The objective of this project was to conduct refrigerant R-290 (propane) leak and ignition testing under whole room-scale conditions to develop data and insight into the risks associated with the use of Class A3 Refrigerants and to generate technical data to support revisions of relevant safety standards. The entire project included parametric testing […]
Most anyone who has spent a day inside an industrial facility has seen a “Chicago Coupling” or as some may call it, a “crows-foot”, although they may have never heard the phrase that describes this device… Photo Source: chicagocoupling.com Having been raised as a safety engineer in the petrochem industry I learned early on that
Most anyone who has spent a day inside an industrial facility has seen a “Chicago Coupling” or as some may call it, a “crows-foot”, although they may have never heard the phrase that describes this device… Photo Source: chicagocoupling.com Having been raised as a safety engineer in the petrochem industry I learned early on that
This is WATER damage! It is on an NH3 process, but this was found to be external damage from treated water with an incorrect water treatment “recepie”. The condenser was not being maintained properly either and the two failures produced this corrosion and a tad bit of erossion as the water was dripping down from
This is WATER damage! It is on an NH3 process, but this was found to be external damage from treated water with an incorrect water treatment “recepie”. The condenser was not being maintained properly either and the two failures produced this corrosion and a tad bit of erossion as the water was dripping down from
Here is a nice presentation from on EPA’s National Enforcement Initiative (NEI) on Ammonia Refrigeration with pictures of some of their findings involving: Housekeeping as a leading indicator Corrosion and CUI Deadman Valve issues (missing deadman, missing plugs, handle manipulated) Hose Failures SAFTENG members can see the images and download the ppt file
Here is a nice presentation from on EPA’s National Enforcement Initiative (NEI) on Ammonia Refrigeration with pictures of some of their findings involving: Housekeeping as a leading indicator Corrosion and CUI Deadman Valve issues (missing deadman, missing plugs, handle manipulated) Hose Failures SAFTENG members can see the images and download the ppt file
P1 P2 P3 Third-party audits (applies to the next scheduled audit after an accident) √ √ Incident Root Cause Analysis (only for facilities with accidents/near misses) √ √ Safer Technologies Alternatives Analysis (STAA) (applies to a subset of P3’s in certain NAICS codes) √ Coordinating Emergency Response Program Requirements with
One of the more common misses by a lot of businesses, especially those using pressure vessels (PVs) in their PSM/RMP covered processes, is the “initial inspection” at the time of installation. We have discussed the “change of service” inspection several times; however, this inspection is for NEW PVs being installed. This requirement will certainly apply
EPA recently announced its enforcement and compliance assurance priorities for fiscal years 2020 to 2023. There are seven (7) priority areas in total for this period, six of which are National Compliance Initiatives (NCIs), which will be led by EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. The one that I follow closely is…
In the recent OSHRC decision where the ALJ decided that “tight-fitting” doors for an engine room/machinery room doors were not a PSM requirement since “doors” were not part of the covered process. What is confusing is that the company successfully convinced the ALJ that ASHRAE 15 was not their chosen RAGAGEP (even though they stated
With today’s announcement of the OSHRC decision that the IMC was the facilities RAGAGEP and that the IMC does not require detectors, I thought this record needs to be CORRECTED and CLARIFIED, as the ALJ’s understanding of how the IMC and its requirements apply to an ammonia refrigeration process/system. In the decision, the facility successfully
