WorkSafe BC (British Columbia) is proposing some thoughtful improvements to its Part 6, Substance Specific Requirements, sections 6.116 to 6.132 — Toxic Process Gases. The hazardous materials that this effort focuses on are: This standard reads much like OSHA’s PSM standard; however, this standard has a bit more specific requirements. Some Highlights of the proposed […]
Upon investigation, it was found that an oxygen–acetylene welding setup inside the shipping container leaked, causing the closed shipping container to fill with the highly flammable mixture of oxygen and acetylene. There was also an upright freezer in use, powered by an extension cord running into the shipping container. This energized equipment provided an ignition
In less than one (1) week, Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) has claimed eleven (11) souls: Six (6) at a Dairy in CO Three (3) in a sewer in TX Two (2) in a Sewage Treatment Plant This chemical has a long history of killing workers: (Note: SAFTENG membership required to access article)
A liquid ammonia NH3 tank failed catastrophically at the Azotas fertilizer plant in Lithuania in 1989. During maintenance on the boil-off system, operators accidentally created a backflow of liquid warm NH3 to the tank. Potentially after a “role-over”, NH3 evaporated quickly, creating pressure that could not berelieved by the PSV. The tank was lifted, releasing
The chemical reaction event at the Friesland Campina site in Borculo early last month (July 2025) was caused by an error in the unloading of hydrochloric acid. The explosion released toxic smoke, chlorine, and nitrogen dioxide. A truck driver reported to the wrong unloading point at the dairy company in Gelderland on Friday afternoon, July
At 4:00 p.m. on May 10, 2021, an employee working for a chemical supplier was transferring chlorine-containing product from a storage tank into a tanker truck. A valve intended to direct the displaced contaminated air to be scrubbed of chlorine was accidentally left CLOSED. The chlorine-containing air was then not scrubbed and was allowed to
This event is a perfect example of why all piping openings are hazardous. At approximately 7:00 p.m. on November 15, 2006, Employee #1 was a process operator at the Chlorine Liquefaction Unit, Block A-19. He was preparing to bleed off chlorine on a process line to clear the line for maintenance work. The valve handle
NOTE: these are from the fatal 2014 NH3 Truck Unloading accident, where the “bleed tank” (which was a plastic IBC) catastrophically failed because a liquid NH3 valve was left open. I have no idea why this 5(a)(1) was not issued as a RAGAGEP citation using ANSI K61/CGA 2.1, which is where the facility siting requirements
At 8:04 a.m. on May 11, 2023, an employee, 58, working for an oil and gas support services company, was found dead. On 5/10/23, the night before, the employee had instructed his coworkers from other contractors to go home, and he would finish the job up. This was the last time anyone had spoken to
At 11:43 a.m. on February 24, 2025, Employee #1, 61, was spray painting aircraft parts while wearing a supplied air respirator. Nitrogen backflowed into the breathing air system, displacing oxygen and asphyxiating the employee. Employee #1 was fatally injured.
THE WORK WE DO INSIDE A PRCS can create a Hazard! Three workers killed in a water tank explosion (PRCS Entry Fatalities) Initial investigations suggest the combination of cleaning agents and high temperatures triggered the fatal reaction.
Cal/OSHA’s Bureau of Investigations referred the case to Los Angeles County District Attorney after double fatality A food company pleaded guilty to two (2) misdemeanor counts after being criminally charged in connection with the 2020 deaths of two (2) workers fatally exposed to nitrogen gas. The victims died after a malfunction in the facility’s nitrogen
