A big part of an energy isolation/control plan for Line Break/Equipment Opening tasks is how to EVACUATE the stored energy after the isolation. In this case, it was STEAM that had cooled into hot condensate, which was NOT drained from the piping before work began to fix the steam leak. A VERY COMMON error made, […]
In many Line & Equipment Opening (LEO) safe work practices, some leeway will be granted to the workers AFTER the INITIAL “break” based on the level of ISOLATION they have protecting them. For example: A LEO has a double block and bleed arrangement on BOTH sides of the opening. During the initial “break,” the worker(s)
I recently participated in a LinkedIn discussion about “panic hardware” for EXIT doors from an NH3 Refrigeration mechanical room. The image shared (which the poster acknowledged fell short) was a push pad about the size of an adult’s hand. Here are the specifics for our (USA-based) panic hardware on EXIT doors:
On May 29, 2024, at about 3:15 p.m., several pounds of hydrogen sulfide and carbon monoxide gas were released at a Sugar Cooperative. As a result of the release, one employee was fatally injured, and another employee was seriously injured due to inhalation of the gases. The facility’s investigation found that, at the time of
On September 5, 2023, at approximately 7:30 p.m., an accidental release of butadiene vapor occurred inside a decanting tank (“tank”). The butadiene vapors ignited, resulting in a fire that seriously injured one employee. The incident occurred in a latex production area during a maintenance shutdown. Employees were tasked with removing an internal part (a “baffle”)
On May 4, 2023, at 6:25 a.m., approximately 790 pounds of a hydrocarbon mixture containing about 7,000 parts per million (ppm) of hydrogen sulfide were accidentally released at a Refinery. Exposure to the toxic hydrogen sulfide vapor seriously injured one employee. The facility’s investigation found that, on the day of the incident, pressure in a
On Friday, February 3, 2023, at approximately 10:46 p.m., a flash fire was accidentally released from a product purge vessel (“vessel”) flange during planned maintenance activities. The fire seriously injured four (4) contract workers. On January 29, 2023, the facility shut down its polyethylene unit for planned maintenance. Following the shutdown procedure, operators purged and
Respondent operated a facility that utilizes chlorine for its aluminum smelting process for use primarily in the automotive and aerospace industries. On June 6, 2023, EPA performed an inspection ofthe Facility to evaluate compliance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act Section 103, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act EPCRA Sections 304-312, and
On September 22, 2022, at approximately 9:00 a.m., a liquid mixture comprised of aniline, formalin, and hydrochloric acid was accidentally released, seriously injuring one contractor at a chemical manufacturing facility in Geismar, Louisiana. On September 20, 2022, two days before the incident, an off-site power outage caused an immediate loss of process flow into the
On October 1, 2020, at approximately 9:00 a.m., approximately 554 pounds of chlorine gas were accidentally released. Exposure to the toxic chlorine vapors seriously injured one employee. At the time of the incident, four (4) workers (two unit employees and two contractors) were trying to stop a chlorine leak (described as a fugitive emission) from
At the time of the event, contract workers were disassembling a 2-inch flange to remove a blind (a solid metal plate used to isolate equipment) before reinstalling a section of piping that had been removed and cleaned. This type of equipment opening is commonly referred to as a “line opening” or “performing a line break.”
