Respondent owns and operates a facility which is used to produce, bottle, and chill apple juice and cider prior to distribution. Respondent owns and operates a second facility (“West Facility” ), which is also used to produce, bottle, and chill apple juice and cider prior to distribution. The East Facility and West Facility are sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as “Facilities.”
On September 29, 2021, EPA performed an inspection of the East Facility to evaluate compliance with Section 103 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), EPCRA Sections 304-312 and CAA Section 112(r), (the ” East Facility Inspection”). Based upon the information gathered during the East Facility Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA alleges that Respondent violated certain provisions of EPCRA and the CAA at the East Facility.
On September 28, 2021, EPA performed an inspection of the West Facility to evaluate compliance with CERCLA Section 103, EPCRA Sections 304-312, and CAA Section 112(r) (the ” West Facility Inspection”).
Based upon the information gathered during the West Facility Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA alleges that Respondent violated certain provisions of EPCRA and the CAA at the West Facility.
At all times relevant to this CA/FO, over 500 pounds of anhydrous ammonia were present at both the East Facility and the West Facility.
At all times relevant to this CA/FO, Respondent has produced, processed, handled, or stored a regulated substance, anhydrous ammonia, within the meaning of CAA Section 112(r)(1) at both the East Facility and the West Facility.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW
East Facility
Count 1 – Failure to Timely Report Tier II Inventory Information
40 C.F.R. § 370.45 requires the owner or operator of a covered facility to report required inventory information on or before March 1 for inventory held onsite at any time in the preceding year.
Based upon the East Facility Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent submitted its last Hazardous Materials and Waste Inventory Matrix Report for the East Facility via the California Environmental Reporting System (CERS) on Sept. 14, 2020, for reporting year 2019. Respondent did not submit a report by March 1, 2021, for the East Facility for reporting year 2020.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 370.45 by failing to report inventory information for anhydrous ammonia for the East Facility by March 1 of 2020 and 2021.
Count 2 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Ammonia Machinery Room Doors Do Not Meet Safety Requirements
EPA alleges it is a recognized hazard within the anhydrous ammonia industries for a facility not to design machinery room doors to mitigate the consequences of an accidental release. One way to reduce this hazard is to outfit machinery room doors with panic hardware and to ensure that they are tight-fitting and open outward. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include ANSI/IIAR 9, 2020, Sections 7.3.2.1 and 7.3.9.2 and ASHRAE 15, 2013 Section 8.12.d.
EPA alleges not having tight-fitting machinery room doors could cause harm because in the event of an ammonia release inside the machinery room, the lack of having tight-fitting doors risks the potential spread of ammonia vapors outside the room. Also, it could be more difficult for employees to escape the room when the doors lack panic hardware and open into the room rather than outward.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection, EPA noted that the primary exit door from the ammonia machinery room (“AMR”) at the East Facility was not outfitted with panic hardware. The access door to the roof from the AMR did not swing in the direction of egress, did not contain panic hardware, and was not tight-fitting at the bottom.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent did not outfit machinery room doors with panic hardware, to swing in the direction of egress, and/or were not tight-fitting at the bottom, in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 3 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Missing Pipe & Equipment Labeling
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is when process equipment and piping is not labeled to indicate system information needed to safely perform operation, maintenance, repair, or emergency response activities. One way to address this hazard is to label all ammonia-containing piping to indicate the pipe’s contents, direction of flow, physical state (i.e., liquid or vapor), and pressure level (i.e., high or low), and for other system equipment, such as receivers and accumulators, to install distinctive component markers and labels indicating the installer, the refrigerant, the lubricant, and testing procedures. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include IIAR Bulletin 109, Section 4.7.6 and IIAR Bulletin 114, Sections 4.1.1 through 4.1.8; ANSI/IIAR 9, 2020, Section 7.2.9.4; ASME A l3 .1, 1996 and 2007 Section 3.1; and ASHRAE 15, 2013, Section 11.2.2.
The absence of properly labeled process equipment and piping could cause harm because it increases the likelihood that individuals performing maintenance, repair, or emergency activities could be unaware of critical system information needed to safely and effectively perform their duties.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection, EPA noted the accumulator in the AMR was not labeled, the surge drum and piping in the Mezzanine Room was not labeled, and the surge drum and piping in the bottling area were not labeled.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to label ammonia-containing piping and process equipment in violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 4 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Machinery Room Construction Not Fire Resistant
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is failing to construct structural components of the machinery room with fire-resistive materials. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include ANSI/IIAR 2, 1992, Section 4.4.1 and ASHRAE 15, 2013, Section 8.12.c.
EPA alleges not constructing machinery room structural components from fire rated materials could cause harm because it exacerbates the risk of an ammonia release should a fire occur in the facility.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection, EPA noted the walls, roof, and floor of the AMR and Mezzanine Room were not constructed with fire rated material.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to construct machinery room structural components from fire rated materials in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 5 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Surface Corrosion on Pipes and Valves
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is failing to maintain piping and valves free from corrosion. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include IIAR Bulletin 109, Section 4.7.4 and ANSI/IIAR 6, 2019, Section 10.1.1.
Failure to maintain piping and valves free from corrosion could cause harm because it risks the release of ammonia should corrosion continue to the point of failure.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection, EPA noted surface corrosion on piping and valves associated with the condensers on the roof, on condenser supports, and on ammonia piping associated with the plate and frame heat exchanger and valves above the compressor in the Mezzanine Room.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to prevent corrosion on the piping and valves associated with the condensers on the roof in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 6 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Protection of Piping and Equipment Surfaces from Frost Buildup
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is failing to protect piping and equipment surfaces not intended for heat exchange to mitigate condensation and excessive frost buildup. Insulation and/or defrost procedures can mitigate this risk. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include IIAR 9, 2020, Section 7.2.6.1 and ASHRAE 15, 2013, Section 8.10.4.
Failure to protect piping and equipment surfaces from condensation and excessive frost buildup is likely to cause harm because ice buildup can weigh down piping, risking collapse and ammonia release. It also exposes pipes to moisture, which can cause corrosion and pipe failure. Excessive frost buildup can also prevent access to valves and other equipment needed to respond to a release or threat of release.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection, EPA noted the surge drum and piping in the bottling area were covered in frost and the facility did not have an established defrost procedure to address ice accumulation.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to prevent condensation and excessive frost buildup in violation of the Section l 12(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 7 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Alarms Not Labeled
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is lack of labeling of audible and visual alarms to indicate the meaning of each alarm. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include IIAR 9, 2020, Section 7.2.9.1 (2), ANSI/HAR 2-2008, Section 13.2.4.1, and ASHRAE 15, 2013, Section 8.11.2.1.
Failure to label audible and visual alarms could cause harm because personnel working at or responding to an emergency at the facility may be unable to react quickly or appropriately in the event of a release if the meaning of the alarm is not clear.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection , EPA noted the audible and visual ammonia alarms in the bottling area were not labeled.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to label audible and visual alarms in violation of Section l 12(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 8 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Lack of Tight-Fitting Construction in the Mezzanine Room
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is failing to have tight-fitting construction in ammonia machinery rooms. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include ANSI/IIAR 9, 2020, Sections 7.3.2.1 and 7.3.9.2, and ASHRAE 15, 2013, Section 8.11.2.1.
Failure to provide for tight-fitting construction in ammonia machinery rooms could cause harm because it may allow for a release of ammonia inside the machinery room to spread to other parts of the building.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection, EPA inspectors noted that the Mezzanine Room did not have tight construction; there was no door into the Mezzanine Room housing a compressor, surge drum and plate and frame heat exchanger; and the ” walls” adjacent to the bottling area were plastic strips that could potentially allow an ammonia release to migrate into the bottling area.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to provide for tight construction of the Mezzanine Room in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 9 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: AMR Exhaust Discharge
Another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is when exhaust from a machinery room is vented to the outside in an improper manner that fails to provide proper dispersion. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include ASHRAE 15, 1989, Section 10.13.4 and ANSI/UAR 9, 2020, Section 7.3.13.2.
Improper venting of machinery room exhaust could cause harm because the poor dispersion of ammonia vapor from the exhaust can result in higher concentrations of ammonia vapor near the surface of the roof and nearby buildings, which increases the risk of exposure.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection, inspectors noted that exhaust from the AMR was discharged horizontally onto the roof adjacent to the walkway leading to the evaporative condensers.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to provide for the proper ventilation of exhaust from the machinery room in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 10 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Inadequate Ventilation in Mezzanine Room
Another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is inadequate ventilation in ammonia machinery rooms. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include ANSI/IIAR2, 1992, Section 4.3.3.1 and ASHRAR 15, 2013 Section 8.11.5.
Inadequate ventilation of an ammonia machinery room could cause harm because vapors are more likely to build up to levels that are significant inhalation and dermal hazards, or that risk causing fire or explosion.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection, EPA inspectors noted that the continuous ventilation system in the Mezzanine Room was not adequately sized for an ammonia release, and there was no emergency ventilation system activated by ammonia detectors.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to provide for adequate ventilation of the Mezzanine Room in violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 11 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Lack of Visual and Audible Ammonia Alarms for AMR and Mezzanine Room
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is a lack of audible or visual ammonia alarms in ammonia machinery rooms. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include ANSI/IIAR 9, 2020, Section 7.3.12.1 (3), ASHRAE 15, 2013 Section 8.11.2.1, IIAR Bulletin 109, Section4.7.4 and ANSI/IIAR 6, 2019, Section 10.1.1.
Failure to provide for audible and visual alarms in ammonia machinery rooms could cause harm because ammonia alarms provide early warning that a release is taking place, enabling quick response and protecting workers, emergency responders, and the public from a potentially larger release.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection, EPA noted that no visual or audible ammonia alarms were present either inside of or outside the entrance to the AMR or the Mezzanine Room.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to provide for audible and visual alarms inside the ammonia machinery rooms and outside their entrances in violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 12 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Improper Set Point for Ammonia Alarm
Another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is improper programming of ammonia alarms. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include IIAR-2, 2021 Section 13.3.3 and ASHRAE 15, 2013 Section 8.11.2.1.
Failure to properly program ammonia alarms could cause harm because the alarms may not trigger at early signs of an ammonia release and may not trigger until harmful levels of ammonia have already been released, potentially endangering workers, emergency responders, and the public.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection, EPA noted that the ammonia detector inside the AMR was set to annunciate at 125 ppm, whereas relevant industry standards provide that such alarms should trigger at 25 ppm. The ammonia detector in the AMR was re-set to trigger at 25 ppm during the inspection.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to set the ammonia alarm in the AMR to annunciate at an appropriately low detection level, in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 13 – Failure to Minimize Consequences of an Accidental Release: Inadequate Emergency Response Coordination
Another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is failing to coordinate with local responders who would respond to the facility in the event of an accidental release, and to document such coordination. EPA identified an example of an industry standard designed to mitigate this recognized risk as California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) regulation Title 19, Division 2, Chapter 4.5, Article 7, Emergency Response, Section 2765.l(b)(l).
Failure to coordinate with local response agencies could cause harm because lack of specific coordination related to hazardous materials with the fire department and other emergency responders may impede proper emergency response in the event of a release.
At the time of the East Facility Inspection and subsequent invest igation, EPA noted Respondent could produce no documentation of coordination with local response agencies specific to potential ammonia releases from the facility other than documentation of annual fire safety inspections.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to adequately demonstrate coordination with local response agencies for a potential ammonia release from the East Facility in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(l ), which requires owners and operators to minimize the consequences of an accidental release.
West Facility
Count 14 – Failure to Timely Report Tier II Inventory Information
40 C.F.R. § 370.45 requires the owner or operator of a covered facility to report required inventory information on or before March 1 for inventory held onsite at any time in the preceding year.
Based upon the West Facility Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent submitted its last Hazardous Materials and Waste Inventory Matrix Report for the West Facility to the Santa Cruz County Certified Unified Program Agency (“CUPA”) via the California Environmental Reporting System (CERS) on July 29, 2021, for reporting year 2020.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to report inventory information for anhydrous ammonia at the West Facility by March 1 of 2021, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 370.45.
Count 15 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Improper Set Point for Ammonia Alarm
As described in Paragraph 80, a hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is improper programming of ammonia alarms. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include IIAR-2, 2021 Section 13.3.3 and ASHRAE 15, 2013 Section 8.11.2.1.
EPA alleges failure to properly program ammonia alarms could cause harm because the alarms may not trigger at early signs of an ammonia release and instead may not trigger until harmful levels of ammonia have already been released, potentially endangering workers, emergency responders, and the public.
At the time of the West Facility Inspection, EPA noted that the ammonia detector inside the AMR was set to annunciate at above 25 ppm, whereas EPA alleges that relevant industry standards provide that such alarms should trigger at 25 ppm. The ammonia detector in the AMR was reset to trigger at 25 ppm during the inspection.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to set the ammonia alarm in the AMR to annunciate at an appropriately low detection level in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 16 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Inadequate Ammonia Sensor and Alarm Testing
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is failure to adequately test ammonia sensors and alarms. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include ANSI/IIAR 2-2008, Sections 13.2.5.1 and 13.2.5.2; IIAR 6-2019, Table 12.3, Ammonia Detection Alarm Systems Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Tasks; and ASHRAE 15-2013, Section 11.6.3.
Failure to adequately test ammonia alarms and sensors could cause harm because failure of an alarm or sensor may prevent detection of an ammonia release and inhibit emergency response procedures.
At the time of the West Facility Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA noted Respondent was unable to provide records of ammonia alarm functionality testing for 2019, 2021, and 2022.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to adequately test ammonia sensors and alarms , in violation of Section l 12(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 17 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Alarms Not Labeled
As described in Paragraph 55, a hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is lack of labeling of audible and visual alarms to indicate the meaning of each alarm. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include IIAR 9, 2020, Section 7.2.9.1 (2), IIAR 2, 2008 Section 13.2.4.1, and ASHRAE 15, 2013, Section 8.11.2.1.
EPA alleges not labeling audible and visual alarms could cause harm because personnel working at or responding to an emergency at the facility may be unable to react quickly or appropriately in the event of a release if the meaning of the alarm is not clear.
At the time of the West Facility Inspection, EPA noted that the audible and visual ammonia alarms near the entry door to the AMR and the audible alarms inside the AMR and at the secondary entry door were not labeled regarding their function.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to label audible and visual alarms to indicate their meaning in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 18 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: No Visual Ammonia Alarm in Ammonia Machinery Room
As described in Paragraph 75, a hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is a lack of visual ammonia alarms in ammonia machinery rooms. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include ANSI/IIAR 9, 2020, Section 7.3.12.1 (3); ASHRAE 15, 2013 Section 8.11.2.1; IIAR Bulletin 109, Section 4.7.4; and ANSI/HAR 6, 2019, Section 10.1.1.
110. Failure to provide for visual alarms in ammonia machinery rooms could cause harm because visual ammonia alarms provide early warning that a release is taking place, enabling quick response and protecting workers, emergency responders, and the public from a potentially larger release.
At the time of the West Facility Inspection, EPA noted there was no visual ammonia alarm inside the AMR and no visual ammonia alarm outside the secondary entry door into the AMR from the bottling area.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to provide for visual alarms inside the ammonia machinery room and outside its entrances in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 19 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Inaccurate Labeling of Emergency Control Box Diagram
Another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is inaccurate labeling of stop valves that control pressures within the system. EPA identified an example of an industry standard designed to mitigate this recognized risk as ASHRAE 15-2013 Section 9.12.6.
Failure to accurately label stop valves could cause harm because employees or emergency responders may inadvertently activate the wrong valve and potentially cause or fail to slow or prevent an ammonia release from the facility.
At the time of the West Facility Inspection, EPA noted the valve identification numbers on the operating instructions inside the Fire Department Emergency Control box to reduce pressures within the system did not correspond to actual valve tags in the control box.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent inaccurately labeled valves that reduce pressures within the system in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 20 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Corroded Inlet Piping to Pressure Relief Valves
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is corrosion of piping. EPA identified an example of an industry standard designed to mitigate this recognized risk as IIAR Bulletin 109, Section 4.7.4.
Corroded piping could cause harm because it can cause an ammonia release if the corrosion continues to the point of failure.
At the time of the West Facility Inspection , inspectors noted corroded inlet piping to the low-pressure receiver pressure relief valves (PRVs).
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to prevent or address corrosion on piping in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA, which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 21 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: Improperly Sized PRVs
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is improper sizing on PRVs to protect multiple vessels. EPA identified an example of an industry standard designed to mitigate this recognized risk as ANSI/IIAR 2, 2008, Section 11.2.7.
Failure to properly size a pressure relief valve that serves multiple vessels could cause harm because an undersized valve could potentially fail because it may not be able to handle the combined relief capacity of multiple vessels under ordinary operating conditions, potentially causing a release of ammonia.
At the time of the West Facility Inspection, EPA noted two high-pressure receivers with a common set of PRVs that were sized for a single pressure vessel.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent improperly sized PRVs that serve multiple pressure vessels in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 22 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility and Failure to Identify Hazards: No Records of Safety Cutout Testing
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is failure of safety cutouts on compressors and pumps, leading to over-pressurization or excessive temperatures in the system that can be prevented by conducting and documenting regular testing of safety cutouts. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include IIAR 6-2019 Sections 5.3.2, 6.1, and 7.1.
Failure to regularly test safety cutouts could cause harm because the safety cutouts may fail in the event of an emergency, potentially causing or contributing to a release of ammonia.
At the time of the West Facility Inspection, EPA inspectors noted that the Hazard Review conducted by Respondent in 2021 recommended annual safety cutout testing documentation be obtained from the refrigeration contractor, and Respondent subsequently confirmed that the refrigeration contractor had no records and was not maintaining documentation of annual safety cutout testing.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to maintain records of safety cutout testing in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA, which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases and failed to identify hazards.
Count 23 – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility: No Safety Shower in Machinery Room
EPA alleges another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is an ammonia release from an ammonia machinery room, necessitating emergency eye wash stations and safety showers both inside and outside of the machinery room. EPA identified examples of industry standards designed to mitigate this recognized risk to include IIAR 9, 2020, Section 7.3.7.1 and IIAR Bulletin 109, 1997, Section 4.10.10.
Failure to provide for a safety shower within an ammonia machinery room could cause harm because employees or emergency responders exposed to ammonia in the event of a release may be unable to quickly decontaminate themselves to prevent additional harm from exposure.
At the time of the West Facility Inspection , EPA noted there was an eye wash station in the AMR but no safety shower.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to provide a safety shower within the AMR in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Count 24 – Failure to Minimize Consequences of an Accidental Release: Inadequate Emergency Response Coordination
As described above, another hazard recognized in the anhydrous ammonia industries is failing to coordinate with local responders who would respond to the facility in the event of an accidental release and to document such coordination. EPA identified an example of an industry-standard designed to mitigate this recognized risk as California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) regulation Title 19, Division 2, Chapter 4.5, Article 7, Emergency Response, Section 2765.l(b)(l).
Failure to coordinate with local response agencies could cause harm because lack of specific coordination related to hazardous materials with the fire department and other emergency responders may impede proper emergency response in the event of a release.
At the time of the West Facility Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA noted that Respondent could produce no documentation of coordination with local response agencies specific to potential ammonia releases from the facility other than documentation of annual fire safety inspections.
Therefore, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to adequately demonstrate coordination with local response agencies for a potential ammonia release from the West Facility in violation of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA which requires owners and operators to minimize the consequences of an accidental release.
CIVIL PENALTY
EPA proposes that Respondent be assessed, and Respondent agrees to pay, a civil penalty in the amount of ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHT DOLLARS ($127,828).
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
In response to the alleged violations of Section 325 of EPCRA and Sections 113(a)(3)(A) and (d) of the CAA and in settlement of this matter, although not required by EPCRA, the CAA or any other federal, state or local law, Respondent agrees to implement a supplemental environmental project (“SEP”), as described below.
Respondent shall complete an emergency response equipment donation SEP, consisting of providing certain emergency response equipment to the City of Watsonville Fire Department, as described in further detail below. Respondent shall arrange for and provide the XXXXXXXXXX Fire Department with the following equipment:
A. Six (6) QXT Thermal Imaging Cameras (estimated to cost $37,000);
B. Four (4) Industrial Scientific Ventis MX4 Gas Monitors (estimated to cost $4,500);
C. Four (4) MSA Altair 2X NH3 (Ammonia) Detectors (estimated to cost $3,100); and
D. Four (4) Motorola APX 6000 Portable Radios (estimated to cost $22,400).
Respondent shall spend no less than sixty-seven thousand dollars ($67,000) implementing the SEP.
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