The respondent is the owner of a chemical manufacturing facility. On September 10, 2020, Complainant issued an information request under Section 114 of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) and Section 104(e) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9603, regarding the Facility to Respondent. Respondent responded to the information request on October 13, 2020.
The complainant sent additional questions pursuant to Section 114 of the CAA on May 26, 2021, to which the respondent responded on July 23, 2021. The information requests were issued in response to an incident on July 12, 2020, during which the #85 diaphragm cell in the #8 Circuit over-pressured due to the ignition of an explosive mixture of hydrogen and chlorine in the cell during startup, injuring four employees with concussive force, and releasing an estimated 115 pounds of chlorine.
Based on EPA’s investigation, EPA has determined that Respondent has the potential to store as much as 27,000,000 pounds of the toxic chemical chlorine in the form of liquefied chlorine gas at the Facility in pressurized storage vessels, ranging in capacity from 180,000 pounds to 700,000 pounds.
Count I – Failure to Comply With Process Hazard Analyses Requirements
Respondent prepared a PHA Report on March 7, 2018 for the #8 Chlorine Circuit at the Facility (“2018 Chlorine PHA”), which it provided to EPA in response to the information requests.
On July 12, 2020, during the startup of the #8 Chlorine Circuit at the Facility, a diaphragm cell over-pressurized due to the ignition of an explosive mixture of chlorine and hydrogen. Four employees were injured and an estimated 115 pounds of chlorine were released at the Facility during this event, referred to herein as the “Incident.”
The PHA in effect at the time of the Incident, Respondent’s 2018 Chlorine PHA, did not contain sufficient documentation of the hazards posed by a torn diaphragm or adequately evaluate safeguards. Respondent’s 2013 Chlorine PHA had documented hazards posed by a torn diaphragm and evaluated safeguards. In its 2018 Chlorine PHA, Respondent failed to fully document the known safety hazards associated with a torn or damaged diaphragm due to corrosion and adequately evaluate the range of possible safety and health effects of failure of controls related to a torn or damaged diaphragm, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(1) and (7).
The 2018 Chlorine PHA did not sufficiently identify a torn diaphragm as a hazard that could cause reverse hydrogen flow into the anode cell, potentially leading to an explosion. The PHA identified reverse flow as a hazard in the chlorine cells but identified no credible causes. The PHA identified a torn diaphragm as an operational issue, not as a safety hazard. In its 2018 Chlorine PHA, Respondent failed to adequately identify the hazards, consequences, and safeguards related to hydrogen backflowing into the anode cell and mixing with chlorine, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(1), (3), and (4).
The 2018 Chlorine PHA did not evaluate the hazards, consequences or safeguards related to adding water through the percolation pipe, a practice that was not provided for in the operating procedures. Respondent should have evaluated the possibility of adding water through the percolation pipe because EPA determined during the course of its investigation that Respondent’s operators had added water through the percolation pipe in the past. In its 2018 Chlorine PHA, Respondent failed to adequately address the hazards,
consequences, or safeguards related to the addition of water through the percolation pipe, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(1), (3), and (4).
The 2018 Chlorine PHA did not specifically address the causes of low liquid levels during startup. Although Respondent had addressed the causes of low liquid levels in the 2018 Chlorine PHA during different phases of operations, and thus, knew that liquid levels might be low during startup, Respondent did not identify in the 2018 PHA any particular safeguards to ensure that liquid levels were adequate during startup. In its 2018 Chlorine PHA, Respondent failed to adequately address the causes of low liquid levels during the startup of the Chlorine #8 Circuit Cells, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(1) and (2).
The 2018 Chlorine PHA did not analyze the hazards of using low-wavelength light sources, even though Respondent used such light sources. One industry publication indicated low wavelength light sources might initiate an explosive chemical reaction between mixtures of chlorine and hydrogen. See Chlorine Institute Pamphlet 121, Explosive Properties of Gaseous Mixtures Containing Hydrogen and Chlorine, 3d. ed. (2009), § 2.2. In its 2018 Chlorine PHA, Respondent failed to adequately address the hazards of using low wavelength light sources, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(1).
By June 2021, Respondent made a number of operational, procedural and administrative changes at its Facility to address the issues revised its PHA procedures to better ensure that identified hazards are properly risk-ranked based on a team analysis to trigger a layer of protection analysis (LOPA) when applicable. Operational changes included eliminating the possibility of adding water through the percolation pipe, replacing low wavelength flashlights and revising its operating procedures to ban such flashlights. Finally, Respondent added a requirement that PHA reports be reviewed by an industry subject matter expert. Respondent has indicated to EPA that it will perform a new PHA during calendar year 2023, as required by the RMP Regulations.
From the time of the Incident on July 12, 2020 to June 2021, Respondent violated 68.67(c) of the RMP Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(1), (3), (4) and (7), by failing to perform a process hazard analysis that fully addressed the hazard of the process, engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships, the consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls, and a qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls.
In failing to comply with Section 68.67(c) of the RMP Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(1), (3), (4) and (7), Respondent violated Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), and is subject to the assessment of penalties under Section 113(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d).
Count II – Failure to Comply with Operating Procedure Requirements
At the time of the Incident, Respondent had numerous operating procedures for the #8 Chlorine Circuit, which were provided to EPA in response to the information requests.
The operating procedures in effect at the time of the Incident did not contain clear instructions in the form of numerical limits easily understood or implementable by operators to ensure that the safe lower limit for the anolyte level was maintained during startup and normal operations. Rather, the operating procedures contained phrases such as “unacceptably low,” “safe,” and “sufficient,” without defining what those terms meant or how to measure them.
As of July 12, 2020, Respondent failed to adequately develop and implement operating procedures that provided clear instructions for safely conducting activities during startup and normal operations, consistent with the process safety information and safe lower operating limit for anolyte level, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(i)-(ii), and (a)(2).
The operating procedures in effect at the time of the Incident were not protective because they defined levels of brine in a diaphragm cell that would require an emergency shutdown at levels less than the safe lower limit for the level of brine, as defined in the Facility’s Safe Operating Envelope Table, which Respondent provided to EPA in response to information requests. As of July 12, 2020, Respondent failed to adequately develop and implement operating procedures that provide clear instructions for emergency shutdown, including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required, with respect to the safe lower operating limit for anolyte level, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(iv), (a)(2).
The operating procedures in effect at the time of the Incident did not specify how to add water to the chlorine cells during a shutdown. The procedures stated that water should be added as needed to keep the liquid level above the diaphragm but did not specify how the water should be added. As a result, operators added water through the percolation pipe. As of July 12, 2020, Respondent failed to adequately develop and implement operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely adding water to diaphragm cells to prevent damage to diaphragms during a shutdown, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1).
The operating procedures in effect at the time of the Incident did not provide clear instructions for safely flushing plant service water from the diaphragms before startup. The hazard from failure to fully flush the plant service water is a buildup of hydrogen. The operating procedures contained sufficient time for flushing but no clear direction to flush plant service water, in contrast to the operating procedures for shutdown. As of July 12, 2020, Respondent failed to adequately develop and implement operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely flushing the plant service water from diaphragm cells before startup, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(iii).
In the aftermath of the Incident, by June 2021, Respondent revised nine of its operating procedures for the #8 Chlorine Circuit. Among other things, the revised operating procedures provided clear instructions for measuring liquid levels, safely adding water to diaphragm cells, and safely flushing plant service water prior to startup, and defined shutdown levels for low brine levels.
From July 12, 2020, to June 2021, Respondent violated Section 68.69(a)(1)(i)-(vii) of the RMP Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(i)-(vii), (2), by failing to develop and implement operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and that address, among other requirements: (1) steps for each operating phase, including (i) initial startup, (ii) normal operations, (iii) temporary operations, (iv) emergency shutdown, and (v) emergency operations, (vi) normal shutdown, and (vii) startup following a turnaround, or after emergency shutdown, and (2) operating limits.
In failing to comply with Section 68.69(a)(1)(i)-(vii) and (2), Respondent violated Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), and is subject to the assessment of penalties under Section 113(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d).
CIVIL PENALTY
In settlement of EPA’s claims for civil penalties for the violations alleged in this Consent Agreement, Respondent consents to the assessment of a civil penalty in the amount of one hundred twenty-six thousand one hundred twenty-two dollars ($126,122.00).
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