The Respondent owns a milk production facility. According to U.S. Census data, more than one thousand people live near the Facility. The Facility has been in use as a dairy since 1886, and at the time of EPA’s inspections, included a milk production site, office space, chemical storage, warehousing, and production areas. The last major upgrade to the Facility’s ammonia system was completed in 2024. The Facility includes an ammonia refrigeration system for cooling milk, orange juice, and other products.
On August 27, 2014, EPA inspectors visited the Facility and performed an inspection (“the 2014 Inspection”) to assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA. At the 2014 Inspection, EPA identified several violations of the RMP Rules. On January 29, 2018, EPA settled an administrative case with the Respondent to resolve Four violations of the RMP Rules and one violation of Section 103 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.
On October 31, 2024, EPA inspectors visited the Facility again and performed an inspection (“the 2024 Inspection”) to assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA. At the time of the 2024 Inspection, Respondent used anhydrous ammonia in a refrigeration process (“the Process”), as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
As the owner or operator of a stationary source that has more than the threshold amount of a regulated substance in a covered process, Respondent is subject to 40 C.F.R. Part 68. In accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.10, Respondent’s use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia at the Facility is subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3.
The covered process is subject to Program 3 because (1) the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release of anhydrous ammonia is more than the distance to a public receptor, making the process ineligible for Program 1; and (2) the process is subject to OSHA’s PSM regulations.
Due to the dangers associated with anhydrous ammonia, the ammonia refrigeration industry has developed industry standards (“Industry Standards of Care”) to control the risks associated with the use of ammonia. In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“IIAR”) has issued (and updates)
Standard 9: Standard for Minimum System Safety Requirements for Existing Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 9”),
Standard 2: American National Standard for Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 2”),
Standard 4: Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 4”), and
Standard 6: Standard for Testing, Inspection, and Maintenance of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 6”)
The 2024 Inspection and EPA’s review of information provided by Respondent revealed several potentially dangerous conditions relating to Respondent’s refrigeration system. These were explained in EPA’s out-brief meeting with the Facility operator at the conclusion of the Inspection and detailed in EPA’s Inspection Report.
The potentially dangerous conditions regarding the use of anhydrous ammonia at the Facility are further described in Attachment A, which is incorporated by reference into this CAFO.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
Count 1: Failure to Comply with Process Safety Information Requirements, Including Documenting Compliance with Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (40 C.F.R. § 68.65)
As further described in Attachment A, which is incorporated by reference into this CAFO, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to document that the Process complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) and that equipment designed according to outdated standards was designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner.
Accordingly, by failing to document that the Process complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices and that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA.
Count 2: Failure to Comply with Mechanical Integrity Procedures (40 C.F.R. § 68.73)
As further described in Attachment A, Respondent had not maintained the mechanical integrity of the Process equipment by correcting deficiencies that are outside of acceptable limits (as defined by the process safety information in 40 C.F.R. § 68.65) before continuing to use the equipment, or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to ensure safe operation.
By failing to comply with the Program 3 mechanical integrity requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA for the Process.
Penalty Payment
Respondent agrees to pay the civil penalty of $104,221 (“Assessed Penalty”) within 30 calendar days of the Effective Date of this CAFO
ATTACHMENT A – Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“IIAR”) has issued (and updates)
Standard 9: Standard for Minimum System Safety Requirements for Existing Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (hereinafter “IIAR 9-2020”),
Standard 2, Standard for Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems, [hereinafter “IIAR 2-2014” with Addendum A published in July 2019, hereinafter “IIAR 2-2014 Add. A”]1;
Standard 4: Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 4”),
Standard 6: Standard for Testing, Inspection, and Maintenance of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 6”), and
Standard 7: Developing Operating Procedures for Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 7”), inter alia, along with other applicable standards and guidance. Bulletins and guidance include, without limitation, IIAR Bulletin No. 109, Guidelines for IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System (1997, and in effect until 2019 when ANSI/IIAR 6 replaced it) (“IIAR Bull. 109”);
IIAR Bulletin No. 110, Guidelines for Start-Up, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (1993, most recently updated in 2007, and in effect until 2019 when ANSI/IIAR 6 replaced it) (“IIAR Bull. 110”);
IIAR Bulletin No. 114, Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and Components (1991, most recently updated in 2018) (“IIAR Bull. 114”);
IIAR Bulletin No. 116, Guidelines for Avoiding Component Failure in Industrial Refrigeration Systems Caused by Abnormal Pressure or Shock (1992) (“IIAR Bull. 116”); and
the Ammonia Refrigeration Management Program (2005, most recently updated in 2019) (“IIAR ARM Program”), which is intended to provide streamlined guidance to facilities that have less than 10,000 pounds of ammonia.
Also in collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 15: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems.” These standards are consistently relied upon by refrigeration experts and are often incorporated into state building and mechanical codes.
In general, the standards of care cited below are those that were in effect in January 2020 when Respondent completed its latest Process Hazard Analysis prior to EPA’s Inspection, except for ANSI/IIAR 9-2020, which was approved by ANSI for publication on March 3, 2020. ANSI/IIAR 9-2020 is cited for informational purposes as it is IIAR’s latest pronouncement on minimum safety standards for ammonia refrigeration systems, regardless of size or age.
In the chart, the column entitled “Issue” refers to the issue numbers listed on pages 10-13 of EPA’s inspection report.
Issue: Count: EPA-Alleged Condition: Examples of RAGAGEP:
While Facility entry points were documented as featuring “Restricted Area” signage during the Inspection, multiple locations, including the raw silo area, outside of loading docks, outside the waste storage area, near the 4,000-gallon fuel oil tank, and cylinder storage outside of the ammonia machinery room did not have required NFPA signage indicating the presence of chemical hazards.
The standard industry practice is for buildings and facilities with refrigeration systems to include placards in accordance with NFPA 704, and include signage to indicate that only authorized personnel are permitted entry. See e.g., IIAR 2- 2014, §§ 6.15 and 7.2.2; IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, §§ 6.15 and 7.2.2; and, IIAR 9-2020, § 7.2.91; and NFPA 704, Section 4.3 (2017).
The outdoors silo area has some ammonia pipes and is accessed by a gate. The access gate for the raw silo area was locked with a combination lock and did not have panic hardware to allow for egress from the raw silo area in the case of an emergency within the fenceline.
IIAR RAGAGEP does not address Respondent’s exact setup. However, multiple provisions in IIAR and NFPA standards address the concern that people are not trapped in areas with ammonia vapors. For example, the standard industry practice is for doors that are part of the means of egress to be equipped with panic hardware and be side hinged to swing in the direction of egress for occupants leaving the machinery room. IIAR 9-2020, §§ 7.3.9.2 and 7.3.3. Equipment installed in machinery rooms to be located in such a manner as to allow egress from any part of the room in the event of an emergency and to provide clearances required for maintenance, operation, and inspection according to manufacturers’ instructions. IIAR 2- 2014, § 6.3.1 and IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 6.3.1. Other examples include equipment enclosure egress requirements in IIAR 2-2014, § 5.16.2; general safety requirements requiring means of egress to comply with the Building Code in IIAR 2-2014, § 5.17.7; and multiple safe egress requirements in the fire code, including, among others NFPA 1-2012, § 14.4.1 (General. Means of egress shall be continuously maintained free of all obstructions or impediments to full instant use in the case of fire or other emergency).
There were problems with corrosion and the insulation on piping in multiple locations at the Facility, including: areas of localized corrosion were observed on ammonia piping throughout the ammonia machinery room (AMR); inspectors observed areas of localized corrosion and metal-on- metal interfaces in association with ammonia piping, supports, and equipment located in the raw silo area and on the roof of the Facility building; inspectors observed signs of condensation or ice buildup were present on ammonia piping indicating a failure of the insulation vapor barrier—specifically, in the AMR and the Stanley Street loading area. The standard industry practice is for piping and equipment surfaces not intended for heat exchange to be insulated, treated, or otherwise protected to mitigate condensation and excessive frost buildup where the surface temperature is below the dew point of the surrounding air during normal operation and in an area where condensation and frost could develop and become a hazard to occupants or cause damage to the structure, electrical equipment, or refrigeration system. See e.g., IIAR 9-2020, § 7.2.6.1; IIAR 2-2014, § 5.10.1; and IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 5.10.1. In addition, the standard industry practice is to check piping for signs of corrosion and to treat corroded piping with rust preventative paint and to replace badly corroded pipe. See e.g., IIAR Bull. 109, §§ 4.7.4 and 4.7.5. It is standard industry practice to evaluate piping where pitting, surface damage, general corrosion, or a combination thereof is observed on a metal surface of the piping. IIAR 6-2019, § 11.1.1. IIAR 6-2019, § 7.2.6.1 (Piping and equipment surfaces not intended for heat exchange shall be insulated, treated, or otherwise protected to mitigate condensation and excessive frost buildup where the surface temperature is below the dew point of the surrounding air during normal operation and in an area where condensation and frost could develop and become a hazard to occupants or cause damage to the structure, electrical equipment, or refrigeration system.); IIAR 6-2019, §§ 5.6.8 (Equipment and piping shall be kept free from excessive ice buildup), 11.1.2 (For insulated piping, where insulation is removed, partly or completely, for visual inspection or remaining wall thickness measurement(s), a protective coating shall be applied to the exposed metal surface and insulation shall be replaced in accordance with the manufacturer’s installation instructions after arresting any identified exposed piping metal surface corrosion), Table 11.1 (piping), Inspection items (a), (b), (c), and (j) and Testing item (c) (calling for regular inspection of uninsulated piping for corrosion and paint degradation and measuring wall thickness where merited under 11.1.1 and, for insulated piping, regular inspection of insulation and vapor barrier and testing underneath areas of observed degraded insulation), and Table 11.1.6 (valves), Inspection items (a), (b), (c), and (f) and Testing items (a) and (b) (same).
Inspectors observed issues with the labeling of visual alarms at the Facility, including: a lack of information about the meaning of. The standard industry practice is for the meaning of each alarm to be clearly marked by signage near the visual and audible alarms. IIAR 9- (which was for indicating wastewater levels); and the signage describing the visual alarms outside of the primary and secondary AMR entrances were difficult to see from a distance. 2020, § 7.2.9.1; IIAR 2-2014, § 17.6, and IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 17.6.
Inspectors observed what appeared to be an air intake vent above the door adjacent to the rolling door.
The vent’s placement above ground-level (i.e., above where compressors and other equipment might have an ammonia release) raises a concern that air inflow may not adequately sweep ammonia vapors out of the AMR. Short-circuit risk: It is standard industry practice for make-up air supply locations in the machinery
room to be located to prevent short-circuiting of the make-up air directly to the exhaust. See e.g., IIAR 9-2020, § 7.3.14.2; IIAR 2-2014, § 6.14.5.2; and IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 6.14.5.2. It is standard industry practice for air intakes for make-up air to draw only uncontaminated outdoor air. See e.g., IIAR 9-2020, § 7.3.14.3; IIAR 2- 2014, § 6.14.5.4 and IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 6.14.5.4.
Inspectors observed that Door #3 was not tight-fitting along the floor. Also, Inspectors observed an open
overhead door (with secondary roll-down mesh screen) adjacent to the secondary entrance to the AMR. The presence of the “open” overhead door indicates that the AMR is not adequately sealed. It is standard industry practice for the ammonia machinery room to be separated from the remainder of the building by tight-fitting construction with a one-hour fire resistance rating. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 6.2.1; IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 6.2.1; IIAR 9-2020, §§ 7.3.2.1, 7.3.2.5, and 7.3.9.2. Specifically, it is standard industry practice for the doors to the ammonia machinery room to be self-closing and tight fitting. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 6.2.1, 6.10.2, and 7.2.1; IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, §§ 6.2.1, 6.10.2, and 7.2.1; IIAR 9-2020, §§ 7.3.2.5 and 7.3.9.2, and ASHRAE 15-2013, §§ 8.11.2 and 8.12(b).
Inspectors observed a lack of proper pipe labeling including a lack of adequate labeling on process lines. The standard industry practice is for piping mains, headers, and branches to be identified as containing ammonia and as to the physical state of the refrigerant (that is, vapor or liquid, etc.), the relative pressure level of the refrigerant, and the direction of flow. Piping no longer being used as “out-of-service.” Specifically, inspectors observed a lack of pipe labeling within the AMR and on the roof of the Facility. See e.g., IIAR 9-2020 § 7.2.9.4; IIAR 2-2014, § 5.14.5, IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 5.14.6; IIAR Bull. 109, § 4.7.6; and IIAR Bull. 114,
§ 4.2.1.
Inspectors observed ammonia process piping supporting a drain pan, a ladder, and other ammonia piping inside the AMR and on the roof of the Facility; and, missing pipe support or supports built of questionable integrity used as supporting structures for ammonia piping within the raw silo area and on the roof of the Facility. The standard industry practice is for ammonia piping to have adequate support to carry the weight of the piping system provide sway bracing to minimize vibration, to prevent movement of equipment and to prevent excessive vibration. IIAR 9-2020, §§ 7.3.2.2, 7.3.2.3, and 7.3.2.4 and IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 5.11.
Inspectors observed a lack of bump protection on ground level high pressure ammonia piping, including at valve 760.
The standard industry practice is for ammonia piping to be inspected throughout a facility to determine that no piping is exposed to possible physical damage through traffic hazards, for example, forklifts. See e.g., IIAR Bull. 109, §§ 4.42 and 4.7.3. It is standard industry practice for equipment to be protected where there is a risk of physical damage. For example, where equipment containing ammonia is located in an area with heavy vehicular traffic during normal operations and a risk of impact exists, it is standard industry practice to provide vehicle barriers or alternative protection. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 5.17.1 and 7.2.4; IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, §§ 5.17.1 and 7.2.4; IIAR 9-2020, §§ 7.2.11.1 and 7.2.12.1 (protection from physical damage) and §§ 7.2.7.1 (adequate support) and 7.3.2.2 (piping support).
Inspectors observed miscellaneous flammable items stored within the AMR including extra parts, floor buffing machines, oil containers, and a storage bin containing oily rags. The standard industry practice is for combustible materials not to be stored in ammonia machinery rooms outside of approved fire-rated storage containers. IIAR 9-2020, § 7.3.4 and IIAR 2-2014, § 6.4 and IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 6.4.
Inspectors observed electrical issues at the Facility, including: condensation from an overhead ammonia pipe was actively dripping on an electrical box immediately below/adjacent to the boiler; and an extension cord was actively being used as a power source for a permanent overhead light fixture; and the control room at the Facility is a designated area within the AMR containing alarm readouts and controls on “high voltage” electrical boxes.
It is standard industry practice for electrical equipment and connections to not be damaged in such a way that may adversely affect safe operation or mechanical strength of the equipment such as parts that are broken; bent; cut; or deteriorated by corrosion, chemical action, or overheating. See e.g., NFPA 70-2014, Section 110.12(B). It is standard industry practice for that extension cords should not be used as substitutes for permanent wiring.
See e.g., NFPA 1 – 2012, Section 11.1.7.6. IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 5.17.10 (general ammonia refrigeration system design requirement stating that electrical equipment and wiring shall be installed in accordance with the Electrical Code). It is standard industry practice to make sure that work practices protect personnel by reducing
exposure to major electrical hazards. NFPA 70E.
The main shutoff value (“king valve”), located on the roof of the building, is accessible by a permanent platform. Inspectors observed that piping above the permanent platform created a difficult path to the king valve and could be inaccessible to someone wearing emergency response-level personal protective equipment (PPE).
It is standard industry practice for the emergency shut-off valve to be directly operable from the floor or chain operated from a permanent work surface. See e.g., IIAR 9-2020, § 7.3.3.3; IIAR 2-2014, §§ 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, and 13.3.7; IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, §§ 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, 13.3.7, and ASHRAE 15-2013, §§ 9.12.6 and 11.2.2a.
Inspectors observed an abandoned Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) pipe behind the HPR, which was capped with duct tape.
The standard industry practice is for pressure vessels to be provided with relief devices built, tested, and marked in accordance with ASME B&PVC, Section VIII. IIAR 9-2020, § 7.4.1.
Inspectors observed compressed insulation with visible footprints on ammonia piping from people using piping to get over piping on the roof. The standard industry practice is for refrigerant piping not to obstruct a means of egress. IIAR 9-2020, § 7.4.6.1 and IIAR 2-2014, § 13.5.2 and IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 13.5.2.
There was inadequate physical barrier protection of overhead ammonia piping from potential contact with forklifts stored or operated in the forklift charging area. EPA acknowledges that at the time of the Inspection, the Facility had hanging signage warning forklift operators about the overhead ammonia piping. EPA also acknowledges that the Facility indicated that it has trained personnel and contractors not to operate or repair hydraulic components of forklifts in the areas surrounding overhead ammonia piping. The standard industry practice is for ammonia piping to be inspected throughout a facility to determine that no piping is exposed to possible physical damage through traffic hazards, for example, forklifts. See e.g., IIAR Bull. 109, §§ 4.4.2 and 4.7.3. It is standard industry practice for equipment to be protected where there is a risk of physical damage. For example, where equipment containing ammonia is located in an area with heavy vehicular traffic during normal operations and a risk of impact exists, it is standard industry practice to provide vehicle barriers or alternative protection in accordance
with the fire code. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 5.17.1 and 7.2.4; IIAR 2-2014 Add. A, § 5.17.1 and 7.2.4; IIAR 9-2020, §§ 7.2.11.1 and 7.2.12.1 (protection from physical damage) and §§ 7.2.7.1 (adequate support) and 7.3.2.2 (piping support).
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