On February 8, 2017, an explosion at the DeRidder Mill killed three contract workers and injured seven others (the “Explosion”). These workers from Elite Welding, LLC (“Elite”), were welding on the cracked intersection of a vertical eight-inch clean condensate pipeline and a three-inch pipeline near the Mill’s 100,000-gallon foul condensate tank. This tank accumulates harmful vapors, referred to as “non-condensable gases,” a byproduct of the Mill’s kraft pulping process used to make containerboard. The tank, which was supposed to have been emptied before the welding began, still contained liquid and highly flammable non-condensable gases, including methanol and turpentine.
While Elite’s workers were welding the intersection of the eight-inch clean condensate pipeline and the three-inch pipeline, flammable vapors from the foul condensate tank ignited. The resulting Explosion blasted the top of the tank over a six-story building before it landed on other Mill process equipment approximately 375 feet away. In addition to the three fatalities it caused, the Explosion released an estimated 2,453 pounds of methanol (in a 1% solution) and a yet-to-be-determined quantity of turpentine.
Following the Explosion, EPA inspected the DeRidder Mill. The inspection and associated investigation identified the Clean Air Act violations now alleged in this Complaint, some of which are unrelated to the Explosion.
The DeRidder Mill includes a kraft pulping process that uses high temperature and pressure to “digest” pine wood chips into pulp for making containerboard. The pulping process produces wastewater, which Defendant treated onsite using chlorine in its Mill Water Chlorine System until October 15, 2018.
The kraft pulping process also produces harmful vapors, called non-condensable gases. Before and including the Explosion date, these non-condensable gases typically accumulated in the DeRidder Mill’s foul condensate tank and included methanol and turpentine.
Before October 15, 2018, PCA’s Mill Water Chlorine System included six chlorine gas sensors positioned throughout the Mill. Four chlorine gas sensors surrounded a group of ten one-ton chlorine storage cylinders, one sensor was located near a pipeline to the Mill’s water reservoir, and one sensor was located near the access door to the chlorination building.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(General Duty Clause – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility)
Defendant violated Section 112(r)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), by failing to design and maintain a safe facility and by failing to take such steps as necessary to prevent accidental releases of extremely hazardous substances.
From at least February 4, 2017, Defendant failed to ensure that non-condensable gases were drained and purged from the foul condensate tank prior to allowing contractors to perform hot work above it. Defendant’s violation continued through February 8, 2017, the day of the Explosion.
The Defendant recognized or should have recognized the risk of an accidental release of extremely hazardous substances, including highly flammable substances such as methanol and turpentine, caused by failing to drain and purge non-condensable gases in the foul condensate tank prior to allowing contractors to perform hot work above it.
Industry standards, such as the TAPPI TIP 0416-09 and NFPA Standard 51B, illustrated industry-wide recognition of the potential hazard of an accidental release of extremely hazardous substances, including highly flammable substances such as methanol and turpentine, caused by failing to drain and purge non-condensable gases in the foul condensate tank prior to allowing contractors to perform hot work above it.
Defendant’s Hot Work Permit Procedure expanded upon the precautions in NFPA Standard 51B to address the potential hazard of an accidental release of extremely hazardous substances, including highly flammable substances such as methanol and turpentine, caused by failing to drain and purge non-condensable gases in the foul condensate tank prior to allowing contractors to perform hot work above it.
The Defendant’s failure to drain and purge non-condensable gases in the foul condensate tank prior to allowing contractors to perform hot work above it caused the Explosion.
There were feasible means by which Defendant could have eliminated or reduced this hazard, including draining and purging the non-condensable gases in the foul condensate tank prior to allowing contractors to perform hot work above it, or by properly using a listed or approved welding curtain, blanket, pad, or equivalent to cover the entire foul condensate tank.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Program 3 Prevention Program – Hot Work Operations)
(40 C.F.R. § 68.85)
From at least September 18, 2015 through October 15, 2018, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.85(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), and LAC 33:III.5901.A by improperly issuing hot work permits for various hot work operations conducted on or near a covered process.
During this time period, Defendant’s hot work permitting program violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.85(b) because various permits issued pursuant to the program failed to consistently and sufficiently document, and thereby verify, that the fire prevention and protection requirements in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.252(a)(2)(iii)(A)(4) and (a)(2)(iii)(B) were to be executed at the conclusion of hot work operations at the Mill. The Defendant’s hot work permits contained a precautions checklist that was often left blank, thereby failing to document that the requirement for a fire watch to be maintained for at least 30 minutes would be executed after welding or cutting operations.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Program 3 Prevention Program – Mechanical Integrity)
From at least September 18, 2015 through April 30, 2016, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), and LAC 33:III.5901.A by failing to establish and implement adequate written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of the Mill Water Chlorine System’s six chlorine gas sensors. Alternatively, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4) by failing to document each inspection and test that it performed on the six chlorine sensors.
During this time period, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b) by failing to comply with its own internal mechanical integrity procedures requiring Defendant to conduct and document monthly preventative maintenance inspections on the six chlorine gas sensors. The Defendant failed to maintain any preventative maintenance records for the six chlorine gas sensors, such as records of tests or inspections.
Consequently, Defendant failed to adequately implement its mechanical integrity procedures for maintaining the six chlorine gas sensors in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b) or failed to properly document the implementation of its preventative maintenance procedures during this time in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4).
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Program 3 Prevention Program – Mechanical Integrity)
(40 C.F.R. § 68.73)
From at least September 18, 2015 through October 15, 2018, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), and LAC 33:III.5901.A by failing to adequately train each employee involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of the Mill Water Chlorine System’s six chlorine gas sensors in the procedures applicable to the employee’s job tasks.
Alternatively, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.200 by failing to maintain records demonstrating that the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(c) were implemented with respect to each employee involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of the Mill Water Chlorine System’s six chlorine gas sensors.
During this time period, Defendant failed to prepare or maintain records identifying trained employees, the date(s) of training, and the means used for verification of the employees’ understanding of any training pertaining to the mechanical integrity/preventative maintenance of the chlorine gas sensors.
Consequently, Defendant failed to train its employees adequately or to maintain records demonstrating that the individuals responsible for mechanical integrity/preventative maintenance testing on chlorine gas sensors were adequately trained in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(c).
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Program 3 Prevention Program – Mechanical Integrity)
(40 C.F.R. § 68.73)
From at least May 1, 2016 through October 15, 2018, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), and LAC 33:III.5901.A by failing to keep documentation identifying the serial number or other identifiers of equipment on which required inspections or tests were performed.
During this time period, Defendant failed to maintain adequate documentation of monthly preventative maintenance and leak detection testing on the Mill Water Chlorine System’s six chlorine gas detectors. Defendant’s testing documents showed only the general location of each chlorine gas sensor (e.g., “north”) and failed to list each sensor’s serial number or other unique identifiers.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Program 3 Prevention Program – Management of Change)
(40 C.F.R. § 68.75)
From at least January 20, 2016, through October 15, 2018, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), and LAC 33:III.5901.A by failing to inform and train employees and contractors, whose job tasks were affected by two changes in the Mill Water Chlorine System, about the changes prior to the start-up of the Mill Water Chlorine System or affected part of the Mill Water Chlorine System. Alternatively, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.200 by failing to maintain records demonstrating that the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(c) were implemented with respect to each employee and contractor affected by the two changes in the Mill Water Chlorine System.
The Defendant was unable to produce documentation confirming that the relevant employees and contractors received information and/or training during this time period about the process changes specified in Management of Change #19 (additional chlorine leak signal light, amplifier, sensor, and horn added to chlorination building) and Management of Change #20 (chlorine alarm warning point to 0.5 ppm).
Consequently, Defendant failed to inform and train employees and contractors or to maintain records demonstrating that employees and contractors, whose job tasks were affected by two changes in the Mill Water Chlorine System, were informed and trained in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(c)
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Program 3 Prevention Program – Emergency Response Program)
(40 C.F.R. § 68.95)
From at least September 18, 2015, through October 15, 2018, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), and LAC 33:III.5901.A by failing to develop and implement an emergency response program to protect public health and the environment, including procedures for inspecting, testing, and maintaining emergency response equipment. Alternatively, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.200 by failing to maintain records demonstrating that the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(2) were implemented with respect to the development and implementation of an emergency response program with procedures for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of emergency equipment.
Defendant failed to provide records documenting that inspections occurred during this time period for multiple pieces of its emergency response equipment including, but not limited to, the Mill’s rescue truck, fire equipment, fire truck bunker gear, and loose bunker gear.
Consequently, Defendant failed to develop and implement an emergency response program with procedures for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of emergency response equipment or to maintain records demonstrating that it developed and implemented an emergency response program with procedures for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of emergency response equipment in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(2).
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Program 3 Prevention Program – Process Safety Information)
(40 C.F.R. § 68.65)
From at least September 18, 2015, through May 4, 2017, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), and LAC 33:III.5901.A by failing to complete a compilation of accurate written process safety information at its Mill Water Chlorine System.
During this time period, Defendant did not have an accurate piping and instrumentation diagram for the Mill Water Chlorine System. The system had a total of six chlorine gas sensors, yet Defendant’s piping and instrumentation diagram only illustrated five unique sensors – “CS-17,” “CS-18,” “CS-19,” “CS-20,” and “CS-21.”
Until approximately May 4, 2017, the “CS-22” sensor was not individually depicted on the piping and instrumentation diagram. The “CS-20” chlorine gas sensor was incorrectly duplicated in the diagram instead of showing the two distinct sensors: “CS-20” and “CS-22.”
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Program 3 Prevention Program – Operating Procedures
(40 C.F.R. § 68.69)
From at least August 6, 2016, until September 26, 2016, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), and LAC 33:III.5901.A by failing to certify annually that its operating procedures for its Mill Water Chlorine System were current and accurate.
Defendant certified its operating procedures on August 7, 2015, but failed to certify its operating procedures again until September 26, 2016, more than one year after its August 7, 2015 certification.
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