Safety Info Posts

We have to stop the madness!

Maybe 1% of businesses we come across are ready for something more than a fundamental approach to safety management. Most have not even given a formal and structured Safety Management System (SMS) a chance to work, or they have stripped down an already very basic SMS to nothing more than “window dressing” and then complained,

Latent Organizational Failure vs Active Failure (LOPC Event and suspending Operators)

Yes, I am betting this same drum again.  I believe in Reason’s SMS model, especially his Human Failure model of Errors, Mistakes, and Violations.  This recent incident is a perfect example of management’s lack of understanding of SMS fundamentals and how LATENT ORGANIZATIONAL FAILURES result in horrible outcomes.  Essentially, this is what happened: An LOPC

Boeing Safety Assessment nuggets (Part 3)

These two (2) findings could almost be standard for most SMS assessments/audits.  Two of the major failures in the implementation and day-to-day management of an immature SMS… (emphasis by me) Finding: Boeing primarily focused its SMS implementation efforts on safety risk management (SRM), which is only one fundamental pillar of the ICAO or Boeing SMS

Boeing Safety Assessment nuggets (Part 2)

The topic of SMS in aviation has been around for more than 30 years. The FAA provides the following description of SMS and its principles: Technology and system improvements have made great contributions to safety. However, part of being safe is about attitudes and paying attention to what your surroundings are telling you. Whether through

Boeing Safety Assessment nuggets (Part 1)

I was reading through the Boeing Safety Assessment report and was so happy to see they used James Reason’s safety culture model, which consists of five components that collectively would cultivate a positive safety culture. The five (5) components include: Reporting Culture, Just Culture, Flexible Culture, Learning Culture, and Informed Culture SAFTENG members can read

EPA issues RMP citations @ chemical transfer business (Flammables and Toxics & $10K w/ a SEP of $41K)

Respondent has a P-Tank Farm Vinyl Acetate Monomer {VAM), D-Tank Farm Toluene Diisocyanate (TDI), and the Isopentane and Isopentane/n-Pentane blend Intermodal Transfer processes at the Facility, meeting the definition of “process,” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. Isopentane, pentane, acrylonitrile, toluene diisocyanate (unspecified isomer), and vinyl acetate monomer are each a “regulated substance” of

Possible Catastrophic Failure of Nurse Tanks and Recommendation for Periodic Testing February 2024 (FMCSA Safety Advisory)

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issue this safety advisory to provide notice of the possibility of catastrophic failure of certain hazardous materials packages commonly known as “nurse tanks.” See Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR) §173.315(m). NOTE:  SAFTENG members can see pics

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