Verifying that grounding and bonding systems meet a specific resistance threshold—such as the common 10 ohms target for flammable liquid processes—requires a systematic approach to ensure both accuracy and technician safety. The following procedure outlines the steps for performing a static ground-resistance test using a dedicated ground-resistance tester (Ohmmeter). This procedure applies to the periodic […]
Take any of the following steps below that may be necessary to guard against stored energy(s) left in the equipment after it has been shut down and isolated from its energy source(s).
An older post, with updates…Ever since the 2005 BP Texas City tragedy, refineries and chemical plants have been working diligently to review “facility siting” risks for their facilities. As with all of the PSM elements, many of us took this new focus as a learning opportunity. We had all done something we called “facility siting”
The 2008 revisions to the LOTO Compliance Directive (CPL 02-00-147) did a great service in advancing a 30+ year-old standard in an area that badly needed clarification: Periodic Inspections under 1910.147(c)(6). I am sure there will be folks who will dissect this, looking for every “out” they can find to not do these safety-critical audits,
Key Principles in integrating Human Factors in Hazard Identification, Hazard Analysis, and Risk Assessments include:
Forklift battery charging areas are NOT automatically classified as Hazardous (Classified) Locations, but they can easily become one if ventilation is inadequate. And I have seen more charging areas without engineered ventilation than I have with the proper ventilation. The hazardous classification hinges entirely on the facility’s ability to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen gas.
As we have discussed here many times, our piping is our “primary containment” that seems to be where the vast majority of Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) events occur. Many reasons for this, which we have spelled out in other postings, but none the less the vast majority of “leaks” occur in our piping. One
March 31, 2009 MEMORANDUM FOR: REGIONAL ADMINISTRATORS THROUGH: DONALD G. SHALHOUB DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FROM: RICHARD E. FAIRFAX, DIRECTOR DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS SUBJECT: Management of Organizational Change This memorandum addresses the application of 29 CFR 1910.119 (l), Process Safety Management (PSM) – Management of Change (MOC), to
The strategic approach to improving human performance within safety embraces two (2) primary challenges: Anticipate, Prevent, Catch, and Recover from ACTIVE errors Identify and Eliminate LATENT organizational weaknesses that provoke human error and degrade controls against error and the consequences of error Preventable errors will not be eliminated if opportunities to err are not methodically
EPA can improve its program management and oversight to better assure that facilities covered by the Clean Air Act’s Risk Management Program submit or re-submit an RMP. EPA had not established national procedures for identifying covered facilities that had not submitted RMPs. For the 5 States reviewed, we identified 48 facilities in 3 States that
This article is for ANYONE with anhydrous ammonia, regardless if you have 100 pounds or 100,000 pounds of ammonia and your primary means of containment is Carbon Steel. I have written numerous times about the Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) failure mode and shared numerous accidents and alerts regarding this failure mode. In this article, I
MAJOR CHEMICAL DISASTERS IN INDIA Origin of accident Year Date Location Products involved Number of Deaths Injured Evacuated Explosion (warehouse) 1992 29.04 New Delhi Chemicals 43 20 Fire at a chemical store 1994 13.11 New Delhi Toxiccloud (chemicals) 500 Leakage 1984 03.12 Bhopal* Methyl isocyanate 2800 50,000 200,000 Leakage 1989 05.05
