James Reason’s Human Failure Model: Active and Latent [Organizational] Failures As safety professionals, we need to understand that we ALL make errors, mistakes, and violations. When we are asked to facilitate a causal analysis, it is incumbent upon us to keep the team aware of this fact and educate them on the differences between Active…...
This is one of my favorite videos to use in my SMS Training courses (with approval from HR). Some of the scenes are over-the-top fake graphic scenes, but they are so over-the-top that I hope adults can handle them. The video mocks Lagging Indicators and Pizza Parties, which most of us have come to recognize…...
As SAFTENG wraps up another successful year, I am reminded of its success. I got a thank you note from a facility manager who hired us to build an SMS/Safety Process to “bring some sense to safety.” He and his team were tired of the ups and downs and wanted consistency in their performance with…...
I have to chuckle when companies and experts tell me there is no such thing as a culture of safety. That there is only one culture (if even that). I call bullshit on that belief. One way to learn this is the hard way, such as what Boeing is going through. And on an investor…...
I will probably catch a lot of flack for repeating this (as I have this debate at least annually), as very few agree with me, but it needs to be repeated! The use of a Lockout Hasp, the device shown to the left, is NOT associated with the phrase “group lockout.” And yes, I am…...
Complex systems contain changing mixtures of failures latent within them The complexity of these systems makes it impossible for them to run without multiple flaws being present. Because these are individually insufficient to cause failure they are regarded as minor factors during operations. Eradication of all latent failures is limited primarily by economic cost but…...
If we spend enough time in chemical plants, we will encounter a widespread, albeit severe, human failure regarding a “safety-critical instrument.” I am referring to the IMPROPER placement of personal gas monitors. Nine times out of 10, where do we find these personal gas monitors on the worker’s body? I am betting your experiences are…...
The EPA’s revisions of its Risk Management Plan requirements regarding emergency drills have gotten much attention. However, they were always a bit behind when it comes to the International Fire Code. And need I remind those of you reading this that many states have adopted the IFC in some form. A Group H occupancy is…...
In a 2024 LOI, OSHA reiterated its position that an Eyewash (EW) station must be capable of delivering 15 minutes of water flow. This means these EW bottles are NOT an “approved” EW station. Even the double barrel wall mount with two (2) squirt bottles does not meet the minimum flow rates. However, OSHA has…...
OSHA will not issue citations to an employer that properly uses a non-metal guard so long as the guard is constructed of a substantial and suitable material. OSHA standard, 29 CFR § 1910.219(m)(1)(i) states: Standard conditions shall be secured by the use of the following materials. Expanded metal, perforated or solid sheet metal, wire mesh…...
The investigation found that they were processing hand sanitizer bottles by shredding them and separating the plastic from the hand sanitizer. During this process, a spark was created from the machine, which initiated a minor explosion and fire. The business has refuted the fire chief’s official account, saying, “There was no explosion at the site.“…...
This can be related to process vessels, hoppers, pits, etc.- just about any “open-topped” space. Now, when it comes to hoppers, these will fall into the PRCS category based solely on their design with “inwardly converging walls or by a floor which slopes downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section.” But even then, a very…...
