We discipline for the behavior – NOT for the result/outcome of that behavior. This is never more true in safety-related events. When we discipline a worker for an injury for not wearing their PPE. We just set the standard for NOT WEARING PPE! So the next time a worker fails to wear their prescribed PPE, […]
I believe the most significant challenge we (safety professionals) face is those outside (and even some inside) our profession and their lack of understanding of RISKS. I am confident that any safety pro reading this has endured the old and tired argument… “We have been doing ________ that way for __________ years, and it has
The dismissal of people and their behavior concerning risk as idiotic really doesn’t help much
This one is bound to offend some folks in the safety profession, but it was some very wise advice a dear friend and former boss gave me after I submitted my first Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to him after a corporate audit. Just 12 years into my career, I was taught the hard way how
A mature Safety Management System (SMS) will contain a Hazard Identification Element that identifies hazards that adversely affect safety. These HAZARD ID processes also provide practical and objective mechanisms to assess the risk presented by those identified hazards and implement ways to eliminate or mitigate the associated risks those hazards may pose to the worker,
Effective SMS implementation heavily depends upon a clear, mutual understanding of ERRORS and VIOLATIONS and the differentiation between the two. The difference between ERRORS and VIOLATIONS lies in INTENT. While an error is unintentional, a violation is a deliberate act or omission to deviate from established procedures, protocols, norms, or practices. Errors or violations may result
Maybe 1% of businesses we come across are ready for something more than a fundamental approach to safety management. Most have not even given a formal and structured Safety Management System (SMS) a chance to work, or they have stripped down an already very basic SMS to nothing more than “window dressing” and then complained,
Yes, I am betting this same drum again. I believe in Reason’s SMS model, especially his Human Failure model of Errors, Mistakes, and Violations. This recent incident is a perfect example of management’s lack of understanding of SMS fundamentals and how LATENT ORGANIZATIONAL FAILURES result in horrible outcomes. Essentially, this is what happened: An LOPC
As you know, I always like to go back in time and pass on what I learned from my former bosses and mentors. This one is a classic and is usually in the Top 5 frustrations of non-safety management personnel: The ever-changing safety programs and expectations every time we get a new safety leader I
These two (2) findings could almost be standard for most SMS assessments/audits. Two of the major failures in the implementation and day-to-day management of an immature SMS… (emphasis by me) Finding: Boeing primarily focused its SMS implementation efforts on safety risk management (SRM), which is only one fundamental pillar of the ICAO or Boeing SMS
The topic of SMS in aviation has been around for more than 30 years. The FAA provides the following description of SMS and its principles: Technology and system improvements have made great contributions to safety. However, part of being safe is about attitudes and paying attention to what your surroundings are telling you. Whether through
I was reading through the Boeing Safety Assessment report and was so happy to see they used James Reason’s safety culture model, which consists of five components that collectively would cultivate a positive safety culture. The five (5) components include: Reporting Culture, Just Culture, Flexible Culture, Learning Culture, and Informed Culture SAFTENG members can read
