The OSHRC sided with the company that used Appendix A from 1910.147 as their machine-specific LOTO procedure. They did so without any revisions to the content of the Appendix, and the OSHRC found this as an acceptable machine-specific LOTO procedure!
Citation 1, Item 8
This item alleges a repeat violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(c)(4)(ii), which states:
(ii) The procedures shall clearly and specifically outline the scope, purpose, authorization, rules, and techniques to be utilized for the control of hazardous energy, and the means to enforce compliance including, but not limited to, the following:
(A) A specific statement of the intended use of the procedure;
(B) Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating, blocking and securing machines or equipment to control hazardous energy;
(C) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal and transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility for them; and
(D) Specific requirements for testing a machine or equipment to determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout devices, and other energy control measures.
The Secretary alleges that the company’s lockout procedures did not sufficiently detail all of the specific procedural steps needed to control hazardous energy during maintenance or servicing activities. The Secretary relies on the Commission’s Drexel decision to support her contention that the company’s lockout procedure lacked the necessary detail. In Drexel, the employer did not have a procedure customized to its machines and processes; instead, its lockout procedure was based on, without modification, the standard’s sample in Appendix A. The Commission found that these general procedures did not provide the information an employee would need to lockout a machine. Further, the Commission stated that the purpose of the lockout procedure is to “guide an employee” through the process. However, the facts of Drexel are not analogous to those here. The company’s procedures included both a general lockout procedure which applied to all its equipment and supplemental machine-specific lockout surveys. I find that the company’s procedures do not resemble the short generic procedure in Drexel.
Commission precedent holds that the required specificity for lockout procedures is evaluated according to a machine’s complexity. General Motors Corp., 22 BNA OSHC 1019, 1026-27 (Nos. 91-2834E & 91-2950, 2007) (“GM II”). In that case, the Commission noted that the lockout standard’s preamble indicates that a lockout procedure should outline the steps to follow and that the amount of detail is relative to the equipment’s complexity. GM II at 1025-27 (citing to the preamble). The Commission also noted that the procedure should be a “guide” for an employee performing lockout. Id. at 1026 (citing to Drexel at 1913). The Commission found that the machinery in GM II was too complex for the company’s general three-page lockout procedure. To illustrate the level of the machinery’s complexity, the Commission observed that one of the machines contained “15 or 16 automatics, 65 weld guns, probably 300 limit switches [and] over 150 disconnects.” GM II at 1027.
The company argues that its lockout procedures are sufficiently detailed and notes that OSHA issued an interpretive letter in 2006 that supports its position. The letter states that the lockout procedure must have “sufficient information to provide employees with adequate direction such that employees effectively can follow the procedure and safely perform the servicing and maintenance activities.” The letter also states that one way an employer can comply with the requirements of the standard is to have a general procedure that is supplemented by information for each machine. This is consistent with Commission precedent, which holds that a lockout procedure is a guide that is evaluated according to a machine’s complexity.
The ALS found that the company’s procedures include multiple steps which outline a general lockout procedure plus information specific to each machine. This is entirely different than GM II’s general three-page procedure coupled with its highly sophisticated machinery. The Secretary did not provide evidence to establish that the company’s machines were so complex that its procedures were an inadequate guide for its employees to use to perform a lockout. The Secretary thus has not met her burden of proving that the company’s lockout procedures were insufficient. Item 8 is vacated.
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