EPA found that Respondent had violated regulations implementing Section 112(r) of the Act at 40 C.F.R. Part 68 by failing to comply with the regulations as noted on the enclosed Risk Management Plan Inspection Findings and Alleged Violations Summary, which is hereby incorporated by reference. In consideration of Respondent’s size of business, its full compliance […]
Respondent operates a beverage production plant with the capacity to produce energy drinks, teas and beer. The production plant uses 160,300 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in its refrigeration system to provide cooling capabilities for its beverage products. On August 22, 2013, the EPA conducted an onsite inspection of Respondent’s RMProgram related records and equipment for
U.S. fire departments responded to an average of 4,440 structure fires involving hot work per year. These fires caused an average of 12 civilian deaths, 208 civilian injuries and $287 million in direct property damage per year. From 2001-2015, five firefighters were fatally injured in four unintentional fires started by torches. Forty-two percent of the fires
Facilities subject to the Program 3 Prevention Program requirements in 40 CFR Part 68 must include in their Risk Management Plan the date of the most recent review or revision of hot work permit procedures in Section 7.13. What is considered hot work and what are the requirements related to hot work?
Westrum (1991, 2004) proposed a description of three (3) levels of safety culture advancement. Hudson (1999), and later Parker, Lawrie & Hudson (2006), built on these and developed five (5) levels of safety culture advancement. Depending on its level of maturity, safety culture is either characterized as Pathological Reactive Calculative Proactive, or Generative This classification
Respondent owns and operates an ammonia refrigeration process, which is an RMProgram level 3 regulated process that stores or otherwise uses 95,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia for cooling and freezing capabilities for its waffle products. On August 20, 2013, EPA conducted an on-site inspection of the RMProgram related records and equipment for the purpose of
No fewer than 60 fatal and non-fatal cases were documented in 2016. Of these, 30 (50%) were fatal and 29 (48%) of those cases were directly related to grain entrapments. In addition to the cases documented in 2016, cases that occurred in previous years continue to be added to the database due to ongoing discovery efforts. The total
Respondent operates a facility that transports and stores anhydrous ammonia and at its stationary source, the Respondent has one RMProgram level 3 covered process, which stores or otherwise uses ammonia in an amount exceeding its applicable threshold of 10,000 pounds. On August 13, 2014, the EPA conducted an onsite inspection of the RMProgram related records
Respondent owns and operates a food oil products manufacturing and distribution facility which is engaged in packaging margarine, liquid oil and shortenings. Respondent operates a closed loop refrigeration system which utilizes or utilized anhydrous ammonia at the Facility. Respondent uses and stores 13,800 lbs. of anhydrous ammonia in the refrigeration system. The Facility is subject
The multiple-fatality explosion on October 17, 2016 explosion and subsequent fires at the german facility has been determined to be caused by a contractor cutting into an incorrect line/pipe containing flammable raffinate. Two employees of the on-site fire department and an employee of a tanker which was anchored in the harbor died in the accident.
