).
TERMS OF PAYMENT
Respondent agrees to a civil penalty in the amount of $13,966 (“Assessed Penalty”), to be paid within thirty (30) calendar days after the Effective Date of this CAFO.
Respondent shall complete an Emergency Planning and Preparedness SEP consisting of the purchase and donation of emergency response equipment to the River Falls Volunteer Fire Department, Andalusia Fire Department, and Opp Fire Department. The SEP is more
specifically described in Appendix A and incorporated herein by reference.
Respondent shall spend no less than $52,372 on implementing the SEP.
Appendix A
The Respondent will purchase and donate the following equipment to the SEP Recipients no later than six months from the Effective Date of this CAFO:
SEP Recipient SEP Description Specific Type of Item (Quantity)
River Falls Volunteer Fire Department
Purchase of fire nozzles, storm response, and rescue equipment
ES-100-28-20v Storm Surge Series Spreader (1)
ESLC-30-20V Storm Surge Series Cutter (1)
ER-40-20V Storm Surge Series Ram (1)
Storm Surge Ram Base Extension Kit (1)
Bulldog Brackets Rescue Tool Mounting Bracket (3)
Akron Nozzle, ProVenger FG, 1.5”, Fixed, PG, 150 @100 (3)
Super Vac 18” Battery PPV Dewalt, 2 Battery Charger (1)
Team Equipment K12 Bundle: contains one K12FD9
saw, one QC330 quick charger, two BLi 300 batteries (1)
Key Fire Hose, 1.75” x 50’ (4)
Andalusia Fire Department Purchase of battery powered fans for ventilation
Super Vac 16” Battery PPV Milwaukee, 2 Battery Charger (1)
Opp Fire Department Purchase of 3 Level A Hazardous Material response suits (DuPont)
Encapsulated Suit, L, Lime Yellow (1)
Encapsulated Suit XL, Lime Yellow (1)
Encapsulated Suit 2XL, Lime Yellow (1)
CLICK HERE for CAFO