Every once in a while, I come across a process design that leads to code issues down the road. This usually occurs with small pressure vessels (e.g., less than 5 cubic ft) that fall outside the scope of ASME Section VIII and also fall outside the scope of being a “confined space” (e.g., too small […]
The definition of stationary source includes transportation containers used for storage not incident to transportation and transportation containers connected to equipment at a stationary source for loading or unloading (40 CFR Section 68.3). In a January 6, 1998 final rule (63 FR 640), EPA clarified that if a container remains attached to the motive power that
There is no specific list of substances that subjects a stationary source owner or operator to the general duty provisions. The general duty provisions apply to owners and operators of all stationary sources that have any “extremely hazardous substances”. Extremely hazardous substances are NOT limited to the list of regulated substances listed under section 112(r),
Drums containing regulated substances (listed in 40 CFR §68.130) are stored in several separate locations at a stationary source and there is no possibility that an accidental release in any of the individual storage areas would impact any of the other storage areas. Must the overall amount of the regulated substance present at the stationary
PLEASE ensure your “life safety” contractor inspector for Exits, Fire Extinguishers, EW/SSs, etc., is FULLY trained on the hazards of the area(s) they will be working in. This year, we have found two (2) national companies that provide these inspection services using electronic devices NOT rated for the hazardous areas where they are working. We
We have 12 SCBA bottles/cylinders that were manufactured in 2003. These specific DOT bottles/cylinders came with a 15-year service life; meaning the service life expired in 2018. They were all Hydro’ed on schedule for their three (3) hydros in 2008, 2013, and 2018. KEY POINT: None of the bottles/cylinders have been used since 2018 (pointing
In an industrial and occupational safety context, a line break accident occurs when workers open pipes, valves, flanges, or vessels containing hazardous materials—such as toxic chemicals, flammable liquids, high-pressure gases, or high-temperature steam—and an unintended release occurs. Because these accidents can result in severe chemical burns, toxic inhalation, explosions, or physical trauma from pressure blasts,
OSHA uses the word “specific” 10 times in its LOTO standard, and yet, the vast majority of the LOTO programs we come across are not even specific to the facility, much less specific in how they define and quantify critical elements. To save you time from looking them all up to prove I’m wrong, here
OSHA 1910.147(d)(5)(ii) is one of the most critical, yet frequently overlooked, requirements of the Lockout/Tagout (LOTO) standard. It moves LOTO from a static, one-time task (“lock it and check it”) to a dynamic process that accounts for the physical reality of residual and regenerative energy. Think about isolating “compressed air” to a machine/equipment and the
Four (4) workers were injured at a worksite on April 30, 2024, while offloading flammable solvents from a vacuum truck into a storage tanker. At the same time, other workers positioned a hydrovac truck in an adjacent bay to offload a wastewater-and-slurry mixture. During this process, flammable vapors were released and drawn into the idling
An independent contractor in Denton, Texas, was severely burned and fell from an extension ladder after his clothing ignited during a flash fire. The worker was torch-cutting steel walls on a transformer unit to dismantle it for a scrapyard. A lawsuit filed in late June alleges the provided fire watch was improperly positioned and inattentive.
Sinopec Yangzi Petrochemical (May 29, 2026): Four workers died during shutdown maintenance at an ethylene plant in China. The flash fire occurred while operations personnel were disassembling a cracking valve. Early investigations point to incomplete emptying and purging of the pipe, which left residual cracking gases (ethylene, propylene, and butadiene) inside. The suspected ignition source
