We are often questioned about our audit methology and techniques. Clients ask… “How did you know to ask me about that?” or “Why in the world do you want to see that for in a PSM/RMP audit?” Well, here is one way I learned what gets asked for; attached is an official EPA RMP Inspection report from a four (4) day inspection at a large refinery complex. The US EPA inspection team comprised of three (3) inspectors: one lead inspector and two others. A look into this inspection will demonstrate how much ground a well-trained audit team can cover and how they can easily identify potential problem areas for further auditing. There was some “low hanging fruit” they found that eventually tallied up to a civil penalty of $326,000 to settle nine violations of the Risk Management Program and the facility has agreed to install a fence-line monitoring system, Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP), with a value of at least $248,000. So three inspectors spent four days looking at a Program 3 RMP facility that had a history of releases/fire and the damage was over $500,000 to EPA rather than spending it on process safety! This inspection report is a MUST READ for any process safety professional that wants to better understand what EPA (and OSHA) will be asking for during an inspection. I have posted the actual citations/NOVs below, but the notes and documentation in this report are where the real learnings come from. The issues they found:
- 68.67(c)(2) The PHA review did not identify all previous incidents which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences. In Section 2.4 .1 , on page 7, of the PHA one incident which had catastrophic consequences was addressed (Attachment 4). The EPA inspectors identified other incidents which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences occurring prior to the PHA, in December 2009.
- 68.67(c) (3) Facility has removed the hydrogen sulfide (H2S) and sulfur dioxide (S02) monitors, and this change has not been addressed in the PHA Revalidation of the Platformers and Pressure Swing Absorber (PSA) Units from December 2009. Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) monitors had been removed from the processes, before April 2010, according to internal audit, due to malfunction, and remain absent. Personnel is required to carry personal H2S and S02 monitors when in the processes with potential for exposure. These warning devices provide a warning sound, light, and vibration. This requires personnel to be present to detect an H2S or 802 release. This is not addressed in the PHA reviewed. There have been incidents due to exposures to H2S and S02.
- 68.67(c)(5) The PHA did not fully address the siting of the stationary source. In Section 3, on page 8 of the PHA, it is stated. “The team did not have access to all of the information necessary to answer every question on the Facility Siting Checklist.” The questions not answered are below. Sitting and vitalization control room needs to be addressed in all the PHAs that uses the control room (Attachment 4).
- 68.67(e) The PHA does not document that the owner or operator has established a system to promptly address the PHA team’s findings and recommendations. The PHA provided identifies a responsible department for each recommendation but does not provide how the recommendations are to be resolved or give a time frame. The Siting recommendations from the June 2009 Facility Siting Evaluation are mentioned as being addressed by Mr. XXXXXXXXXX. At the time of the EPA, inspection plans were reported to be in progress to resolve the siting issues, including the building of a new control room outside of the blast radius of the processes. No construction had occurred as of the inspection, 8/15/2011-8/18/2011.
- 68.69(c) Annual certification of operating procedures was not documented prior to 2008. The facility provided a statement that they were not in full compliance prior to 2008 (Attachment 5) 27 of the operating procedures annual certification reviewed were overdue at the time of the inspection.
- 68.71(b) Refresher training were not taken or documented at least every three years. Attachment 6 contains training records that have been identified as not meeting the refresher training every three years, or more often if necessary.
- 68.73(d) (3) Inspections not conducted with a frequency consistent with applicable manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, or more frequently. Thirty-four (34) inspections were overdue at the time (8/18/2011). Facility generated the list of corrosion monitored equipment (shown in Table 11 ). During the EPA inspection, Mr. XXXXXXXXXX of the maintenance department indicated some inspections were overdue because inspections ports in insulation did not exist, and inspections have to be done when equipment is shut down and cool.
- 68.81(b) Incident investigations were not always initiated no later than forty-eight hours following the incident. 12 of the selected 161 incident reports reviewed have “Date/Time of Occurrence” and “Date/Time of Report” greater than 48 hours. These are marked with orange flags in Attachment 2.
- 68.81(d)(4) Incident reports did not include factors that contributed to the incident. In the 161 incident reports selected by EPA for review 133 had no or inadequate information under the factors contributed to the incident.
- 68.81(e) Failed to adequately investigate and resolve Platformer incidents. The above incident reports lacked critical information, such as factors contributing to the incident, finding from the investigation, and corrective actions taken as a result of the incident, needed to show adequate investigation and resolution.
- 68.95(a)(1)(ii) Did not document specific proper medical treatment necessary to treat accidental exposures related to hazardous substance. The facility stated that the XXXXXXXX Fire Department provides rescue service at the facility. This is in the Emergency Response Teams Procedure. Facility’s Emergency Operating Procedure (Document No. OO-H-002 5) does include a medical treatment section, 6.7 page 12. This states that medical treatment will be the responsibility of the XXXXXXXX Fire Department EMS (Attachment 13). The facility is still required to document proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures to the specific hazardous substances at the site.
- 68.180(a)(2) Emergency response program did not include specific actions to be taken in response to accidental releases of a regulated substance? The facility stated that the XXXXXXXXX Fire Department provides rescue service at the facility. This is in the Emergency Response Teams Procedure. Facility’s Emergency Operating Procedure (Document No. OO-H-0025) does include actions to be taken in response to accidental releases but does not cover specific actions related to specifically regulated substances (Attachment 13).
- Clean Air Act 112 (r)(1) “General Duty Clause” Owners and operators of facilities producing, processing, handling, or storing extremely hazardous substances have a general duty to: Identify hazards associated with a potential accidental release, using appropriate hazard assessment techniques; Design and maintain a safe facility, taking steps to prevent releases; and Minimize the consequences of accidental releases that do occur. The General Duty Clause is not limited to a finite list of chemicals or established thresholds. The facility fai led to the design and maintain a safe facility, and taking steps to minimize the consequences of accidental releases that do occur by not monitoring for the release of H2S, an extremely hazardous substance produced as a byproduct of the crude oil refining. The facility had H2S monitors installed at one time but they were removed due to malfunctions. Currently, refinery personnel is required to wear personal H2S/S02 monitors. These warning devices provide a warning sound, light, and vibration. This requires personnel to be present to detect an H2S or S02 release. There have been incidents (Table 8) due to exposures to H2S and S02.
CLICK HERE (12MB PDF) to download and read the full inspection report.