Too often, management will view the decline in recordable injuries as a positive trend without understanding the driving force(s) behind this trend. It is common to find a decrease in reportable injuries in line with a decrease in total reported incidents. We call this “Low Confidence”. We can have a higher level of confidence when […]
I am updating my SMS/HF course for a course in October. This may be helpful to some. This is the James Reason HF model. I have shared other graphics of his model over the years, but this one and the one from our friend at the UK’s HSE are my favorites. I hope that some
One of the biggest mistakes we see in BBS processes is the fundamental misunderstanding of a BBS process’s role in an SMS. Each observation is NOT about looking for unsafe behaviors; rather, it should be more about reinforcing the SAFE behaviors. Suppose an organization has a high rate of observed deviant behaviors from prescribed Safe
Maybe it’s my age, but I have grown tired of organizations that proclaim their dedication to safety. Yet, they have no desire to put in place a formal and measurable SAFETY PROCESS/SMS that INVOLVES the men and women we work to protect. It is not rocket science, and it is the most basic and PROVEN
It is a common thing to hear regarding safety in workplaces today… “Own it”. The concept is solid; management wants broad ownership of safety. Safety is NOT safety’s job, after all. But like many safety movements, this one usually fails in significant ways because it takes years of educating and motivating a workplace to accept
Many organizations struggle to identify “safety metrics” besides their lagging indicators. But the PRCS article I posted Friday night contains at least a dozen metrics around our PRCS safety management efforts. There are a lot of “SIF salespersons” out there selling their “SIF approach.” On the other end of the SMS spectrum are the facilities
I hate this meme! This is an employee taking a shortcut and reflects the culture. But in almost every depiction of this photo, the intent is that the employee(s) know best, and we need to suit their wishes. Such garbage. If we have the employees involved in writing the SOP(s) and we train them well
If we reverse the brake and accelerator pedals on your car, even if you are warned, and a sign reminds you, you can be sure that sooner or later you will press the accelerator when you meant to brake. Source: Human and organizational factors of safety: a state of the art, Daniellou, F., Simard, M.
Today, my “friend in safety” and I continued our debate/discussion regarding the “proper” length of written programs. He staunchly believes that a shorter program will attract more eyes and get used more often. On the other hand, I have programs that are over 50 pages, which blows his mind. He brought a few samples of his
Much can be said about the safety movement mimicking the 1990s Quality Movement in the US automobile industry. Does anyone remember Ford’s “Quality is Job 1” ads? It was a huge branding image effort to compete with Toyota and Honda, who were stealing market share based on the QUALITY of their vehicles. Even today, Toyota
Earlier this month, I wrote Cuts so deep that workers can’t participate in their safety process concerning how reorganizational changes can lead to a lean workforce that the workers who need to participate in their safety process do not have the time to. Now, let’s take a look at what happens when the layer of
Professor James Reason had a similar image to today’s “Work as imagined vs. Work as done” model. This image is from his 1997 book titled “Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents“ It shows the “ideal” layers of protection model (i.e., the pieces of cheese with no holes) vs. the “reality” (i.e., the pieces of cheese
