EXCELLENT video for those of us that have Hazardous Locations and utilize “explosion proof” equipment. This is the type of equipment that contains an explosion within the device and does NOT allow the flammable atmosphere outside the device to be ignited. This video CLEARLY shows how easy it is to DEFEAT this safety critical feature, […]
In some recent PHA’s for a client I have seen a pattern in some general assumptions that PHA teams should not be making, but often do. It involves the “consequences” for scenarios such as “LOSS of ELECTRICTY”. The catch is that there is a general assumption that with a “LOSS of ELECTRICTY” that everything shuts
Not many OSHA CHSO’s are knowledgeable on Pressure Vessel Safety and with CSHO’s having to be expert in ALL the OSHA regs, the leadership thought it would be nice if the field CSHO’s had some guidance and reference document they could use. This document was actually published in the 1980’s, long before PSM came about.
The releases were 1 ton releases (at least the videos in the presentation were the 1-ton releases). The presentation does an EXCELLENT job showing how these two chemicals differ when released. Along with the Seward, IL Ammonia video footage, this footage confirms that NH3 will act as a “heavier-than-air” gas when it is released in
OSHA’s most recent PSM Letter of Interpretation (LOI) confirms their position on covered process battery limits. I struggle with this, as their position states, and I quote, “Neither the application paragraph nor the definition of “process,” states or implies that controls can limit the extent or boundaries of a PSM-covered process.” With this position, OSHA
No mention if this inspection was an NEP, scheduled, or complaint; but 9 of 12 citations were PSM. They include: 1) The employer did not develop P&IDs which accurately represent current equipment for the ammonia refrigerationsystem. 2) No periodic inspections of the energy control procedures at least annually. 3) The employer did not train affected
In August 1999, an explosion in an MDEA storage tank at a Nitrogen Products plant in Alaska propelled the tank off its base and into the air. The tank landed on an adjacent air-cooled heat exchanger filled with synthesis gas. The impact of the tank on air-cooled heat exchangers initiated a second explosion and fire.
A lot of folks know that all it takes to break a window is around 0.5 psi, but what happens above that force?
How did EPA select the substances to be included in their RMP rule? The chemical accident prevention provisions promulgated pursuant to Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) are designed to focus on chemicals that pose a significant hazard to the community in the event of an accidental release and to prevent and minimize
There is a “personnel safety” practice that is very common in the design of process plants, but it is not the best design for “process safety,” and I forgot to mention this in my earlier Car-Seal article. Here is the setup. Do you see anything wrong with the pressure gauge arrangement?
Coveralls become oil-contaminated very rapidly in many work situations, particularly offshore, in some cases within one day. From time to time, there are significant hydrocarbon fires offshore (eg on the Rough Platform). There is evidence that frequent washing reduces the fire retardant properties of some materials, thereby increasing personal risk to persons and compromising their
In the chemical industry, we had things a bit easier when it came to defining our process battery limits and this made it easy for us to define who was a PSM/RMP contractor. But things are not so easy in facilities where the PSM process is a small and not core to the business. We
