Check-valves are utilized in all sorts of applications, including safety applications – most notably in process safety and hazardous materials safety. In some state fire codes, these valves may even be required in certain lines, and in some process safety RAGEGEPs, they are required. Although this incident occurred in an off-shore rig, the sight-glass involved […]
OSHA has just released a new PSM Booklet titled “Process Safety Management for Petroleum Refineries,” which contains “Lessons Learned” from their Petroleum Refinery Process Safety Management National Emphasis Program (NEP). This publication is a MUST READ for any practicing process safety professional, regardless if your process(s) is a refinery or not! The publication focuses on
This is my second and probably the last post regarding this incident. This post will cover the Boston Fire Department’s (BFD) activities that took place at the facility AFTER the fatality. As you can see, these guys are true pro’s and they know hazardous materials as well as did a nice job using IIAR-2, American National
This anhydrous ammonia (NH3) refrigerated storage tank (photo source: Jerusalem Post) was feared to be a target of terrorist and as one report claimed, imminent failure. The battle heated up in 2013 when “Hezbollah” (a recognized terrorist group) threatened to blow up the tank (or the ship delivering the NH3) with missiles and the courts
Fire officials have an idea how much ammonia leaked from a cold-storage business but can’t say exactly how long it spewed. Roughly 60 pounds of the material leaked fire Capt. James Brown said. Investigators believe the leak was caused by a valve that wasn’t completely closed while the business was closed. No one was required
It certainly looks like EPA has been busy with their review of the proposed amendments to the RMP Rule. To that fact, they have released this Q&A explaining what they are keeping, what they eliminated, and what they revised in their NEW FINAL RULE. This new FINAL RULE is set to take effect on 2/19/2019
At approximately 9:50 a.m. on October 24, 2012, Employees #1 and #2 were working as mechanical engineering technicians at a food cold storage facility. The two workers were troubleshooting a Hansen Technology Model AP08 Auto-Purger. The Auto-Purger removed non-condensable material from the refrigeration system. It was mounted on a wall inside the facility’s anhydrous ammonia
Its 2017 and we still debate the flammability of anhydrous ammonia (NH3). It is a fact that NH3 is not classified as a “flammable gas” due to its high Lower Explosive Limit (16%) and it’s flammable range being less than 12 percentage points. But there is one other fact that we seem to lose sight
I have finally received the investigation information regarding the anhydrous ammonia fatality at a refrigerated seafood warehouse in Boston in March 2016. Sadly these reports do not indicate the cause of the accident and it does not appear that the AHJ used the state’s 527 CMR 33.00: Hazardous Material Process or Processing to enforce the
Here we have a darn near perfect example as to why OSHA/EPA are now asking businesses with PSM/RMP covered process to “justify” their “maximum intended inventory(s)” of their Highly Hazardous Chemicals (HHC)/Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS). The business had, at the time of the EPA inspection four (4) 1-ton cylinders of Chlorine in the same room
NOTE: This case, as unfortunate as it is, stands in a very small group of State Fire Code violations, and in my memory stands atop of the pile @ $302,500. It is rare for a state to issue code violations and even more rare for the dollar amount to be so high. The one thing
Both OSHA’s and EPA’s process safety standards require operating procedures to contain the “steps required to correct or avoid deviation(s)”, but what exactly does this mean? I really wish OSHA/EPA would have phrased it as “avoid or correct” as putting the words in this order is actual reality. Let’s look at a simple process set-up
