Respondent is a Gourmet Pasta Company that uses anhydrous ammonia in two refrigeration “processes,” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3, in two separate systems of pipes and vessels at the Facility (the “Processes”). On October 12, 2016, Respondent conducted a Process Hazard Analysis (“PHA”) for the Facility. On March 30, 2017, Respondent filed an update of its RMP with EPA. Respondent’s RMP categorizes the Facility as a Program Level 3 facility with two ammonia refrigeration
systems: (a) Process #1 containing 12,200 pounds of anhydrous ammonia; and (b) Process #2 containing 29,100 pounds of anhydrous ammonia.
Respondent submitted Tier II reports pursuant to Sections 311 and 312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021 and 11022, reporting that the Facility used 42,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in 2016. Accordingly, the anhydrous ammonia Processes at the Facility are both “covered processes” subject to the RMP provisions of Part 68.
The endpoint for a worst-case release of the amount of anhydrous ammonia used in the process is greater than the distance to a public receptor.
Additionally, both of the Processes are subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 because both use anhydrous ammonia in an amount over the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds. Therefore, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(a)-(d), Respondent’s use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia in the Processes is subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3.
In light of the potential hazards posed by the mishandling of anhydrous ammonia, industry trade associations have issued standards outlining the recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) in the ammonia refrigeration industry. The standards of care are set out in Attachment A.
On March 22, 2017, EPA inspectors visited the Facility (“the Inspection”) to assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA, Part 68, and with Sections 302–312 of EPCRA. Complainant alleges the following violations of 40 C.F.R. Part 68.
Count 1: Failure to Comply with Process Safety Information Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(a), the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to compile written process safety information before completing the Process Hazard Analysis. This includes documenting information pertaining to the hazards of the RMP chemical in the process and information pertaining to the technology and equipment of the process. Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65(d)(2) and (3), the owner or operator must also document that the equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices and document that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner.
As further described in Attachment A, Respondent failed to document that the Processes complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) and that equipment designed according to outdated standards were designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner. For example,
- there was lack of proper labeling or signage on an emergency shutoff switch, ammonia detector alarms, piping, valves, vessels, and doors;
- the Facility lacked
- an emergency ventilation switch at an entrance,
- a self-closing valve for an oil pot, and
- an eyewash/safety shower outside the ammonia machinery room;
- the discharge point for pressure relief valves did not have proper clearance;
- isolation valves for a high pressure receiver were not easily accessible;
- an ammonia detector was improperly placed;
- one door lacked panic hardware and another was not tight fitting;
- some refrigeration equipment was inadequately supported and protected from forklift impacts; and
- the ammonia machinery room did not have emergency shutdown steps posted
Accordingly, by failing to document that the Processes complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices and that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E).
Count 2: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Mechanical Integrity Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of certain process equipment and train employees accordingly. The owner or operator must train each employee involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of process equipment in the procedures applicable to the employee’s job task. Inspections and testing procedures shall follow RAGAGEP, and the frequency of inspections and tests shall be consistent with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, or more frequently if needed based on prior operating experience.
The owner or operator must also document the inspections or tests on process equipment, correct deficiencies, assure that any new equipment is suitable for the process application, perform checks to ensure that equipment is installed properly, and assure that maintenance materials and spare parts are suitable for the process application.
As further described in Attachment A, Respondent had not maintained the mechanical integrity of the Processes equipment by correcting deficiencies that are outside of acceptable limits (as defined by the process safety information in 40 C.F.R. § 68.65) before continuing to use the equipment, or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to ensure safe operation. For example, some piping was vibrating; an ammonia sensor was not functioning adequately; and some electrical wiring and insulation on ammonia piping were not adequately maintained.
By failing to comply with the Program 3 mechanical integrity requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), for the Process.
Penalty Payment
Respondent agrees to pay the civil penalty of $103,000 (plus interest) in a monthly installment payment method and delayed initial payment.
ATTACHMENT A – Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“IIAR”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 2: Standard for Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 2”), specifically, Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration,
Standard 2-2014, Standard for Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (2014), [hereinafter “IIAR 2-2014”];
Standard 4: Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 4”),
Standard 6: Standard for Testing, Inspection, and Maintenance of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 6”),
Standard 7: Developing Operating Procedures for Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 7”),
Standard 9: Standard for Minimum System Safety Requirements for Existing Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 9”), inter alia, along with other applicable standards and guidance.
Bulletins and guidance include, without limitation,
IIAR Bulletin No. 109, Guidelines for IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System (1997, and in effect until 2019 when ANSI/IIAR 6 replaced it) (“IIAR Bull. 109”);
IIAR Bulletin No. 110, Guidelines for Start-Up, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (1993, most recently updated in 2007, and in effect until 2019 when ANSI/IIAR 6 replaced it) (“IIAR Bull. 110”);
IIAR Bulletin No. 114, Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and Components (1991, most recently updated in 2018) (“IIAR Bull. 114”);
IIAR Bulletin No. 116, Guidelines for Avoiding Component Failure in Industrial Refrigeration Systems Caused by Abnormal Pressure or Shock (1992) (“IIAR Bull. 116”); and the Ammonia Refrigeration Management Program (2005, most recently updated in 2019) (“IIAR ARM Program”), which is intended to provide streamlined guidance to facilities that have less than 10,000 pounds of ammonia. Also in collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 15: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems.” These standards are consistently relied upon by refrigeration experts and are often incorporated into state building and mechanical codes.
The standards of care cited below are those that were in effect in 2016 when Respondent completed its latest Process Hazard Analysis before the March 22, 2017 inspection.
The remote emergency stop located outside the main entrances for the Processes were not labeled to indicate what systems would be shut down when the stops were activated. In addition, there was no emergency ventilation override switch at the auxiliary entrance to the Hale Street Process to start ventilation in the event of a release.
It is standard industry practice for the emergency shutoff switch to have a tamper-resistant cover and to be marked by clear signage near the controls regarding its function. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 6.12.1 and ASHRAE 15-2013, § 8.21(i); IIAR 9-2019, § 7.3.11.1. It is standard industry practice for a facility to have a clearly identified control switch for emergency ventilation with a tamper-resistant cover to be located outside the machinery room and adjacent to the designated principal machinery room door. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 6.12.2; IIAR 9-2019, § 7.3.11.2.
The facility lacked a self-closing valve for the oil pot located beneath the Hale Street ammonia pump recirculation vessel.
The standard industry practice is for ammonia refrigeration equipment used for oil removal to have a shut-off valve in a series with a self-closing shut-off valve. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 5.9.3.2 and 5.9.3.3. IIAR Bull. 109, § 7 Inspection Checklist; IIAR 9-2019, § 7.2.5.3.
Ammonia detector alarms were not equipped with signs identifying the meaning of the alarms.
It is standard industry practice for ammonia leak detection alarms to be identified by signage adjacent to visual and audible alarm devices. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 6.15.2 and 17.6, ASHRAE 15-2013, §8.11.2.1; and IIAR 9-2019, § 7.3.12.6.
Ammonia refrigeration vessels at the Facility lacked appropriate labeling, and piping lacked labeling to indicate the purpose of equipment, contents, physical state, or direction of flow.
The standard industry practice is for all ammonia machinery to be labeled. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 5.14.2, 5.14.4, 8.4, 10.2.3, and 11.2.3. The standard industry practice is for piping mains, headers, and branches to be identified as containing ammonia and as to the physical state of the refrigerant (that is, vapor or liquid, etc.), the relative pressure level of the refrigerant, and the direction of flow. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 5.14.5, IIAR Bull. 109, § 4.7.6, IIAR Bull. 114, § 4.2.1; and IIAR 9-2019, § 7.2.9.4.
Exterior ammonia vessels lacked required NFPA signage to indicate the presence and hazards of ammonia.
The standard industry practice is for buildings and facilities with refrigeration systems to include placards in accordance with NFPA 704 at the means of access to an exterior storage area. See e.g., NFPA 704, Section 4.3 (2017).
The ammonia system pressure release valve vent headers for the Hale Street refrigeration system discharged through gooseneck pipes extending to the roof, but the discharge point for each vent header was insufficiently high enough above the roof to prevent spraying ammonia on people.
It is standard industry practice for the termination of pressure relief devices is to discharge to atmosphere not less than 7.25 feet above a roof that is occupied solely during service and inspection. And where a higher adjacent roof level is within 20 feet horizontal distance from the relief discharge, the discharge termination shall not be less than 7.25 feet above the height of the higher adjacent roof. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 15.5.1.3 and 15.5.1.4, ASHRAE 15-2013, § 9.7.8; and IIAR 9, § 7.4.2.
The isolation valves (i.e., king valves) for the Primrose Street high pressure receiver were inaccessible and were not labeled.
The standard industry practice is for all manually operated valves that are inaccessible from floor level to be operable from portable platforms, fixed platforms, ladders, or to be chain-operated. Isolation valves identified as being part of an emergency shutdown procedure should be directly operable or chain-operated from a permanent work surface. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 5.14.3, 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, and 13.37; ASHRAE 15-2013, §§ 9.12.6 and 11.2.2a; and IIAR 9-2019, § 7.3.3.3 and 7.2.9.3.
The Facility’s ammonia machinery room did not have an eye wash or safety shower outside of the room.
The standard industry practice is to maintain an eyewash station and body shower unit located external to the machinery room and readily accessible by an exit. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 6.7; IIAR Bull. 109, § 4.10.10; and IIAR 9-2019, § 7.3.7.
The exit door from the Primrose Street boiler room lacked appropriate panic hardware.
It is standard industry practice for doors that are part of the means of egress to be equipped with panic hardware. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 6.10.2; and IIAR 9-2019, § 7.3.9.2.
The main entry door to the Primrose Street ammonia machinery room was not tight sealing.
It is standard industry practice for machinery room doors to be self-closing and tight fitting. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 6.2.1, 6.10.2, and 7.2.1, ASHRAE 15-2013, §§ 8.11.2 and 8.12(b); and IIAR 9-2019, § 7.3.9.2.
Ammonia piping, valves, and evaporators at Facility were unprotected and/or unsupported.
The standard industry practice is for ammonia piping to be inspected throughout a facility to determine that no piping is exposed to possible physical damage through traffic hazards, for example, fork lifts. See e.g., IIAR Bull. 109, §§ 4.42 and 4.7.3. It is standard industry practice for equipment to be protected where there is a risk of physical damage. For example, where equipment containing ammonia is located in an area with heavy vehicular traffic during normal operations and a risk of impact exists, it is standard industry practice to provide vehicle barriers or alternative protection in accordance with the fire code. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 7.2.4; IIAR 9-2019, § 7.2.12.1 (protection from physical damage) and § 7.2.7.1 (adequate support).
Both ammonia machinery rooms at the Facility lacked required signage to display important information about the Processes and emergency shut down documentation.
It is standard industry practice to for the person in charge of a facility with an ammonia refrigeration system to provide directions for emergency shutdown of the system in a location that is readily accessible to trained refrigeration system staff and trained emergency responders. The schematic drawings or signage shall include several types of information including:
(1) Instructions with details and steps for shutting down the system in an emergency;
(2) The name and telephone numbers of the refrigeration operating, maintenance, and management staff, emergency responders, and safety personnel;
(3) The names and telephone numbers of all corporate, local, state, and federal agencies to be contacted as required in the event of a reportable incident;
(4) Quantity of ammonia in the system;
(5) Type and quantity of refrigerant oil in the system; and, (6) Field test pressures applied. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 5.15; ASHRAE 15-2013, § 11.2.1; and IIAR 9-2019, § 7.2.10.
The ammonia detector in the Hale Street production area was not placed in an appropriate location to detect an ammonia leak where it would be expected to accumulate.
It is standard industry practice for ammonia leak detection sensors to be mounted in a position where ammonia from a leak is expected to accumulate. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 17.4; IIAR 9-2019, § 7.3.12.4.
Some electrical wiring at the Facility was not properly maintained.
It is standard industry practice for electrical components to have no damaged parts that may adversely affect safe operation or mechanical strength of equipment such as parts that are broken, bent, cut, or deteriorated See e.g., NFPA 70-2014, § 110.12(B).
There were problems with insulation of ammonia piping at the Facility, including insulation that was breached, frosted or rusted, indicating that the insulation was failing.
The standard industry practice is for piping and equipment surfaces not intended for heat exchange to be insulated, treated, or otherwise protected to mitigate condensation and excessive frost buildup where the surface temperature is below the dew point of the surrounding air during normal operation and in an area where condensation and frost could develop and become a hazard to occupants or cause damage to the structure, electrical equipment, or refrigeration system. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 5.10.1. In addition, the standard industry practice is to check piping for signs of corrosion and to treat corroded piping with rust preventative paint and to replace badly corroded pipe. See e.g., IIAR Bull. 109, §§ 4.7.4 and 4.7.5.
During the Inspection, an ammonia discharge pipe had significant vibration, which could lead to pipe failure and an ammonia release.
It is standard industry practice for supports and foundations shall be designed to prevent excessive vibration or movement of piping, tubing, and equipment. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 5.11.5, 6.2.4, and 13.4.2, ASHRAE 15-2013, § 8.10.4; and IIAR 9-2019, § 7.2.7.1.
During the Inspection, the ammonia sensor near the ceiling of the Hale Street ammonia machinery room was not functioning properly.
It is standard industry practice to test ammonia detectors in accordance with the manufacturers’ specifications. See e.g., ASHRAE 15-2013, § 11.6.3, and IIAR 2-2014, § 5.12.3.
ATTACHMENT B – LIST OF KEY SAFETY MEASURES
Identifying Hazards
- Hazard Addressed: Releases or safety deficiencies that stem from a failure to identify hazards in design/operation of system
- Facility has completed a process hazard analysis or review.
Operating Activities:
- Hazard Addressed: High risk of release from operating or maintenance activity
- System has self-closing/quick closing valves on oil pots.
- Facility has written procedures for maintenance and operation activities.
- Only authorized persons have access to machinery room and the ability to alter safety settings on equipment.
Maintenance/Mechanical Integrity:
- Hazard Addressed: Leaks/releases from maintenance neglect
- A preventative maintenance program is in place to, among other things, detect and control corrosion, deteriorated vapor barriers, ice buildup, and pipe hammering, and to inspect integrity of equipment/pipe supports.
- All piping system openings except the relief header are plugged or capped, or valve is locked.
- Equipment, piping, and emergency shutdown valves are labeled for easy identification, and pressure vessels have legible, accessible nameplates.
- All atmospheric pressure relief valves have been replaced in the last five years with visible confirmation of accessible pressure relief valves [note – replacement every five years is the general rule but there are other options in IIAR Standard 6].
Machinery Room and System Design
- Hazard Addressed: Inability to isolate and properly vent releases
- The System(s) has/have emergency shut-off and ventilation switches outside each machinery room.
- The machinery room(s) has/have functional, tested, ventilation. Air inlets are positioned to avoid recirculation of exhaust air and ensure sufficient inlet air to replace exhausted air.
- Documentation exists to show that pressure relief valves that have a common discharge header have adequately sized piping to prevent excessive backpressure on relief valves, or if built prior to 2000, have adequate diameter based on the sum of the relief valve cross sectional areas.
Emergency Actions
- Hazard Addressed: Inability to regain control and reduce release impact
- Critical shutoff valves are accessible, and a schematic is in place to show responders where to access them.
- EPCRA Tier II reporting is up to date.
Additional Compliance Items:
Identifying Hazards
- For systems that employ hot gas defrost, the process hazard analysis/review includes an analysis of, and identifies, the engineering and administrative controls for the hazards associated with the potential of vapor propelled liquid slugs and condensation-induced hydraulic shock events.
Operating Activities and Maintenance/Mechanical Integrity
- Written procedures are in place for proper use and care of personal protective equipment.
- If respirators are used, facilities know the location of their respirators, and they are inspected and maintained per manufacturer or industry standards.
- All changes to automation systems (programmable logic controls and/or supervisory control and data acquisition systems) if present, are subject to management of change procedures.
Machinery Room and System Design
- The facility has engineering controls in place to protect equipment and piping against overpressure due to hydrostatic expansion of trapped liquid refrigerant. Administrative controls are acceptable where hydrostatic overpressure can occur only during maintenance operations.
- Eyewash station(s) and safety shower(s) is/are present and functional.
Emergency Actions
- Emergency response communication has occurred or has been attempted with the Local Emergency Planning Committee and local responders.
- The facility has an emergency action plan pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1910.38(a) or an emergency response plan pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(q) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.90.
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