A welder died when struck by a piece of a hydraulic tank that came apart after being pressurized with air and water to check for leaks. The welder had removed the tank the previous day to repair a leak. On the day of the incident, the victim filled the tank with water and used an […]
Polish Authorities have determined that the heat pump explosion that killed two people last year was caused by using oxygen to carry out a leak test. The heat pump explosion on August 20, 2024, killed two people: an engineer (30) who was servicing the unit and the property owner (45). They were said to have
WORKER BADLY INJURED: FIFE FIRM BACK IN DOCK AND FINED A worker sustained horrific injuries after being struck by highly pressurised water during hydraulic testing on machinery. His employer has been fined £161,250 ($218,460) for breaching health and safety law. A testing booth should have remained automatically locked when it presented a danger to employees
Employee #1, a welder, was inside a double-walled, approximately 5.5 ft in diameter steel tank to perform leak tests. A contractor had installed new stainless steel piping to the 1,000-gal blending tank, and initial use of the tank revealed some leakage where the new pipe entered the bottom of the tank. To perform the leak
On March 6, 2018, a 49-year-old pipefitter was hit in the chest by a pressurized 12-inch diameter polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipe during a hydrostatic pressure test of a fire suppression system. The sudden pipe movement was attributed to a pipe joint connection failure in a buried section of the pipeline. The failure was due to
Natural gas was released into the basement of the Realty Building and caused an explosion in Youngstown, Ohio, after a member of a scrap removal crew cut into a steel pipeline. Although the cut pipeline had not been marked or otherwise identified as containing natural gas, it did contain gas, pressurized at about 38 psig,
This is not only about a failed pressure test gone bad, but it is an excellent example of how “contributing factors” play a role in accidents. Deviating from the test plan, changing the time frame in which the test is to be conducted due to a noise ordinance, etc., played a role in this multimillion-dollar
WorkSafe BC (British Columbia) is proposing some thoughtful improvements to its Part 6, Substance Specific Requirements, sections 6.116 to 6.132 — Toxic Process Gases. The hazardous materials that this effort focuses on are: This standard reads much like OSHA’s PSM standard; however, this standard has a bit more specific requirements. Some Highlights of the proposed
A liquid ammonia NH3 tank failed catastrophically at the Azotas fertilizer plant in Lithuania in 1989. During maintenance on the boil-off system, operators accidentally created a backflow of liquid warm NH3 to the tank. Potentially after a “role-over”, NH3 evaporated quickly, creating pressure that could not berelieved by the PSV. The tank was lifted, releasing
At 4:00 p.m. on May 10, 2021, an employee working for a chemical supplier was transferring chlorine-containing product from a storage tank into a tanker truck. A valve intended to direct the displaced contaminated air to be scrubbed of chlorine was accidentally left CLOSED. The chlorine-containing air was then not scrubbed and was allowed to
This event is a perfect example of why all piping openings are hazardous. At approximately 7:00 p.m. on November 15, 2006, Employee #1 was a process operator at the Chlorine Liquefaction Unit, Block A-19. He was preparing to bleed off chlorine on a process line to clear the line for maintenance work. The valve handle
NOTE: these are from the fatal 2014 NH3 Truck Unloading accident, where the “bleed tank” (which was a plastic IBC) catastrophically failed because a liquid NH3 valve was left open. I have no idea why this 5(a)(1) was not issued as a RAGAGEP citation using ANSI K61/CGA 2.1, which is where the facility siting requirements
