Respondent operates a natural gas processing and fractionation facility. Respondent had maintenance activities performed on the Inlet Filter Separator (“Vessel”) on March 10, 2014 and March 11, 2014. The Respondent used a contractor to perform the routine maintenance on the vessel, specifically, to replace filters. The Vessel was flooded with water overnight on March 10, 2014, which cleaned residual hydrocarbons from the vessel. All of the High Point Vent Valves on the vessel were not opened prior to flooding the vessel with water. On the day of the incident, March 11, 2014, the Vessel was drained and the filters were removed. Upon returning from lunch, but before the arrival of the operator assigned to oversee the project, the contractors noted white smoke escaping from the vessel. In response to the smoke one of the four contractors sprayed water into the vessel. A pyrophoric reaction occurred inside the vessel, and the ensuing fire injured the four contractors. The fire was extinguished and the injured workers were transported to emergency medical treatment.
The Respondent provided an Incident Investigation Report dated July 23,2014, which included a description summary, classification/causal factors, recommendations and timeline of the incident. The Respondent stated in this report that procedure “SHP-001 Process Filter Element Change Out” did not specify that all the High Point Vent valves needed to be open when the Vessel was flooded with water as the Vessel has multiple compartments, thus restricting the complete removal of hydrocarbons when all the high point vent valves are not opened. The facility identified along with various industry and manufacturer sources, the need to ensure that all the High Point Vent valves need to be opened when the Vessel is flooded with water to avoid restricting the complete removal of hydrocarbons and thus avoiding pyrophoric reactions which lead to igniting hydrocarbons. The hazards associated with ignition sources in and around vessels containing flammable or explosive substances, such as hydrocarbons, are well established as are the standards for preventing or minimizing explosions and fires in such areas.
The Respondent failed to safely ensure that the proper safety procedures were followed during the replacement of the filters in the Vessel on March 10 and 11, 2014. An owner/operator of a stationary source producing, processing, handling or storing substances listed pursuant to section 112(r)(3) of the CAA, or any other extremely hazardous substance, has a general duty to:
- identify hazards which may result from accidental releases of such substances using appropriate hazard assessment techniques;
- design and maintain a safe facility, taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases; and
- minimize the consequences of accidental releases that do occur
The release of flammable hydrocarbons from the Vessel at the Facility on March 11, 2014 constituted an “accidental release” as that term is defined by section 112(r)(2)(A) of the CAA. Respondent failed to design and maintain a safe facility and did not take such necessary steps to minimize the consequences of accidental releases by not fully utilizing commonly available and accepted practices to ensure safety by failing to follow the proper SOP when flooding the vessel with water in preparation for maintenance activities.
Respondent’s failure constitutes a violation of the general duty clause in section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
EPA and Respondent agree that an appropriate penalty to settle this matter is $35,000.