“An operator’s behavior is strongly influenced by their working situation and the human and organizational factors that characterize the situation. If unsafe behavior is noted, the most effective way to prevent it from happening again is to eliminate the conditions that produced it. This implies that time and thought must to given to an analysis. […]
“If there is the will to achieve, if true accident causes are known and remedies are effectively applied, there can be no question of results. From the point of view of the industrial executive, no innovations are required. He may apply to accident prevention the very same methods that are successful in controlling the quality
The immediate and proximate causes of industrial accidents such as “falls of persons” are known to lie in two general groups, namely, mechanical or physical and personal. Both causes are controllable by management, and in the case of both, management has an unexcelled opportunity to exercise remedial action. Management further has a strong incentive to
Many these days will decry the concept/practice of “Cardinal Rules” as if they are a bad thing and then suggest that workers go out and identify “Stuff That Kills you” (STKY) which is at the very heart of the Cardinal rules administrative control approach. The belief is that once the serious hazard is identified that
Many in our profession seem to be on this kick that “what gets measured gets manipulated”. That is NOT the fault of the metric but rather a very immature (in safety) management group. Go to the finance group and tell them we are going to stop measuring profit and losses, after all, they can’t be
“Dependence must be placed largely on the recognition by management of its moral rather than its legal responsibility for preventing accidents, not only because existing legal requirements are limited in scope, but also because it is a most difficult task to be practical and fair in any attempt by law to achieve wholly safe employee
Safety should not be like trying to figure out how to get out of a panic room! Those who have played the group game “panic room” where you try to figure out clues to eventually unlock the door to win, can maybe relate. When we put safety goals in place and do not provide the
“Much has been said of near accidents—meaning those that produce no injury whatever, although having the potentiality of doing so. These improper occurrences—these defects, slips, and fumbles; these near accidents—because of their proportionately greater volume, present to the capable person who is intelligent enough to take advantage of it, a splendid opportunity to anticipate and
“In many cases the same faulty practice is involved, and the reason for existence of the fault is similar, both for accident occurrence and for unsatisfactory production. If it is known as a result of a correct fact-finding job that a particular unsafe practice is chiefly responsible for accident occurrence, it can safely be assumed
“We often hear: “We have to change people’s behavior”. However, behavior is not only the result of an operator’s personality or training. The characteristics of the situations in which a human being is placed make certain types of behavior more likely. Some operating situations can have characteristics that increase the probability of undesirable human behavior.
Safety is not the only priority the organization’s leaders have to manage. Within a constrained environment, they must produce products or services that fulfill customer requirements, using specific raw materials, within a given time frame, etc. Accidents are not the only danger that threatens the entity. It can also be jeopardized by customers taking their
Here is a list of eight general principles that was established, following the major steps in the approach but adapted specifically to the implementation of Golden Rules. These principles emphasize the set-up of a coalition and the importance of ensuring synergy with the actions and processes of any external contractor companies. These steps are intended
