This tank fire incident is a MUST READ for all SAFTENG members who are in process safety and industrial safety who manage bulk tanks containing hazardous materials. The learnings from this incident investigation are too many to mention, but the investigation got into:
- Corporate Strategy and Commitment to Safety & Operational Excellence
- Contractors Engagement
- Training and Certification of Personnel
- Welding on In-Service Tanks
- Inadequacies in Relation to API RP 2009
- Documentation and Processes
- Job Safety Analysis Breaches
- Hotworks on Tank
- Tank Internal Design
- Method of Repair/Welding
On 22 and 23 July 2017, a fuel depot commissioned their 3rd party contractor to carry out repairs to the roof of Tank No. 8 at its Terminal. The work undertaken entailed patching pre-identified areas on the roof where the extent of metal loss resulted in severe thinning and/or perforations of the roof plates. The patches were made of mild steel plates which were welded in place by a certified welder and the work scheduled for Saturday 22 July was completed without any reported incident.
On Sunday 23 July 2017 at approximately 16:40 hrs, it was reported to Public Safety and Communication Department – Emergency Services (911) that there was a potential fire inside Tank No. 8 at the Terminal. The only positive indication of the fire was the evident scorching on the external surface and paint on the outside of the tank’s upper shell. This incident preceding as a persistent heat source along a localized area of the inner shell (wall) of the tank. At the time of the occurrence, Tank No.8 contained approximately 15,000 barrels or 524,550 imperial gallons (IG) of Ultra Low Sulphur Diesel (ULSD).
At or around the time Emergency Services were notified, terminal personnel activated the internal fire suppression system (“FSS”) which operated for a short period before the fire monitor in the area of Tank No. 8 failed at its base causing the entire Fire Mains (piping) system to lose pressure, and remained inoperable throughout the incident response. The relevant emergency services were dispatched by 911, and the Cayman Islands Fire Services (“CIFS”) were on scene within twelve minutes of notification. The relevant first responders promptly attended the incident. However, OfReg Fuels Response Team, which was not included in the initial rounds of notifications, responded at approximately 18:10 hours immediately after becoming aware of the situation. A command center was activated at which senior emergency responders held an initial meeting to discuss progress and further response strategies at approximately 19:15 hrs. The command center was subsequently moved to Sunset House and all the key emergency services personnel were represented at the briefing which was coordinated by Hazard Management Cayman Islands (“HMCI”) Director and Team.
Further to the investigation and findings in the preceding section, the investigation team also notes the following key findings:
- Given it may have been the first such incident of this nature, there were some delays in obtaining some relevant information to get underway with the investigation. The investigation team was deliberate in outlining that the purpose of the investigation and timely provision of key information was to identify and urgently remedy gaps to prevent recurrence in order to save lives, properties, and the environment. Additional bits of evidence such as CCTV footage from other (strategically) located cameras were not available. This was due to those equipment being out of service.
- There was a significant delay of approximately 35 minutes from the time personnel on site first observed the scorching to the time an appropriate response was taken. Emergency Services responded within a fraction of this time personnel on site observed the incident and alerted 911.
- The only two persons on site were not thoroughly familiar or properly trained to respond to an incident of this nature adequately.
- The critical role of Fire Watch was notably ineffectively executed in some instances while hot-work (welding and grinding) were being performed. The Fire Watch ideally should have been the first to observe the scorching.
- In some instances, no one was at ground-level monitoring the planned hot works which were being performed on top the tank (working at height) which made the persons on the tank vulnerable during those periods.
- Documentation was lacking; all forms which required renewals for the continuation of work on the second day were not completed as required or was not available to the investigation team. In one instance a permit was signed off that “the job was completed, and the site was left in a safe condition” on 23 July 2017.
CLICK HERE (pdf) for the full report – it is a MUST read for process safety professionals.