On March 3, 2009, at approximately 1:29 p.m., Employees #1 and #2 were conducting a gas line pressure test on a 20-inch gas line. The test involved pressurizing the line to 100 psi and holding this pressure for one (1) hour. This test was conducted to determine whether the gas line being tested could be…...
Pneumatic Pressure Testing gone bad (20″ NG line) Read More »
I have written a lot about leak testing and pressure testing our piping systems and those articles all mention using the “bubble test” method. Now lets talk about the actual requirements of this test method. ASME B31.3, 345.8 Sensitive Leak Test refers us to ASME BPVC, Section V, Article 10, Mandatory Appendix I, for how…...
Let’s talk about Leak Testing our piping using the Bubble Testing method Read More »
335 ASSEMBLY AND ERECTION 335.1 Alignment …… Membership Required You must be a member to access this content.View Membership LevelsAlready a member? Log in here...
ASME B31.3 – 335 ASSEMBLY AND ERECTION of FLANGED Joints Read More »
Both labels meet ASME A13.1 – Scheme for the Identification of Piping Systems. Who can tell me… What does the top label, and what does the bottom label tell us? This is a NEW requirement from ASME A13.1-2020…. Membership Required You must be a member to access this content.View Membership LevelsAlready a member?...
Who can tell me what these different pipe labels tell us? Read More »
Our #1 RAGAGEP for labeling/marking piping that contains a hazardous material, ASME A13.1, saw a significant updates in 2020 and 2023. The major revisions include: revising the Scope, updating each of the definitions, expanding the Legend section, and revising both the Color section and Table 4.2-1, Designation of Colors adding a new paragraph to address…...
Updates to ASME A13.1 – Scheme for the Identification of Piping Systems Read More »
Respondent was the owner or operator of a pulp and paperboard manufacturing facility. At all times relevant to this Consent Agreement, Respondent was in charge of the Facility. At all times relevant to this Consent Agreement, Respondent produced, used, or stored chlorine at the Facility. Chlorine is a “hazardous substance” listed in 40 C.F.R. Part…...
EPA EPCRA citations @ paper mill for failing to report 4 Cl2 releases (Cl2 & $322K) Read More »
Based on the feedback from other SAFTENG members, I have made this article public for the next 30 days. Much like the process safety debates around valve/equipment labeling, no RAGAGEP specifically requires a unique identifier on every valve or piece of equipment. Yet, labeling valves/equipment within the covered process is necessary to manage the process’s…...
HAZLOCs and Labeling Read More »
EPA has found that major chemical accidents continue to occur from facilities that are not adequately managing the risks they pose to ensure the safety of their facilities and protect surrounding communities. Many of these communities have environmental justice concerns or face climate change-related hazards or both. Thousands of facilities nationwide make, use, and store…...
National Enforcement and Compliance Initiative: Chemical Accident Risk Reduction (2024) Read More »
The Program 3 prevention program requirements under 40 CFR Part 68 are almost identical to the requirements of OSHA’s process safety management (PSM) standard. OSHA exempts certain industries from the PSM standard. Why does EPA not exempt those same industries from the CAA §112(r) risk management program requirements?… Membership Required You must be a member...
UPDATED: Why are industries exempt under OSHA’s PSM subject to RMP? Read More »
When selecting the worst-case release scenario for Program 2 and 3 processes as required by 40 CFR §68.25, a stationary source owner or operator must analyze the release scenario that results in the greatest distance to an endpoint. Does the “greatest distance to an endpoint” refer to the greatest total distance from the process (e.g.,…...
Does the distance to endpoint start at the process or stationary source boundary? Read More »
On Dec. 3, 2004, a 50,000-pound steel pressure vessel violently exploded at the southwest Houston Marcus Oil and Chemical facility. The pressure vessel contained flammable hydrocarbons such as hexane. The pressure vessel was a horizontal tank 12 feet in diameter, 50 feet long, and operated at a pressure of approximately 67 psi. Marcus Oil did…...
Not following National Board code for repairs to PVs can be very costly Read More »
On January 15, 2008, a pressure vessel at a New Jersey foundry exploded, killing one 60-year-old worker instantly while injuring eight other workers with shrapnel. The pressure vessel in question was used to pressurize/depressurize molten aluminum to prevent/eliminate porosity from the metal. The incident occurred while two (2) workers, including the one who was killed,…...
Leak Testing a PV kills worker Read More »
